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THE MILES PROJECT
The “Modelling and Informing Low-Emission Strategies” (MILES) project 
is an international research project bringing together 16 leading research 
teams in order to build capacity and knowledge on low-emissions devel-
opment strategies. The objective of this report is to understand the impli-
cations of INDCs of the 5 countries and 1 region covered by the project 
(US, China, Japan, EU, Brazil and India), both at a national and global 
level, by investigating the concrete implications of INDCs for the low-
carbon transformation by and beyond 2030, from energy systems, build-
ings to transport and industry.
THE INDCs IMPLY AN ACCELERATION AND CONSOLIDATION  
OF ACTION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE IN MAJOR ECONOMIES  
AND AROUND THE WORLD
A significant transition appears in the electricity sector, where INDCs will 
further drive the transition towards renewables and other low-emissions 
forms of electricity production. In the six major economies assessed indi-
vidually, carbon dioxide emissions per unit of electricity production falls 
by about 40% between 2010 and 2030 and renewable electricity becomes 
the dominant source of electricity production at about 36% of the elec-
tricity mix. 
THE INDCs IMPLY UNEVEN PROGRESS AMONG THE DRIVERS  
OF DECARBONISATION
Some crucial low-carbon solutions, like CCS, electric vehicles, advanced 
biofuels, sustainable urban planning, appear unlikely to be developed 
under the INDCs at the scale and speed required for a 2°C scenario. Like-
wise, the report highlights that INDCs would leave too much inefficient and 
unabated fossil fuel capacity online in 2030 to be coherent with a 2 degrees 
scenario. This highlights the risks of lock-in into a high carbon trajectory 
if action is not strengthened quickly. Post-Paris policy efforts need to stim-
ulate technology innovation, deployment and diffusion in order to drive 
down costs in such sectors where insufficient progress is being seen. 
THE INDCs ARE AN ENTRY POINT TO PUT THE WORLD  
ON A TRAJECTORY TOWARDS 2°C 
The INDCs imply a significant acceleration of climate action but as currently 
submitted may not be enough to keep the below 2°C goal in reach. The Paris 
Agreement should establish a clear mechanism to allow the regular, predict-
able and timely revision of national contributions and the global framework. 
New contributions should be based on a vision for the deep decarbonisation 
of national energy systems. The Paris agreement should foster the develop-
ment of national deep decarbonisation pathways around 2018.
The report “Beyond the Numbers. Understanding the Transformation Induced by INDCs” has been prepared by the MILES 
project Consortium under contract to DG CLIMA (No. 21.0104/2014/684427/SER/CLIMA.A.4). 
This project is funded by the European Union. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
What is Innovative 
and Complementary 
About this Report? 
As part of the negotiations towards a new climate 
agreement to be sealed in Paris in December 2015, 
countries have been requested to submit new 
‘intended nationally determined contributions’ 
(INDCs), in particular new greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions targets for the period beyond 2020. As of 
October 19, the 123 INDCs, covering 150 countries, 
submitted to the UNFCCC represent ca. 85.8% of 
global GHG emissions in 2012.1 
At the Lima Conference of the Parties (COP20) 
in 2014, the Secretariat of the UNFCCC was tasked 
with producing a synthesis report on the “aggre-
gate effect” of INDCs. This UNFCCC synthesis re-
port will analyse the impact of INDCs on global 
emissions, in the light of the goal of limiting warm-
ing to 2°C or 1.5°C. Other analysis, in particular the 
annual UNEP Gap Report, will perform similar 
assessments. These reports represent the cutting 
edge in terms of understanding the aggregate ef-
fect of INDCs on global emissions, in the light of 
the below 2°C goal.  
This report aims to do something different 
and complementary. It is the outcome of an in-
ternational research project involving 14 leading 
research teams from 10 countries (see authors’ 
list). In 2015, the objective of the project has been 
to produce a detailed analysis of INDCs in terms 
of three innovative aspects:
 m Understanding the transformation of the 
energy sector that would result from 
1. Source: WRI, CAIT Climate Data Explorer, Paris Con-
tributions Map. Available online at: http://cait.wri.
org/indc/. 
implementing the INDCs, in particular at 
the national level for major economies but 
also at the global level. The focus here has 
been on the implications of INDCs to 2025 and 
2030, while taking into account the importance 
of embedding this understanding in the long-
term perspective of the transformation requi-
red to 2050. The project has developed detailed 
analysis on what it would take to implement 
the INDCs, in terms of the roll-out of renewable 
energy, improvement of energy efficiency, and 
the deployment of other low-carbon solutions. 
The project is based on the participation of lea-
ding national experts, who have each analysed 
their country’s INDC, as well as on leading glo-
bal modelling teams who have assessed INDCs 
in aggregate.  
 m Understanding options to stay on track with 
2°C at the global level, in the light of the level 
of transformation in the global energy system 
implied by INDCs by 2030.
 m Understanding the co-benefits and trade-offs 
of INDCs, in particular related to local air-pol-
lution, energy-security, investment require-
ments, and risks of lock-in into high emitting 
infrastructure. 
In order to perform this analysis, the report has 
adopted an innovative methodology:
 m Detailed, sector-specific, national-level INDC 
scenarios are developed, which show concre-
tely what would be required to reach INDCs 
(national INDC scenarios). These national INDC 
scenarios have been produced by the respective 
research teams for five countries and one re-
gion: the USA, China, Brazil, Japan, India2 and 
the EU. Together these represent 60% of global 
2. The India assessment is based on the previously pub-
lished TERI study “Energy Security Outlook” (2015), 
adjusted for the headline targets of the Indian INDC. 
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emissions from fossil fuel combustion, and 74% 
of global GDP in 2012. These countries are very 
different, and the transitions that will be in-
duced by INDCs will vary between countries. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to see some common 
trends or patterns.                    
 m In order to assess the global implications of 
INDCs, a global-level INDC scenario was deve-
loped integrating the headline emissions or 
policy targets of INDCs published by October 2 
within a global modelling framework. This de-
tails transformations in the global energy sector 
implied by INDCs. Secondly, a global INDC-2°C 
scenario was developed, which implements IN-
DCs until 2030, and then shifts to a 2°C scenario 
from 2030. This scenario is used to explore the 
implications of INDCs for the below 2°C objec-
tive. Thirdly, a 2°C- bridge scenario was deve-
loped, allowing for a more continuous transition 
from the INDCs to 2°C. In this scenario, policies 
and targets are strengthened by 2020 for 2030 
and beyond, and investors respond early to this 
strengthened policy commitment.         
INDCs Significantly Accelerate 
the Energy Transition 
in Major Economies
Energy resource endowments, energy supply 
systems and the economic drivers and the struc-
ture of energy demand differ markedly between 
major economies. However some robust features 
of the impact of INDCs on national energy trans-
formations in Brazil, China, the European Union, 
India, Japan and USA, as well at the global level, 
can be identified. 
 m Key finding: the INDCs will accelerate and 
consolidate a significant transition in the 
electricity sector and in energy efficiency in 
the next 15 years, driving innovation and re-
duced costs. 
The INDCs imply a significant transition in 
the electricity sector. In aggregate from 2010 to 
2030 the carbon intensity of electricity production 
declines by 40% in the five countries and one re-
gion assessed (Figure A). In these national INDC 
scenarios, renewable energy becomes the domi-
nant source of electricity, reaching 36% in the 
electricity mix. At the global level, the deployment 
of low-carbon electricity production under the 
global INDC scenario is 41% in 2030, an increase 
of roughly 10 percentage points from 2012 levels, 
but still below what is seen in 2030 in 2°C scenarios 
(Figure B). Global investments in low-carbon elec-
tricity account for 78% of cumulative investment 
from 2020-2030 in electricity supply in the global 
INDC scenario, up from 67% in 2012.
Similar positive trends are seen regarding en-
ergy efficiency in the end-use sectors: transport, 
buildings and industry. Transport in particular 
2012
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Figure A. Aggregate reduction in carbon intensity 
of electricity in USA, EU, China, India, Brazil and Japan   
Figure B. Low-emissions electricity share 
at the global level
Source: MILES project analysis (see country chapters in this report) 
Note to Figure B: INDC-2°C assumes INDC implementation to 2030, and then a shift to a 2°C trajectory; Bridge-2°C assumes stronger policy action from 2020 
towards a 2°C trajectory ; Immediate-2°C assumes an immediate global implementation of a 2°C goal after 2015
Source: REMIND model calculations and IPCC scenario database (box plots)
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would see significant improvements in energy in-
tensity, falling in aggregate by 30% between 2010 
and 2030 in the five countries and one region as-
sessed individually. In Japan and the European 
Union for example, the energy intensity of GDP 
drops a further 33% and 34% between 2010 and 
2030, while it drops 48% in China over the same 
time period. In the USA, energy intensity of GDP 
drops 26% between 2010 and 2025. 
 m Key finding:  some crucial low-carbon solu-
tions, like CCS, electric vehicles, advanced 
biofuels, sustainable urban planning, appear 
unlikely to be developed under the INDCs at 
the scale and speed required for a 2°C scena-
rio, given the implied lock-in of carbon-inten-
sive infrastructure in 2030 under the INDC 
scenario. Post-Paris policy efforts also need 
to focus on stimulating technology innova-
tion, deployment and diffusion in order to 
drive down costs in such sectors where insuf-
ficient progress is being seen. This highlights 
also the importance of developing short-
term targets in the light of long-term climate 
constraints, building on the development of 
national deep decarbonisation pathways to 
2050. The Paris agreement should foster the 
development of national deep decarbonisa-
tion pathways by 2018.  
The INDC scenarios demonstrate little penetra-
tion of alternative technologies in the transport 
sector by 2030 (with the exception of Brazil and 
biofuels). However, 2°C scenarios suggest that 
alternative transport technologies, in particular 
electric vehicles in many scenarios, will need to be 
rolled out massively from 2030, with the share of 
electricity in transport energy consumption reach-
ing a significant share of global transport energy 
demand by 2050 (about one sixth to one fifth). To 
achieve this level in 2050, innovation in and de-
ployment of alternative vehicles must start ear-
ly, with a growth rate of the alternative passenger 
vehicle industry of around 35-40%/year already 
between 2015 and 2030. It seems unlikely that 
INDC scenarios would support this rate of technol-
ogy deployment.  The national and global INDC 
scenarios likewise demonstrate little deployment 
of CCS, with a share of CCS in electricity genera-
tion of about 3% in 2030 for the USA, China, Japan 
and the EU, although given the scale of fossil fuel 
infrastructure in 2030 under the INDC scenario 
it seems that CCS will need to be a crucial tech-
nology for mitigation post-2030. The level of 
penetration of CCS seen in INDC scenarios raises 
questions of whether the technology would be de-
ployable at scale from 2030.   
The report also investigates the risk of lock-in 
into high-carbon infrastructure. In the global 
INDC scenario, deployment of unabated fossil fuel 
is significantly higher than what would be seen 
in a 2°C scenario. By 2030, unabated coal deploy-
ment is more than twice as high in the global INDC 
scenario developed for this paper than in the im-
mediate 2°C scenario (Figure C). At the same time, 
as noted above, the CCS technology that could 
render this unabated fossil fuel capacity coherent 
with a 2°C scenario does not seem to be developed 
sufficiently under the INDCs. The INDC scenario 
thus implies a significant bet on CCS after 2030, 
EJ/yr
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Figure C. Risks of lock-in through the deployment of unabated fossil fuels in 2030
Source : REMIND model calculations and IEA
ImmediateBridgeINDC ImmediateBridgeINDCImmediateBridgeINDC
Oil without CCS Gas without CCSCoal without CCS
2012 historic value, black line
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without providing assurances that research, de-
velopment and deployment of the CCS technology 
would be sufficient to rapidly assure its commer-
cial availability. 
It seems like there is insufficient policy focus 
to disincentivize fossil fuel use in the INDCs, in 
particular via carbon pricing and emissions per-
formance standards. Without such policies, low-
carbon support policies face an uphill battle to re-
place fossil fuel infrastructure. 
Building the Bridge 
from INDCs to 2°C  
The number of INDCs submitted and their level 
of ambition constitute a significant improvement 
over previous policy commitments. They have 
initiated a broad and interlinked policy process at 
national and international level, giving an entry 
point to put the world on track to 2°C.  However, by 
themselves INDCs as currently submitted are not 
yet in line with 2°C. Therefore, the report develops 
a ‘bridge scenario’, in which action is strengthened 
and accelerated by 2020. 
 m Key finding: INDCs imply an acceleration 
of climate action and a deviation from pre-
vious trends and policy commitments. Howe-
ver, they would necessitate very stringent and 
rapid mitigation measures post-2030 if the 
2°C target is to be met. This would imply at 
the global level significantly higher costs and 
risks to feasibility compared to a scenario of 
earlier, stronger action. A dynamic approach 
to climate policy-making under the Paris 
agreement, with further rounds of strengthe-
ned policy commitments, is critical to keep the 
2°C target in reach. This policy strengthening 
would need to happen rapidly after 2015.  
INDCs lead to a significant reduction of emissions 
compared to projections based on existing policies 
and commitments (Figure D). Nonetheless the glob-
al INDC scenario in this report showing emissions 
of 54 GtCO2eq3 in 2030 is above the emissions range 
of cost-effective scenarios consistent with the below 
2°C goal as estimated by the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment 
Report (30-50 Gt CO2e in 2030).  With this level of 
emissions in 2030, emissions reductions would 
need to be extremely rapid, more than 4% per 
year, if the below 2°C objective is to be met. 
The bridge scenario represents a situation in 
which by 2020 targets and policies for 2030 are 
strengthened, and ideally new ambitious targets 
are proposed for the period after 2030. Due to this 
3. Source: REMIND model and PBL INDC Tool.
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Figure D. Greenhouse gas emissions in the scenarios of this study, compared with literature
Immediate−2°C
Bridge−2°C
INDC−2°C
INDC−extended
Greenhouse gas emissions in the scenarios of this study (solid lines), compared with the 2030 range and best estimate from the country-level analysis of conditional 
INDCs of PBL (www.pbl.nl/indc, vertical black line and dot), and the inter-quartile ranges of the FullTech-450-OPT (Immediate 2°C*), FullTech-450-LST (Low 2030)
and FullTech-450-HST (High 2030) scenarios of the AMPERE study, as well as the reference policy scenarios of the AMPERE and LIMITS studies.
While section 4.3 discusses the INDC-2°C scenario, section 4.4 explores the possible effect of an early announcement of 2°C compatible policies (Bridge-2°C). 
Total greenhouse gas emissions were calculated based on global warming potentials from IPCC's second assessment report (SAR).
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strengthening of policy commitments by 2020, en-
ergy sector and other actors perceive the long-term 
commitment to attain the below 2°C goal as cred-
ible, and therefore restructure their investments 
in the energy sector early on and reduce emis-
sions below the level of what would be required by 
current INDCs in order to avoid abrupt and rapid 
reductions after 2030. The report shows that this 
can lower global emissions in 2030 substantially to 
around 49 GtCO2eq/yr, close to the upper bound 
of the range of cost-effective 2°C scenarios in AR5, 
amounting to an overachievement of current IN-
DCs by about 5 GtCO2eq/yr in 2030. In the bridge 
scenario, cumulative low-carbon electricity invest-
ment exceeds that in the INDC scenario by roughly 
half between 2020-2030, while reducing invest-
ments into new freely emitting fossil-fuel power 
capacity by a third compared to today’s level and 
the INDC scenario. The bridge scenario can play a 
major role in avoiding a carbon investment bubble 
and stranded assets in the energy sector.  
If the provisions for such continuous strength-
ening of policy commitments in the Paris Agree-
ment are perceived credible and backed up by 
strengthening national policies, it can have an 
immediate and amplifying effect on the trans-
formation process by shifting expectation of 
businesses and altering investment decisions. 
Addressing the pre-2020 ambition gap through 
stronger national policies and international co-
operative initiatives is also crucial. This analy-
sis shows the crucial importance of a system 
of dynamic revision and a credible long-term 
goal in the Paris agreement.  
Sustainable development 
co-benefits of INDCs can be a 
driver for their implementation
Governments inevitably have multiple objectives: 
reducing environmental damage, promoting 
growth and jobs, innovation and competitiveness, 
energy security, etc. They must assess the interac-
tion between these objectives in defining climate 
policy.  In this report, we have considered co-bene-
fits and trade-offs through a quantified assessment 
of national model results and country case-studies. 
 m Key finding: INDCs can lead to significant 
co-benefits from climate mitigation in the 
countries studied, in terms of percentage 
reductions in energy import dependency and 
local air pollution. Such co-benefits can be a 
significant driver to develop ambitious natio-
nal climate policies. 
For energy importers, INDCs can lead to signifi-
cant improvements in energy security. The report 
estimates reductions in energy imports in the order 
of 2-12% in China, 9-17% in Japan and up to 9% in 
the EU in 2030, compared to a reference scenario 
with existing policies but no further climate ac-
tion. In the Japan case study, import dependency 
is reduced from 94% today to 75% under the INDC 
scenario in 2030 (taking nuclear electricity as a 
domestic energy source), reducing import bills by 
23% from 283 billion USD to 219 billion USD. 
Implementing INDCs also implies significant co-
benefits in terms of reducing local air pollution. 
In China, the report estimates a reduction of black 
carbon and sulphur dioxide in the order of 5-10% 
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Figure E. Assessment of local air pollution co-benefits of INDCs 
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 m There appears to be uneven progress on ad-
dressing the drivers of GHG emissions, when we 
consider what actions are projected to underpin 
the implementation of INDCs. Future climate 
cooperation and national policy must consider 
how to address specific barriers to certain cru-
cial solutions, such as accelerating innovation 
and deployment of post-2030 mitigation options 
and limiting carbon lock-in. 
 m The INDCs are an entry point to put the world 
on a trajectory towards 2°C but as currently sub-
mitted may not be enough to keep the below 2°C 
goal in reach. Post-2030, the required rate of 
transformation is very high and potentially cost-
ly. In order to address this, the Paris Agreement 
should establish a clear mechanism to allow the 
regular, predictable and timely revision of na-
tional contributions and the global framework. 
New contributions should be based on a vision 
for the deep decarbonisation of national energy 
systems. The Paris agreement should foster 
the development of national deep decarboni-
sation pathways by 2018. ❚
and about 10% respectively (mid-range of the esti-
mates) in 2030, compared to a Reference Scenario 
of existing policies and no further climate action 
(Figure E).
Key Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
This report has assessed the aggregate and real-
economy effect of INDCs. Doing so can provide 
a more detailed national and sectoral picture of 
progress being made, and areas where further 
policy efforts are required. There are three key 
conclusions from the analysis:
 m In the analysis of this report, INDCs accelerate 
and consolidate action on climate change in 
key major economies and at the global level. A 
significant transition appears in the electricity 
sector, with the dynamic of technology deploy-
ment approaching what is required for 2°C. The 
whole process towards the Paris negotiations 
has established a dynamic on which future poli-
cy and business strategies can build. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Countries have committed to signing a new global 
agreement on climate change in Paris by the end of 
2015. The bricks of this agreement are the so-called 
‘intended nationally determined contributions’ 
(INDCs), which contain countries’ proposed 
undertakings on mitigation and, for some, adapta-
tion. Regarding mitigation, these INDCs contain a 
range of different emissions targets, expressed in 
different forms and against different years. They 
are often accompanied by descriptions of more 
precise aspirations regarding aspects of the tran-
sition to a low-carbon economy, such as goals 
for renewable energy, non-fossil fuel energy, or 
specific regulatory policies. 
Given this diversity, understanding the implica-
tions of INDCs for the transition to a low-carbon 
economy in line with the 2°C or 1.5°C objective is 
challenging. It is also challenging for another rea-
son. More than the precise emissions level in a 
given year, the potential of INDCs to limit warm-
ing to 2°C is determined by their capacity to un-
leash concrete transformations, particularly in the 
global energy sector, which would allow the deep 
decarbonisation of the global economy by 2050. 
These transformations are technological, infra-
structural, economic and financial, and social and 
political. Multiple transition pathways are pos-
sible, but only some are coherent with long-term 
deep decarbonisation. Moreover, the transition 
pathway developed towards a certain year, such 
as 2030, conditions profoundly both what can and 
what must be done thereafter in order to reach 
long-term climate goals. 
The objective of this report is to analyse the en-
ergy sector transformations that would be required 
to reach INDCs, and understand what these trans-
formations imply for the goal of limiting warming 
to 2°C. This report is the result of an international 
research project encompassing 15 leading research 
teams from 11 countries (see authors’ list, page 2). 
It is structured as follows:
 m Section 2 provides a national level assessment 
of INDCs for five countries and one region – the 
EU, the US, China, India, Brazil and Japan – 
which together account for 60% of global emis-
sions from fossil fuel combustion, and 74% of 
global GDP in 2012. This analysis focuses on the 
years 2025 and 2030, while taking into account 
the need for a long-term trajectory to 2050. 
 m Section 3 provides analysis of the co-benefits 
and trade-offs of INDCs, with a particular focus 
on their implication in major economies for 
local air pollution and energy security, notably 
energy import dependency. 
 m Section 4 provides a global assessment of the im-
pacts of INDCs in the energy sector, in the light 
of the below 2°C goal. It explores the post-2030 
energy sector transformations and emissions 
trajectory that would be required to hold war-
ming to below 2°C, given the implementation 
of INDCs. It also develops a ‘bridge’ scenario, in 
which policy action is strengthened by 2020 in 
order to smooth the transition from INDCs to a 
2°C trajectory. 
Throughout this paper, a number of case stud-
ies deepen the analysis presented in the main 
body of the report. These are not essential to the 
understanding of the report as a whole, but con-
tain in themselves a wealth of interesting analysis. 
Readers are invited to browse them or focus on the 
main report as they prefer. 
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2. UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECTS 
OF INDCS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
2.1. Introduction and 
Methodology 
The objective of this chapter is to build a better 
understanding of the implications of INDCs at the 
national level, in terms of the transformations 
that they imply in the real economy. The analysis 
of this chapter focuses on the 6 countries/regions 
with research teams contributing to the MILES 
project – the United States, the European Union, 
Japan, China, India and Brazil. Together, these 
countries made up 60% of global GHG emis-
sions excluding land-use in 2012, or 56% of global 
GHGs including land-use. Countries represented 
in the MILES project made up 74% of global GDP 
at market exchange rates in 2012. The analysis in 
this chapter focuses particularly on the energy 
sector. GHG emissions from the energy sector 
represent 80% of emissions in the countries 
represented in the MILES project in 2012.4
The methodology in this chapter gives a de-
tailed vision for the potential transformation in-
duced by the INDC in the energy sectors of the 
countries assessed. There are several reasons for 
trying to understand the potential transforma-
tions induced by the INDCs with this high level 
of granularity: 
 m It can help to increase the national and inter-
national credibility of the INDCs, by understan-
ding what transformations and policies would 
be required to implement them. 
 m It can provide useful information to the public 
and private sectors at the national and inter-
national level, in terms of the strategies being 
4. All data from this paragraph based on CAIT. Available 
at: http://cait.wri.org/ 
pursued, the potential future growth of low-car-
bon technologies, energy markets, and so on. 
 m It can provide further understanding of the op-
portunities, barriers and level of ambition for 
the INDCs. 
 m It can provide complementary analysis to at-
tempts to aggregate the effects of INDCs rela-
tive to 2°C, for example by comparing techno-
logy deployment in the INDC scenarios and 2°C 
scenarios. 
The assessments in this chapter are provided on 
a country by country basis, as the focus is on the 
implications of the INDCs at the national level. The 
objective is not to compare across countries: signif-
icant differences in the development and resource 
endowments of each country render cross-country 
comparison difficult. Rather the objective is to 
provide as detailed an understanding as possible 
of the INDC at the national level. 
In order to understand the methodology of the 
analysis here, it is important to provide the distinc-
tion between INDCs and INDC scenarios. INDCs 
provide the headline target(s) for emissions and 
in some cases other related targets such as a non-
fossil fuel share in the energy mix. INDC scenarios 
involve the development of detailed, internally co-
herent scenarios which explore the INDCs’ impli-
cations for the energy sector. In order to develop 
these INDC scenarios, each national research team 
has used the modelling and analytic tools avail-
able to them. Each country research team has also 
benefited from its proximity to the policy process 
and public debate in their country. The INDC sce-
narios therefore include both the headline targets 
of INDCs, but also the underlying policy vision to 
achieve the INDC, to the extent of each country re-
search team’s knowledge. 
The results have been presented using a con-
sistent data template, ensuring the usability and 
transparency of results. In addition to the data 
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submissions, each country research team has de-
veloped or is developing under the MILES project 
a detailed report on the implications of their coun-
try’s INDC. 
INDC scenarios should therefore not be taken 
as predictions, still less as government policy, but 
rather as credible, detailed and internally coher-
ent explorations of pathways towards achieving 
the headline ambitions announced in the INDCs. 
The following subsections present the analysis 
for each country represented in the MILES project. 
An effort has been made to present similar infor-
mation in each subsection, although this needs to 
be balanced with flexibility to present the unique 
circumstances of each country. 
2.2. The European Union
Analysis of effect of the INDC scenario in the 
energy sector 
The European Union (EU) submitted its INDC on 
the 6th of March 2015.5 Under its INDC, the Euro-
pean Union and its Member States are committed 
to a binding target of an at least 40% domestic 
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 
compared to 1990. This covers the following green-
house gases (GHGs): CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs, 
SF6, and NF3. All emitting sectors are covered, and 
international credits will not be used. The EU had 
also previously adopted an objective to reduce 
emissions by 80-95% by 2050 compared to 1990, 
based on the reductions assessed to be consistent 
with the 2oC target by the IPCC AR4 report for 
developed countries as a group.6 The EU’s INDC is 
therefore intended by European policy makers to 
be a credible mid-term milestone towards this 2050 
objective. The EU’s INDC is based on the policy 
targets and orientations adopted by the European 
Council of heads of state in October 2014, under 
the so-called EU 2030 Climate and Energy Frame-
work.7 These are presented in Table  1.
5. Submission by Latvia and the European Commission 
on behalf ff the European Union and its member states, 
Riga 6 March 2015. Available at: http://www4.unfccc.
int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/
Latvia/1/LV-03-06-EU%20INDC.pdf 
6. Council of the European Union (2009), “Presidency 
Conclusions”. Available at http://www4.unfccc.int/
submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Lat-
via/1/LV-03-06-EU%20INDC.pdf 
7. European Council, 23 and 24th of October 2014, Con-
clusions. Available online at: http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/
ec/145397.pdf 
Case Study 1. Shift in investment requirements 
for INDC implementation in the EU
The implementation of the European INDC (that envisages at least 
40% reduction in domestic GHG emissions in the period 1990-
2030) implies significant changes in investment requirements for 
the EU energy system both in demand and supply sectors.
Investment expenditures1 for the energy system increase already 
in the Reference scenario from 638 bn. €’ 10 in 2010 to 826 
bn. € in 2020 and to 873 bn. € in 2030, i.e. a growth of 37% 
during 2010-2030. The main reasons for the increase are: 
 m Replacement of ageing energy infrastructure (power plants, 
passenger cars, electricity grids, gas pipelines, petroleum 
refineries)
 m Extension and enhancement of network infrastructures 
 m  Additional investments in the framework of already agreed pol-
icies as part of the 2020 Energy and Climate Package (mainly 
directed towards energy efficiency improvements in energy 
demand sectors and accelerated deployment of renewables)
The EU INDC implies a further increase in energy related upfront 
investments by 10% from Reference levels in 2030, while the 
benefits of these investments in terms of reduced fuel spend-
ing are more tangible in the longer term. Capital expenditures 
increase following the accelerated penetration of renewable 
energy sources, advanced energy efficient technologies, equip-
ment and infrastructure (e.g. insulation investments to improve 
thermal integrity of the European building stock, RES for power 
generation, advanced efficient appliances, improvement in grids, 
hybrid vehicles). 
The 2030 Energy and Climate policy framework and the European 
INDC can facilitate effective market coordination between differ-
ent energy/economy system actors in the decarbonisation pro-
cess (technology providers, individual consumers, infrastructure 
developers, policy-makers). Investments in energy efficiency and 
low/zero carbon technologies can be triggered by specific policy 
instruments like the ETS (clear price signal), while specific energy 
efficiency and renewable policies can provide further incentives 
for extensive restructuring of the EU energy system. Even with ETS 
reform, a tightening of the ETS cap and increased carbon prices, it 
is unlikely that carbon pricing alone can trigger sufficient invest-
ments in the energy system towards carbon abatement especially 
in the buildings and transport sectors. Complementary policies are 
required in order to overcome market and non-market barriers and 
to achieve the required investments for the cost-effective imple-
mentation of the EU INDC, especially in the period after 2020.
1. Annualized and discounted
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in transport-related investments is relatively modest, while the 
share of transport in overall energy system investments declines 
from 84% in the Reference to 77% in the ICCS INDC scenario in 
2030.
In order to understand the investment challenges at macro-
economic level, we must compare energy investment figures 
with overall EU GDP. In 2010, total energy system investments 
accounted for 5.2% of European GDP. The Reference scenario 
implies a stabilisation of energy investments as a percentage of 
GDP for the period 2010-2030. On the other hand, the EU ICCS 
INDC scenario leads to an increase of overall energy investment 
expenditures which in 2030 represent 5.7% of the EU GDP. Trans-
port investments account for the bulk of overall energy invest-
ments and represent 4.4% of EU GDP in 2030 (in both scenarios). 
The implementation of the EU INDC leads to particularly high 
investment challenges for the residential/commercial sector, as 
investment expenditure have to increase by about 2.5 times (from 
0.2% of EU GDP in Reference to 0.5% in the EU ICCS INDC sce-
nario). Investment in the energy supply sector (including power 
plants) increase from 0.5% of the EU GDP in Reference to 0.6% 
in EU ICCS INDC scenario in 2030, as a result of accelerated 
deployment of capital-intensive low-carbon technologies and 
additional investments for grid expansion and enhancement in 
order to complement massive penetration of variable renewables 
(storage, back-up capacity, intelligent grids, flexible generation).
Sectoral investment trends: 
In 2010, the transport sector accounted for about 85% of the 
overall energy system investments due to high expenditure 
requirements for vehicles purchases (especially for passenger 
cars), vessels and railways. The Reference scenario shows an 
increase in investments in all energy sectors by 2030, with trans-
port and power supply accounting for about 90% of the overall 
increase between 2010 and 2030.
Based on PRIMES results (see figure above), the implementation 
of the EU INDC requires higher investments relative to the Ref-
erence scenario especially in the residential/commercial and in 
the energy supply (power generation) sectors, which account for 
65% (54 bn. €) and 19% (16 bn. €) respectively of the overall 
increase in 2030. In the INDC context, the most important policy 
challenges that the EU faces are the large-scale deployment of 
intermittent Renewable technologies for electricity production 
(which must be complemented with additional investments for 
grid enhancement, storage, balance and flexible generation) 
and massive energy efficiency investments in buildings (ret-
rofits, deep renovation of households, investments for energy 
using equipment and direct energy efficiency investment for 
improving thermal integrity of households). On the other hand, 
electrification of the transport sector which is considered as a 
critical ingredient of the transition to a low-carbon economy will 
mainly take place in the period after 2030 and thus the increase 
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Figure a. Energy system investments, European Union
Source: ICCS, PRIMES model
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Table  1. Targets and policy orientations adopted under the 
EU 2030 Climate and Energy Framework 
2030 target
Greenhouse 
gases
All sectors 
At least -40% 
from 1990 
levels
Sectors covered by the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme
-43% from 
2005 levels 
Sectors not covered by the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme
-30% from 
2005 levels 
Renewable 
energy 
Renewable energy share in gross final 
energy consumption
27% at 
European level 
Energy 
efficiency 
Absolute reduction in primary energy 
demand compared to a BAU case 
-27% 
(indicative)
Source: Authors  
The analysis in this section is based on the sce-
narios developed by Energy-Economy-Environ-
ment Modelling Laboratory (E3MLab) at the Na-
tional Technical University of Athens, using the 
PRIMES energy system model and the GEM-E38 
macroeconomic model. These models are often 
used by the European Commission for Impact As-
sessments and related analysis of EU energy and 
climate policies. The ICCS INDC scenario pre-
sented here assumes a 40% reduction in EU GHGs 
emissions by 2030 compared to 1990, while in the 
long term it assumes the achievement of an 80% 
GHG emissions reduction by 2050 (in line with the 
“Roadmap for moving to a competitive low-carbon 
economy in 2050”). The headline macroeconomic 
drivers in the ICCS INDC scenario are reproduced 
in Table  2.
8. www.gem-e3.net
Table  2. Headline drivers in the EU ICCS INDC scenario 
2010 2020 2030
GDP (billion 
US$2005)
13901 16098 18834
Population 
(million)
504 517
525
Source: ICCS, PRIMES and GEM-E3 models   
Figure 1 presents the evolution of EU primary 
energy demand9 by energy source between 2010 
and 2030 in the ICCS INDC scenario. A 13% reduc-
tion of primary energy demand is achieved, with 
demand falling to 64.3 EJ in 2030. The largest 
reduction is in coal demand, which falls by 45%. 
Primary energy from renewables and biomass, on 
the other hand, grows by 80%. Figure 2 represents 
the high-level drivers of decarbonisation in the EU 
in terms of the so-called Kaya identity, which de-
scribes changes in CO2 energy-related emissions as 
the product of four factors: 
 m 1. Change in population
 m 2. Change in GDP/capita
 m 3. Change in final energy consumption / GDP 
(energy intensity)
 m 4. Change in carbon emissions / unit of final 
energy (carbon intensity)
Compared to the period 2010-2020, the decar-
bonisation of European energy system acceler-
ates dramatically in the decade 2020-2030, as 
9. Defined as total primary energy consumption (PRIMES 
results are consistent with the EUROSTAT and IEA con-
ventions that use the physical energy content method 
for calculating primary energy equivalent of alterna-
tive energy forms and fuels).
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Figure 1. Primary energy, European Union Figure 2. High-level drivers of emissions changes, EU
Source: ICCS, PRIMES model Source: ICCS, PRIMES model
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a result of further renewables growth to substi-
tute for fossil fuels in both electricity generation 
(mainly wind turbines and solar PV) and in fi-
nal energy consumption (biofuels in transport, 
biomass and solar thermal heating in buildings), 
and a slight increase of nuclear electricity. Im-
provements in energy intensity provide the bulk 
of emissions reductions, underscoring the im-
portance of strong energy efficiency policies in 
all energy demand and supply sectors, including 
more ambitious standards, regulations for heat-
ing and electrical appliances, higher renovation 
rates in buildings, stringent implementation of 
the Efficiency-related directives, purchase of 
more efficient energy equipment and vehicles by 
energy consumers. This improvement in energy 
efficiency represents a major challenge of imple-
menting the EU INDC. 
Figures 3-5 present the so-called three pillars of 
decarbonisation: improvements in energy inten-
sity, decarbonisation of electricity, and the shift 
from fossil fuels to electricity in final energy (for 
example, the shift from internal combustion en-
gine to plug-in hybrid and full electric vehicles).10 
In the INDC scenario the EU’s energy intensity 
improves by 33% between 2010 and 2030 (Figure 
3), or 2.1% per year compared to 1.5% over the 
last 10 years. An even more significant improve-
ment is required in the carbon intensity of elec-
tricity supply, which reduces by 56% between 
10. The concept of the three pillars of decarbonisation 
is further developed in the report of the Deep Decar-
bonization Project. Cf. IDDRI and SDSN, “Pathways to 
Deep Decarbonization – 2014 Report”. Available online 
at: www.unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/
DDPP_Digit.pdf 
2010 and 2030, reaching 50.9 tCO2/TJ and en-
tailing very significant changes in the EU’s elec-
tricity generation mix.  
Figure 6 presents this changing electricity mix 
between 2010 and 2030 under the ICCS INDC 
scenario. As can be seen, the share of renewables 
grows very significantly, making up 50.7% of the 
EU electricity mix by 2030. This entails a com-
pound annual growth rate for wind of 9.1% and 
12% for solar in the period 2010 to 2030. The share 
of nuclear falls by 5 percentage points between 
2010 and 2030; by 2030 a small amount of CCS is 
modelled to be coming online.  
Figure 7 and Figure 8 present the major drivers of 
decarbonisation in two significant end-use sectors: 
20302010 2020 20302010 2020 20302010 2020
Figure 3. Energy intensity of GDP, 
European Union
Figure 4. Carbon intensity 
of electricity production, EU
Figure 5. Electrification 
of final energy demand, EU
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transport and buildings.11 It can be seen that the 
carbon intensity improvement of energy consump-
tion in the transport sector is slight, and indeed 
slows down in the decade from 2020-30, compared 
to 2010-20. This is because of slower penetration 
of biofuels due to concerns regarding the life-cycle 
emissions impacts of biofuels, the displacement of 
food production, as well as the lack of an explicit 
target for biofuels deployment after 2020. In-
creased electrification of transport through modal 
switch and growing deployment of plug-in hybrid 
and electric vehicles is not able to fully compensate 
this slow-down in the penetration of biofuels. Elec-
tricity contributes 3% to final energy consumption 
in transport in 2030, and biofuels 8%; oil falls from 
95% in 2010 to 88% of final energy consumption 
in transport in 2030. Further, important improve-
ments in energy intensity are observed (Figure 7). 
These offset significant increases in the demand 
for transport services as economic activity, trade 
and standards of living increase: passenger kilo-
metres per capita are projected to grow by 18% be-
tween 2010 and 2030, and tonne kilometres grow 
by 37%. Overall, transport emissions are reduced 
by 11% between 2010 and 2030 mainly as a result 
of significant improvements in energy efficiency. 
The buildings sector, on the other hand, reduces 
emissions by 36% between 2010 and 2030. The 
11. The carbon intensity is measured in terms of direct 
emissions from transport and building, excluding indi-
rect emissions from electricity generation.
   2020/2010
Energy intensity in passenger and freight transport is calculated as TJ/pkm and 
TJ/tkm respectively.
Energy intensity of buildings is calculated as TJ/capita.
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Figure 7. Energy and carbon intensity
in the transport sector, European Union
Figure 8. Energy and carbon intensity
in the buildings sector, European Union
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drivers of this are shown in Figure 8. Significant 
improvements in energy intensity drive an 18% 
reduction in total buildings final energy demand 
between 2010 and 2030. In order to achieve this, 
large-scale deep retrofits of the buildings stock 
are required. Energy supply in the buildings sector 
also decarbonizes, as electricity displaces fossil fu-
els and specific electricity consumption increases 
(i.e. new uses for electricity such as information 
technology). Electricity’s share in final energy de-
mand in the buildings sector increases from 33% in 
2010 to 43% in 2030. 
Emissions Outcomes and Conclusions 
The section above presented the main energy 
sector transformations induced by the EU ICCS 
INDC scenario. Table  3 shows the results in the 
emissions reductions for the energy sector. It 
should be noted that scenario results for all GHGs 
and emitter sectors were not reported for the EU 
under the MILES project, due to the focus on the 
energy sector.  
The analysis above shows the importance of the 
decarbonisation of electricity supply in Europe, 
through notably the massive penetration of re-
newables. This poses a policy challenge in terms 
of appropriate incentive schemes (such as feed-in-
tariffs and subsidies), appropriate electricity mar-
ket design, provision of the required storage and 
flexible generation to balance and support a rapid-
ly growing share of variable renewables, and grid 
enhancement, reinforcement and interconnection 
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see case study 1. Two other challenges can be high-
lighted related to the improvement of energy effi-
ciency in the buildings and transport sectors, both 
of which must significantly contribute to the re-
duction of energy-related GHG emissions. Vehicle 
performance standards, currently in place to 2020, 
will need to be extended to the freight transport 
sector and tightened for the period after 2020. Am-
bitious retrofit programs of the building stock will 
need to be developed and financed. 
Table  3. Emissions reductions achieved in the EU ICCS 
INDC scenario (Mt CO2 from fossil fuel combustion and 
industry)
2010 2030
Electricity 1295 621
Buildings 647 416
Industry 756 676
Transport 1051 936
Other 266 187
Total 4015 2836
Source: ICCS, PRIMES model
The analysis suggests that the EU’s INDC repre-
sents a significant acceleration of the decarboni-
sation of the EU economy, notably in the elec-
tricity supply, transport and buildings sectors. 
It also points to some of the challenges beyond 
2030. Electrification of road transport, although 
at a low level in 2030, would have to be scaled 
up dramatically (in combination with provi-
sion of the required recharging infrastructure) 
thereafter to reduce transport-related emissions. 
Likewise, CCS which is a very small in the ICCS 
INDC scenario in 2030, will have to be deployed 
at scale to further reduce both power generation 
emissions and start to make a dent on industrial 
emissions.   
2.3. Japan
Analysis of effect of the INDC scenario in the 
energy sector 
Japan presented its INDC to the UNFCCC on the 
17th of July 2015.12 Japan’s INDC is to reduce GHG 
emissions by 26% by 2030 compared to 2013 levels, 
equivalent to a 25.4% reduction against 2005 
levels. This would equate to emissions levels of 
about 1.042 Gt CO2eq in 2030. All sectors and all 
GHGs (CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs, SF6, and NF3) 
12. Government of Japan (2015), Submission of Ja-
pan’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 
(INDC). Available online at: http://www4.unfccc.
int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Ja-
pan/1/20150717_Japan’s%20INDC.pdf
are covered by Japan’s INDC (Table  4). A detailed 
estimation of sectoral reductions is given along-
side the INDC (Table  5), as well as an estimation of 
the level of final energy consumption in 2030 and 
electricity generation mix in 2030. In this regard, 
the Japanese INDC provides a high level of trans-
parency regarding the strategy required to achieve 
its INDC. 
Table  4. Description of the Japanese INDC
Commitment
GHG emissions reduction of 26%by 2030 
compared to 2013 (25.4% compared to 2005)
Greenhouse Gases
Carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), 
nitrous oxide (N2O), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), sulfur hexafluoride 
(SF6), and nitrogen trifluoride (NF3)
Calculation Net emissions (including LULUCF)
Aggregation Across 
Gases
CO2-equivalent using 100-year global warming 
potential (GWP) values taken from IPCC AR4.
Sectors
Energy, Industrial processes and product use, 
Agriculture, LULUCF, Waste
Reference Year FY 2013 and FY 2005
Target Year FY 2030
Source: http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Japan/ 
1/20150717_Japan’s%20INDC.pdf
Table  5. Estimated emissions of energy-originated CO2 in 
each sector in the Japanese INDC (Mt CO2)
Estimated emissions of 
each sector in FY 2030
FY 2013
Energy originated CO2 927 1235
Industry 401 429
Commercial and other 168 279
Residential 122 201
Transport 163 225
Energy conversion 73 101
Source: http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Japan/ 
1/20150717_Japan’s%20INDC.pdf
After the nuclear accident at the Tokyo Electric 
Power Company’s Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear 
Power Station, the Japanese nuclear fleet was en-
tirely stopped for safety reasons. The share of nu-
clear in gross electricity generation fell from 25.8% 
in 2010 to 1.3% in 2013. After the Fukushima ac-
cident, in July 2015 the Japanese Government fi-
nalized a «Long-term Energy Supply and Demand 
Outlook”, which formed the basis of the Japanese 
INDC. 
Within the context of the MILES project, two re-
search teams from Japan provided INDC scenarios: 
the Research Institute of Innovative Technology 
for the Earth (RITE) and the National Institute for 
Environmental Studies (NIES). These scenarios are 
broadly speaking comparable, and both achieve the 
INDC target of a reduction of 26% against 2013 levels, 
or 25.4% against 2005 levels. Unless otherwise 
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indicated, in this subsection the figures are taken 
from the INDC scenario provided by NIES, while the 
discussion in the text builds on both scenarios and 
points to interesting differences between the two. 
The headline macroeconomic drivers in the two 
INDC scenarios are reproduced in Table  6.
Table  6. Headline drivers in the NIES and RITE Japanese 
INDC scenarios
2010 2020 2030
GDP (billion US$2005) NIES
GDP (billion US$2005) RITE
4619
4648
5322
5343
6406
6429
Population (million)
NIES and RITE
128 124 117
Source: NIES AIM/Enduse[Japan] model and RITE DNE21+ model 
The cornerstone of the NIES INDC scenario is a 
significant improvement in energy intensity13, which 
poses a big challenge in a country that is already as 
efficient as Japan. Figure 9 provides an overview 
of primary energy supply between 2010 and 2030, 
which falls by 12.4% reaching 19.3 EJ/yr in 2030. 
The sectoral division of these improvements and 
the challenge that this entails is discussed further 
below. Figure 10 shows the four high-level drivers 
of decarbonisation in the NIES INDC scenario. Im-
provements to energy intensity provide the bulk of 
emissions reductions in the decades 2010 to 2020 
and 2020 to 2030. In the first decade, decarboni-
sation of the Japanese energy supply is marginal, 
due to the 2 percentage point drop in nuclear as a 
share of primary energy and the time-lag required 
to ramp up renewable energy. By contrast, in the 
13. Energy intensity is defined as final energy 
consumption/GDP.
decade 2020 to 2030 the decarbonisation of the 
Japanese energy supply accelerates, as renewables 
ramp up and nuclear reaches its pre-Fukushima 
level in Japanese primary energy supply (11%). A 
similar pattern is seen in the RITE INDC scenario 
for Japan, in which decarbonisation of the energy 
supply contributes just 1% to the decline of Japa-
nese emissions in the decade 2010-2020, before 
jumping to 11% in the decade 2020-2030.       
Figures 11-13 display the impacts of the NIES INDC 
scenario across the three pillars of decarbonisation. 
It was noted above that a reduction in energy de-
mand provides a crucial driver of emissions reduc-
tions in the INDC scenario. Energy intensity of the 
GDP falls by 34% between 2010 and 2030, leading 
to an intensity level of 2.2 MJ/M$ GDP. Final en-
ergy consumption falls by 8.4% between 2010 and 
2030 in absolute terms, to a level of 13.7 EJ in 2030. 
This is close to the level projected by the Japanese 
government in the information accompanying its 
INDC submission, namely a reduction of 9.7% in 
absolute terms between 2013 and 2030. In the elec-
tricity sector, after rising slightly between 2010-
2020 due to Fukushima, the carbon intensity of the 
Japanese electricity mix decreases by 28% reaching 
79.4 tCO2/TJ in 2030. A similar level is reached in 
the RITE INDC scenario, namely 74.6 tCO2/TJ. Elec-
trification of final energy demand also climbs signif-
icantly, reaching just under 26% of total final energy 
consumption in the NIES INDC scenario and 27.45% 
of final energy demand in the RITE INDC scenario. 
Figure 14 displays the electricity mix for Japan 
in 2010, and in 2030 in the NIES and RITE INDC 
scenarios respectively. The NIES INDC scenario 
sees a slight absolute decline in electricity demand 
between 2010 and 2030, in the order of -3.7%; 
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whereas the RITE INDC scenario essentially sees a 
stabilisation of electricity demand. In the context 
of economic growth and increasing electrification 
of final energy, this highlights the importance of 
electrical efficiency measures in end-use sectors.   
Currently, the impact of Fukushima can be seen 
in the spike of coal and gas generation and to a 
lesser extent oil. Coal has jumped from 26.8% in 
2010 of the Japanese electricity mix to 33.7% in 
2014, while gas has jumped from 26.9% in 2010 to 
39.6% in 2014. 
In 2030, the NIES and RITE INDC scenarios re-
flect a broadly similar mix, with some differenc-
es. A key commonality is the strong increase of 
renewables, which rise from 9% of the electricity 
mix in 2010 to 20.3% in the NIES INDC scenario 
and 24% in the RITE INDC scenario. The total 
level of the production of nuclear is very close 
in 2030 in both scenarios, namely 231.6 TWh in 
the NIES INDC scenario and 222.6 TWh in the 
RITE INDC scenario. By contrast, the NIES sce-
nario relies slightly more on natural gas (38.6%) 
than coal (17%), whereas the RITE scenario re-
lies slightly more on coal (22.7% unabated coal 
and 26% if coal with CCS is included ) and less on 
gas (27%). Japan is a country almost complete-
ly lacking in domestic fossil fuel resources, and 
therefore a key issue in the design of the energy 
and electricity mix is energy security. This is ad-
dressed further in case study 6. One key conclu-
sions emerging from the analysis summarized 
in Figure 14 is that there are multiple credible 
pathways to a transition in the Japanese electric-
ity mix, which can contribute to implementing 
the Japanese INDC. 
Figure 15 and Figure 16 show the improvements 
of energy and carbon intensity in the transport and 
buildings sectors under the NIES INDC scenario. It 
can be seen that the buildings sector must make 
significant improvements in energy intensity of 
12% between 2010 and 2020 and a further 6% in 
2020 to 2030 (a total of 18% between 2010 and 
2030), through the purchase of efficient equip-
ment. Likewise the carbon intensity of energy 
supply in the buildings sector improves by 14% 
between 2010 and 2030, thanks notably to a shift 
away from oil and further towards electricity and 
natural gas. The share of electricity in final energy 
consumption of the buildings sector increases to 
53% by 2030. In the transport sector, continuous 
declines in energy intensity are achieved between 
2010 and 2030, -27% for passenger transport and 
-7% in freight transport. The carbon intensity of 
transport fuel declines only by 2%, reflecting lim-
ited electrification and biofuel penetration. 
Emissions Outcomes and Conclusions 
Table  7 presents the emissions reductions achieved 
in the NIES INDC scenario for energy-related emis-
sions. It can be seen that a significant reduction is 
achieved in the electricity, buildings and transport 
sectors. 
The data represented in this Table  are derived 
from the NIES INDC scenario, and not from the 
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Figure 11. Energy intensity of GDP, 
Japan
20302010 202020302010 202020302010 2020
* It should be noted that there are no official energy-related targets for 2020. Therefore the 2020 carbon intensity of electricity depends of the assumptions on the 
electricity mix, especially on the schedule for restarting nuclear power plants. In this modelling scenario, nuclear power is restarted but still stays at a low level in 2020, 
accounting for the temporary rise in carbon intensity by 2020. Nonetheless, the main point holds true, namely that the challenge for Japan is to manage the challenges 
associated with its nuclear fleet, and drive down the carbon intensity of its electricity supply. This had led to a spike in carbon intensity of electricity in Japan. 
Source: NIES AIM/Enduse [Japan] model Source: NIES AIM/Enduse [Japan] model Source: NIES AIM/Enduse [Japan] model 
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Japanese Government’s INDC document, which 
provides detailed breakdowns by sector of how 
the INDC could be achieved.14 The differences in 
the results presented here and those of the Japa-
nese Government’s INDC scenario are partly an 
outcome of the modelling framework used in the 
NIES INDC scenario. The NIES INDC scenario re-
lies more on low-emissions electricity than end-
use efficiency, as a result of cost-minimization by 
the AIM/Enduse model. In the NIES INDC scenar-
io, the share of fossil fuels in power generation in 
2030 is around 56%, the same share as in the Jap-
anese Government’s INDC document; but in the 
NIES INDC scenario, gas rather than coal makes up 
a greater share of residual fossil fuels. Moreover, 
the NIES INDC scenario controls all Kyoto-gas in 
2030 in order to reach the 2030 INDC target, but 
the share of different GHGs depends on the mod-
el’s optimization of reductions between sectors 
and gases. In this case, the reduction depends 
more on CO2 rather than non-CO2 gases. Hence, 
there is a difference in CO2 emissions between 
the NIES INDC scenario and the INDC document 
submitted by the Japanese government, although 
the NIES scenario reaches the total GHG emissions 
target as specified in the INDC document.
However, the central points developed here re-
main valid. The NIES INDC scenario underscore 
some key transformational challenges facing 
14. Government of Japan (2015), Submission of Ja-
pan’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 
(INDC). Available online at: http://www4.unfccc.
int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Ja-
pan/1/20150717_Japan’s%20INDC.pdf 
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Japan, in particular the significant improvement 
of end-use efficiency in buildings and transport, 
and the rollout of renewables in electricity while 
managing the challenges of the nuclear fleet. The 
NIES and RITE INDC scenarios demonstrate that 
the Japanese INDC appears feasible as long as a 
significant restructuring of the Japanese energy 
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Case Study 2. Challenges and opportunities for 
emissions reductions in the industrial sectors
The above analysis of the Japanese INDC illustrated the impor-
tance of improved end-use efficiency in achieving emissions 
reductions. This will require pushing forward the technology fron-
tier, by developing technologies that can then be diffused globally. 
A particular challenge relates to the reduction of emissions in the 
industry sectors, some of which are energy intensive, exposed to 
international competition and technologically difficult to decar-
bonize. The objective of this case study is to illustrate the poten-
tial of reducing emissions in the industry sectors globally, and 
describe some of the conditions for tapping this potential. 
One area where short-term gains could be made is in improving 
the efficiency in iron and steel and cement industries. There are 
still large discrepancies in the efficiency of those sectors among 
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countries, and room for substantial improvements in many of 
them (Oda et al., 2012). The estimated potentials of global emis-
sions reductions in 2010 are about 420 million tCO2/year in the 
iron and steel sector, when best available technologies in 2010 
are adopted throughout the world (Oda et al., 2013). In addition, 
the global potential of emissions reductions in 2020 in the cement 
sector are about 180 million tCO2/year when best available tech-
nologies in 2005 are adopted (Akimoto, 2012). The figure below 
shows global emissions reduction potential for crude steel.
Sector-based efforts for emission reductions with global coop-
eration are thus very important to achieve the emission reduction 
potentials. This in turn requires further sector-specific efforts in 
cooperation, to diffuse best-available technologies and mitigate 
the competitiveness concerns that may arise from applying strin-
gent constraints to emissions-intensive, trade exposed industries 
(Spencer et al., 2015). 
STUDY 05/2015 2 5IDDRI
Beyond the Numbers: Understanding the Transformation Induced by INDCs
system is achieved. The estimated marginal abate-
ment costs for the INDC in 2030 are about 180 
US$/t-CO2, and 260 US$/t-CO2 by NIES and RITE 
scenarios, respectively. A number of challenges 
emerge from this analysis. Firstly, the INDC re-
quires ambitious energy efficiency and even con-
servation policies to reduce energy and in particu-
lar electricity demand. To implement this level 
of efficiency Japan will have to further push the 
technology frontier for efficient equipment, and 
explore options to conserve energy through struc-
tural measures. Secondly, energy security and af-
fordability will continue to be important issues for 
Japan, as it emerges from the Fukushima crisis (see 
case study 4). Thirdly, the NIES and RITE INDC 
scenarios sees a huge growth in renewables in 
Japan, which will further drive global markets but 
also poses a challenge given the geographical con-
straints that Japan faces to exploiting renewables. 
Table  7. Energy related emissions 2010 – 2030, Japan 
under the NIES INDC Scenario (Mt CO2)  
2010 2030
Electricity 373 274
Buildings 153 108
Industry 346 315
Transport 225 193
Other 27 26
Total 1124 916
Source: NIES AIM/Enduse[Japan] model
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2.4. United States 
Analysis of the effect of the INDC scenario in 
the energy sector
On March 31, 2015, the United States submitted 
its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 
(INDC) to the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The heart of that submission is an under-
taking on the part of the United States “to achieve 
an economy-wide target of reducing its greenhouse 
gas emissions by 26%-28% below its 2005 level in 
2025 and to make best efforts to reduce its emissions 
by 28%.”15 The scope and coverage of the United 
States’ contribution is summarized in Table  8. The 
United States’ contribution is framed exclusively in 
terms of greenhouse gas emissions. It does not, for 
example, include technology standards or emis-
sions intensity goals. It also eschews the use of 
international emissions trading mechanisms.
Table  8. Scope and Coverage of the United States INDC
Commitment
26-28% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions 
relative to 2005 in 2025.
Greenhouse 
Gases
Carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide 
(N2O), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), hydrofluorocarbons 
(HFCs), sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), and nitrogen 
trifluoride (NF3)
Calculation Net emissions (including land-use change)
Aggregation 
Across Gases
CO2-equivalent using 100-year global warming 
potential (GWP) values taken from IPCC AR4.
Sectors All IPCC sectors
Reference Year 2005
Target Year 2025 (no intermediate year commitments)
Source: http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Unit-
ed%20States%20of%20America/1/U.S.%20Cover%20Note%20INDC%20and%20
Accompanying%20Information.pdf
The United States expects to be able to imple-
ment its INDC by using existing legislative author-
ity, e.g. the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §7401 et seq.), 
the Energy Policy Act (42 U.S.C. §13201 et seq.), 
and the Energy Independence and Security Act 
(42 U.S.C. §17001et seq.). Those instruments are 
applied to reducing emissions in four general cat-
egories as outlined in Table  9.
The analysis in this section is based on scenarios 
developed using a U.S.-focused version the Global 
Change Assessment Model (GCAM-USA). GCAM 
is a regionally disaggregated, technologically de-
tailed model of human and physical Earth systems 
(Calvin, et al., 2011). GCAM models the simultane-
ous interactions of 31 geopolitical regions outside 
15. US cover note, INDC and accompanying informa-
tion. Available at: http://www4.unfccc.int/submis-
sions/INDC/Published%20Documents/United%20
States%20of%20America/1/U.S.%20Cover%20
Note%20INDC%20and%20Accompanying%20Infor-
mation.pdf 
of the U.S. The version used for this study (GCAM-
USA), then breaks the energy and economy com-
ponents of the U.S. into 50 states and the District 
of Colombia. GCAM simulates the behavior of eco-
nomic agents allocating scarce resources. GCAM 
has energy, agriculture, land use, macro-economy 
and climate modules coupled in a comprehensive 
computational framework. It runs on a 5-year time 
step from 1990. In this analysis we focus on the 
United States region in the larger global context. 
Two key drivers for the analysis, United States’ 
population and GDP are presented in Table  10.
Table  9. Mechanisms and Instruments to achieve the 
United States INDC
Target Emissions Instrument
Reduce power 
plant emissions
Clean Air Act: regulations to cut carbon pollution 
from new and existing power plants.
Reduce 
transportation 
emissions
Clean Air Act: fuel economy standards for light-
duty vehicles (2012-2025 model years), heavy-duty 
vehicles (2014-2018 model years with the intention 
to adopt standards for heavy duty vehicles in 2016 
for model years 2021-2027);
Reduce building 
sector and 
related emissions
Energy Policy Act and the Energy Independence and 
Security Act: Energy conservation standards for 29 
categories of appliances and equipment as well 
as a building code determination for commercial 
buildings.
Reduce non-CO2 
emissions
Clean Air Act: use specific alternatives to high 
GWP HFCs 
in certain applications through the Significant 
New Alternatives Policy program; Reduce 
methane emissions from landfills and oil and gas 
production.
Table  10. United States Population and GDP Drivers
Year 2015 2020 2025
GDP (Billions 
US$2005)
15,450 17,535 19,871
Population 
(Millions)
321 334 346
Source: PNNL, GCAM-USA
In this analysis, we use GCAM-USA to run three 
scenarios. The first is a reference scenario (REF) 
that assumes no additional policies beyond those 
in place roughly in 2010 with the exception of a 
limitation on new coal in the U.S. This scenario 
serves as a counterfactual against which to con-
sider future policies. However, as relevant policies 
have, indeed, been put in place over the interven-
ing years, we supplement this scenario with analy-
sis conducted by EIA when exploring the potential 
implications of the Climate Action Plan (CAP). 
The second scenario, referred to as INDC-PRICE, 
is one in which the INDC is achieved using an 
economy-wide carbon price within the GCAM-
USA modelling framework (INDC-Price). This 
scenario is used to explore the full economy-wide 
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implications of the U.S. INDC inside a comprehen-
sive modelling framework, although the actual 
policies to implement the INDC will involve a mix 
of regulatory policies. This is an expedient and 
instructive modelling approach taken to simulate 
the achievement of the U.S. contribution in which 
emissions mitigation is achieved with a common 
marginal cost of carbon. It is not intended to ap-
proximate the complete policy mix being de-
ployed. It is important to note that this scenario, 
as well, is constructed from the REF, which means 
that it does not include recent policy actions that 
will reduce emissions across various sectors. 
The final scenario, CPP, explores in more detail 
the implications of the ‘Clean Power Plan’ (CPP), 
a crucial pillar of the regulatory policies used to 
implement the INDC. This analysis focuses on the 
electricity mix. 
Figure 17 shows United States GHG emissions for 
2005 and 2025 for the REF and INDC-PRICE sce-
narios. Whereas in the REF scenario, the United 
States’ fossil fuel and industrial emissions are little 
changed between 2005 and 2025, the INDC-PRICE 
scenario reduces total greenhouse gas emissions 
by roughly 27%, relative to 2005. Figure 18 shows 
the drivers of emission changes in the INDC-PRICE 
scenario between 2015-2020 and 2020-2025. It can 
be seen that a significant share of the emissions 
reductions is driven by the decarbonisation of en-
ergy supply, notably electricity.
For comparison, Figure 17 also shows the refer-
ence scenario from the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration’s (EIA’s) Annual Energy Outlook 
(2025 EIA REF). EIA’s transportation emissions 
are lower in 2025 in the reference scenario than in 
2005, and well below those in the GCAM reference 
scenario, in which they continue to grow. This dis-
crepancy between reference scenarios is undoubt-
edly attributable  in large part to the treatment 
of passenger vehicle policies (e.g., fuel economy 
standards, biofuels standards, tax incentives) that 
have emerged over the last several years in the U.S. 
These policies are included in the EIA REF, but not 
in the GCAM REF. An obvious but important con-
clusion of this result is that U.S. policies are already 
being undertaken to reduce emissions, raising is-
sues about what is meant by a “reference” scenario 
in the context of analyses such as this one. It is also 
useful to note that EIA’s transportation emissions 
are below even those in the INDC Price scenario 
from GCAM. This confirms a standard analytical 
result that emissions-price-based policies tend to 
favour supply-side reduction; whereas real policy 
implementation approaches in the U.S., which are 
favouring regulatory approaches, can have a very 
different distribution of effort.
Figure 19 shows the sources of reductions be-
tween the 2025 REF scenario and the INDC-PRICE 
scenario. About half of the emissions reductions 
needed to implement the US INDC in this case 
are delivered by the power sector. The remainder 
comes from CO2 reductions from other sectors 
(those derived from other measures including 
those addressing buildings, transport), and from 
non-CO2 GHG reductions.
As noted above, the current approach to the U.S. 
INDC is to rely on measures implemented through 
existing laws. The most substantial single element 
of this plan is the Clean Power Plan (CPP). The 
CPP aims to reduce power sector carbon dioxide 
emissions from electricity by 32% from 2005 levels 
by 2030.
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For this analysis, we have run the CPP through 
GCAM-USA to assess its implications for emissions 
reductions. The CPP leads to electricity CO2 reduc-
tions in 2025 and 2030 relative to 2005 of 27% and 
32% respectively, for the country as a whole. 
The CPP substantially changes the energy sys-
tem. In Figure 20 we compare 2010 and power 
generation technology in our three scenarios. 
While there is little difference in total power pro-
duction across the three scenarios, the technology 
composition varies substantially. The INDC-PRICE 
and CPP scenarios contrast sharply to the REF 
scenario.
The CPP scenario is characterized by reduc-
tions in coal use for power generation accompa-
nied by increased use of natural gas, renewables, 
and nuclear, as compared to 2010 (Figure 20). 
The CPP scenario accelerates the rate of reduc-
tion of coal use relative to the reference scenario 
by an additional approximately 2 EJ/yr. In the 
CPP scenario, the increased use of natural gas, 
renewables, and nuclear replace some of the 
power provided by coal in our reference scenario, 
which is otherwise identical, but lacks the effect 
of the CPP. The INDC-PRICE scenario accelerates 
the transition away from coal still faster than in 
the CPP scenario, and accelerates deployment of 
non-emitting power generation technology, par-
ticularly nuclear energy.
By comparing Figure 19 and Figure 20, we can 
see that the changes in the power sector from 
the CPP are less than half of those implemented 
by the INDC-PRICE scenario, which was imple-
mented via an economy-wide carbon price. As 
noted above, the continuing attention to regu-
latory approaches beyond the power sector in 
U.S. policy leads to higher reductions outside 
the power sector than would be associated with 
an economy-wide carbon price. With respect to 
technology deployment, the INDC-PRICE sce-
nario produces increased deployment of nucle-
ar, wind, solar, and bioenergy, in contrast to the 
CPP scenario. It also leads to the deployment of 
some CCS. This is most notable  in its application 
to coal use, but it also produces the first deploy-
ment of bioenergy with CCS. None of this occurs 
under the CPP case. 
For context, it is instructive to compare the 
results of the INDC-Price scenario with results 
obtained by the Centre for Climate and Energy 
Solutions (C2ES). We find that the market-based, 
economy-wide price scenario (Figure 19) produc-
es roughly twice the emissions mitigation in oth-
er parts of the energy system, as compared to the 
C2ES analysis. C2ES estimates the range of emis-
sions reductions from measures other than the 
CPP to be between 4.7 and 8.4% relative to 2005. 
The higher end of this range is roughly equiva-
lent to obtaining an additional 10% improvement 
in energy efficiency, as compared with the ref-
erence scenario, in transportation, non-CO2 and 
buildings, with associated additional reductions 
in electricity demands. 
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Figure 19. Sources of emissions reductions between 
Reference and INDC-PRICE scenarios, US
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A primary concern in the context of the US INDC 
is the degree to which the U.S. Climate Action Plan 
will lead by itself to the 26% reductions intended 
under the INDC. To explore this issue and supple-
ment previous explorations of this work, we have 
combined several different analyses with our own 
to produce a composite assessment. In specific 
terms, we have combined the CPP reductions from 
our analysis with the reductions in non-electric 
CO2 from the EIA baseline along with an assess-
ment of other CO2 reduction possibilities from 
C2ES. Figure 21 shows economy-wide emissions 
reductions, relative to 2005, under the CPP sce-
nario (as well as from other measures, discussed 
below). 
The EIA REF scenario includes emissions reduc-
tion of roughly 6.9%. However, this reference sce-
nario includes not only reductions in non-electric 
sectors (primarily transportation emissions, as dis-
cussed above). It also includes reductions in elec-
tricity emissions. If we eliminate these reductions, 
we find a total reduction of 2.2% in the EIA base-
line net of the power sector. In other words, non-
electric measures already in place can be expected, 
according to EIA, to reduce total emissions by 2.2% 
relative to 2005 levels.
The CPP then provides additional reductions be-
yond those from other sectors. The GCAM CPP sce-
nario produces a direct CPP emissions mitigation 
effect of roughly 10.4% relative to 2005. This com-
pares favourably with results obtained from C2ES, 
which found 10.1% reductions from the CPP. Add-
ing in these reductions, we find a total of 12.6% 
relative to 2005 levels. However, this is only 5.7% 
beyond the EIA baseline, because the EIA REF sce-
nario (as with the GCAM REF scenario) already 
includes reductions in electricity sector emissions. 
This illustrates the important point that it is not vi-
able to simply add the CPP or other elements of 
the U.S. INDC to existing reference scenarios. Only 
the net effects from additional measures should 
be added. It also highlights the importance of the 
“baseline” scenario, which is inherently uncertain. 
The GCAM analysis does not include an assess-
ment of other measures in the CAP beyond the 
CPP that might be used to meet the 26-28% goal. 
Here, we conduct an off-line calculation to help 
understand their potential implications, and then 
we review the existing literature in this regard to 
provide a fuller picture. First, to support the off-
line analysis, we take from C2ES the additional 
CO2 reductions they expect to find beyond the 
CPP. C2ES estimates these to provide reductions of 
4.7% to 8.4% relative to 2005. Adding these to the 
12.6% already discussed leads to a total reduction 
of between 17.3% and 21% from CO2 reductions. 
(Note that we have not assessed whether any of 
the C2ES reductions may already be embodied in 
the EIA reference scenario, which would further 
limit the contributions from these other meas-
ures.) This leaves a deficit of between 5.0% and 
8.7% that must be made up through reductions in 
non-CO2 gases and other measures. 
As a matter of comparison, C2ES finds that 3.1 
to 6.6% reductions will be needed beyond actions 
already included in the present CAP for the United 
States to meet its goal of 26-28% reductions by 
2025. Given the large uncertainty in baselines and 
the nature of implementation, these estimates can 
be considered roughly comparable. In summary, 
then we find that as the present measures that 
the United States has invoked will likely need to 
be supplemented for the INDC to be successfully 
met. There is, however, significant time in which 
to strengthen the present set of measures. Further-
more, the situation for the United States is not en-
tirely different from that of some other major emit-
ters, which have also not yet fully articulated a set 
of measures that would affect their INDC. And, in 
fact, the United States has gone further than some 
in identifying an initial suite of measures that can 
be employed to implement its INDC.
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2.5. China 
China submitted its INDC to the UNFCCC on the 
30th of June 2015.16 The Chinese INDC contains the 
following objectives:
 m To achieve the peaking of carbon dioxide emis-
sions around 2030 and making best efforts to 
peak early; 
 m To lower carbon dioxide emissions per unit of 
GDP by 60% to 65% from the 2005 level by 2030; 
 m To increase the share of non-fossil fuels in pri-
mary energy consumption to around 20% by 
2030; 
 m To increase the forest stock volume by around 
4.5 billion cubic meters on the 2005 level by 
2030.
Table  11. The social and economic development 
indicators in China
2010 2020 2030
Population  (Millions) 1341 1400 1420
GDP per capita ($/capita, 
2010 price)
4604 8819 14504
Urbanization rate
(%)
49.3 60 68
Source: authors’ China INDC scenario
In this context, a joint INDC scenario was devel-
oped by the Chinese researchers in this project to 
study China’s future energy development and car-
bon emission pathway (actually the scenario rep-
resents an coherent average of three INDC scenar-
ios developed by the three Chinese research teams 
in this project – for this reason, we call it the INDC 
scenario in this chapter) . We start with the headline 
drivers of the scenario (Table  11). The population 
of China is predicted to increase and peak around 
2030 with the population of 1420 million, and then 
gradually fall to 1353 million in 2050. Urbaniza-
tion rate increases from 49.3% in 2010 to about 
68% in 2030, with more than 350 million people 
moving into cities. Driven by China’s continued in-
dustrialization and urbanization process, China’s 
economy will still grow in fast pace. However, due 
to the economic transition characterized as the 
“New Normal” phase, the GDP growth rate may be 
somewhat slower in the short-term, while return-
ing to a longer-term trend thereafter. In the INDC 
scenario, the GDP per capita of China is anticipat-
ed to increase by over 3 times from 2010 to 2030. 
16. Enhanced actions on climate change: China’ s intend-
ed nationally determined contributions. Available at: 
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Pub-
lished%20Documents/China/1/China’s%20INDC%20
-%20on%2030%20June%202015.pdf 
Table  11 displays the headline socio-economic as-
sumptions underpinning the scenario reviewed 
here. 
Driven by the economic and social development 
parameters listed above, China’s primary energy 
consumption in the INDC scenario will increase by 
64% from 90EJ in 2010 to 160EJ in 2030. Electric-
ity consumption doubles to 34EJ in 2030, and elec-
tricity consumption per capita increases to about 
6700 kWh, still lower than the average level for de-
veloped countries in 2010 of 7 800 kWh per capita. 
Energy-related CO2 emission will reach its peak 
around 2030 between 11-12 Gt CO2 emission (Fig-
ure 22). The improvement of carbon intensity of 
GDP reaches about 65% by 2030 against 2005 lev-
els, showing an acceleration of decarbonization. 
Figure 23 shows the headline drivers of emission 
changes in China in the period 2010 to 2030; the 
improvement in the carbon intensity of energy and 
energy intensity of GDP start to slow the growth 
of emissions as the peak around 2030 approaches.
According to the analysis of the Chinese research 
teams, this decarbonization path is consistent with 
the possible scenario range with more than 50% 
probability of achieving 2°C goal from IPCC AR5 
scenario database. Carbon emission per capita 
shows a similar trend with national emission, at-
taining 7.4 and 8.1 tons in 2020 and 2030 respec-
tively, and the highest carbon emission per capita 
is in 2030, which is about the same level with EU 
1990 level. 
Figures 24-26 show the drivers of decarbonisa-
tion across the three pillars of energy intensity, 
carbon intensity of electricity and the shift to low-
carbon energy sources in final energy, notably 
electricity. It can be seen that improvements in en-
ergy intensity are very significant, although China 
remains a relatively energy intense economy in 
2030. The improvement in the carbon intensity of 
electricity production is likewise very significant, 
falling by 40% between 2010 and 2030. 
A remarkable optimization of the energy mix 
plays a key role in the INDC trajectory. The share of 
coal in primary energy consumption falls from 71% 
in 2010 to 58% in 2030, while the share of non-fossil 
fuels and natural gas are predicted to increase from 
7.9% and 3.8% in 2010 to 22% and 9.2% in 2030 re-
spectively. Non-fossil fuel will gradually dominate 
the power sector thanks to continuous support pol-
icies and measures, including increasing research 
funds into reducing the cost of non-fossils, higher 
priority for newly-built non-fossil power plants, 
feed-in tariff for renewable power plants, etc. 
In 2030, the share of all renewables in total 
power generation will rise to 32%, while nucle-
ar power will contribute another 11%. Combined 
with increasing share of non-fossil electricity and 
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application of some CCS in thermal power gen-
eration, the CO2 emission per unit of electricity 
generation in 2030 will be reduced by more than 
40% from the level in 2010, and helps to reduce 
the carbon intensity per unit of energy use by large 
degree in China. The decarbonisation of the pow-
er sector is vital for the decarbonization of end-
use sectors, as the electrification rate of China 
will increase from 18% in 2010 to 21% in 2030 and 
electricity becomes a major energy source in final 
energy consumption (Figure 26). Figure 27 shows 
the electricity mix between 2010 and 2030. 
Considering China’s development stage and its 
level of industrialization and urbanization, end 
use sectors will see different trends in both energy 
consumption and emissions. Industry will still re-
main as the biggest end use sector in terms of en-
ergy consumption before 2030, and its final ener-
gy consumption will increase 52% on its 2010 level 
with emissions anticipated to peak around 7100 Mt 
CO2 between 2020 and 2025. Transportation and 
buildings, the two major sectors closely related to 
urbanization, will see enormous increases in final 
energy demand, with their final energy consump-
tion in 2030 increasing by 133% and 102% respec-
tively on their 2010 levels, and their emissions 
peaking around 2650 and 1850 Mt CO2 by around 
2030 and 2035 respectively.
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While China’s development needs in terms of ad-
vancing people’s living standards and eliminating 
poverty serve as drivers for its economic growth, 
they also creates large demands for services and 
products, which drive up China’s energy consump-
tion and CO2 emissions. Hence keeping the increase 
of service demands at a manageable level and con-
verting industrial production to a more sustainable 
model are prerequisites for China’s low-carbon de-
velopment, and policies and measures guiding both 
producers and consumers covering different end 
use sectors are essential in the INDC scenario. 
In the buildings sector, thanks to administra-
tive measures including better urban planning and 
restrictions on mass demolishing of old buildings 
and economic measures including house taxes on 
residential buildings, the total floor area will con-
tinue to rise but will be controlled at a reasonable 
level, with public building area per capita and res-
idential building area per capita increasing to 11.5 
m2 and 37 m2 around 2030 respectively, similar to 
major EU countries’ current levels17. With better 
implementation of clean and low-carbon energies, 
including heat, natural gas, electricity and distrib-
uted renewables, the proportion of coal consump-
tion is expected to decrease from 58% in 2010 to 
41% in 2030 in the buildings sector, while those of 
electricity and gas will rise from 47% and 9% in 
2010 to 56% and 17% in 2030. Figure 28 shows the 
emissions trends and energy mix in the buildings 
sector from 2010 to 2030. 
In the transport sector, through the implemen-
tation of incentivizing policies for higher capacity 
public transport modes (such as mass rail trans-
port, bus rapid transport), and the use of informa-
tion and communication technologies in transport 
management, freight and passenger turnover will 
rise to 2.8 times and 3.6 times of that in 2010 level 
respectively in 2050, and car ownership per thou-
sand persons in 2030 will increase to 200, which is 
close to 1/4 of US level in 2010.18 Through enhanced 
efforts in technology innovation, infrastructure 
construction and product diffusion, many types of 
low-carbon vehicles will gradually take dominant 
roles, such as 100% electrically powered vehicle 
(EPV), plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV), fu-
el-cell vehicles (FCV),  will take account for more 
than 25% of total light duty vehicle stock in 2030, 
and the use of biofuel will be an important option 
to reduce the use of gasoline and diesel. Figure 29 
shows the emissions trends and energy mix in the 
transport sector from 2010 to 2030. 
17. BPIE, Data hub for the energy performance of build-
ings, http://www.buildingsdata.eu/
18. Wardsauto, http://wardsauto.com/special-reports/2011
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In the industry sector, by promoting the devel-
opment of tertiary industry, controlling overca-
pacity of major energy-intensive industrial sectors, 
and eliminating backward production capacity 
(e.g. prohibiting new industrial capacity until at 
least that much inefficient capacity is shut down), 
the share of secondary industry in GDP decreases 
gradually from 46.2% in year 2010 to 38.5% in year 
2030, close to that of Germany in the mid-1990s 
and the world average level in the early-1990s. 
This helps to significantly improve the energy and 
carbon intensity of GDP and reduce emissions (cf. 
Case Study 5). By promoting the conversion of coal-
fired boilers to gas-fired boilers and enhancing the 
use of electricity, the share of gas and electricity 
will increase to 18% and 32% in 2030 from less 
than 4% and 21% respectively in 2010, while coal 
use decreases from 63% in 2010 to 37% in 2030. 
Figure 30 shows the emissions trends and energy 
mix in the industry sector from 2010 to 2030. 
Energy efficiency is an essential component of 
the INDC scenario. As the world’s largest energy 
consumer, energy efficiency gains will deliver sig-
nificant benefits in terms of cutting down total 
energy consumption. Although China has focused 
on energy efficiency improvement during the past 
decades and has cut its energy consumption per 
unit of GDP to less than twice the global average 
in 2012 from four times higher than the global 
average in 1990, there’s still great remaining po-
tential for improvement. In power sector, this oc-
curs through phasing out the outdated coal pow-
er plants and broadly deploying higher efficiency 
power generation units such as ultra-super criti-
cal coal, integrated gasification combined cycle 
coal units and natural gas combined cycle units. 
In the transport sector, by implementing strict-
er vehicle fuel economy standards, the fuel econ-
omy of light duty vehicles will increase by 20% 
from 2010 to 2030. In the buildings sector, by 
improving insulation properties of buildings and 
heating pipelines and using waste heat and high 
efficient heating technologies, the heating energy 
consumption per unit of area in northern heating 
area will decrease by about 35% on 2010 level. In 
the industry sector, by adopting the application 
of energy saving technologies, efficient waste heat 
recycling technologies and efficient boilers and 
motors, and by retiring inefficient industrial facil-
ities, the energy consumption will decouple from 
the economy growth of industry sector, with the 
final energy consumption growing by 50%, while 
industry value added increasing by 178%. The en-
ergy consumption per value added of the industry 
sector will be reduced by 45% from 2010 to 2030. 
CCS has been identified by IPCC AR5 as an es-
sential technology to meet 2-degree target, and 
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its application in power generation sector and the 
industry sector is necessary for China to achieve 
a large–scale reduction in CO2 emissions, given 
that the Chinese energy system is dominated by 
fossil fuel especially coal. In the INDC scenario, by 
accelerated technology development, promoting 
demonstration projects, improving the regulatory 
framework and the creation of a substantial price 
signal from the government, commercial CCS ap-
plication in power sector and energy-intensive in-
dustries will be seen from 2030. 
2.6. Brazil 
The Brazilian INDC
The Brazilian INDC (Brasil, 2015) establishes 
absolute emissions targets of 1.3 GtCO2eq by 2025 
and of 1.2 GtCO2eq by 2030 (GWP-100, AR5), 
corresponding to reductions of 37% and 43%, 
respectively, compared to 2005, leading to per 
capita emissions of 6.2 GtCO2eq in 2025 and of 
5.4 GtCO2eq in 2030. These percentage reductions 
are relative to reported emissions of 2.1 GtCO2eq 
(GWP-100, AR5) in 2005, according to the Brazilian 
INDC (Brasil, 2015).
The latest published Brazilian inventory of GHGs 
is the Second National Communication (SCN) to 
the UNFCCC (Brasil, 2010)—henceforth the SCN 
for its acronym in Portuguese—, which reported 
emissions of 2.29 GtCO2eq19 in 2005, exceeding the 
2.1 GtCO2eq referred to in the Brazilian INDC as 
the 2005 base year emissions. As a result, apply-
ing the 37% and 43% reductions announced in the 
INDC to the SCN implies absolute emissions of 1.44 
GtCO2eq for 2025 and of 1.30 GtCO2eq for 2030 
(GWP-100, AR5), which do not correspond to the 
absolute targets announced. Still under review, 
the unpublished Third National Communication 
to the UNFCCC20 (TCN henceforth) reports differ-
ent values for GHG emissions for 2005, namely of 
2.74 GtCO2eq, which also do not match the 2005 
value of 2.1 GtCO2eq explicitly defined in the INDC 
as the base year emissions for 2005 (Brasil, 2015). 
The only place where 2.1 GtCO2eq is reported as 
the 2005 emissions is in the 2014 report of annu-
al emissions estimates published by the Ministry 
of Science, Technology and Innovation (MCTI), 
which reports 2005 emissions of 2.04 GtCO2eq 
(MCTI, 2014), being closer to the figure of 2.1 Gt-
CO2eq. However, these estimates are not an offi-
cial report to the UNFCCC. 
19. Using the AR5 conversion factors for emissions of 1.64 
GtCO2, 18.1 MtCH4 and 546 ktN2O reported in the SCN.
20. http://www.mct.gov.br/index.php/content/
view/360077.html, currently closed for public 
consultation.
Table 12. Summary of measures included in the Brazilian INDC
Green-
house 
Gases
All Sectors Absolute targets of:
  1.3 GtCO2eq in 2025
  1.2 GtCO2eq in 2030
    (GWP-100, AR5)
LULUCF Forestry Strengthen Forest Code
 
Zero illegal deforestation in Amazonia by 
2030, with sequestrations compensating 
for emissions from legal suppression of 
vegetation.
 
Enhancing sustainable forest management 
practices
   
Restoring and reforesting 12 million hec-
tares of forests by 2030
Energy
Primary 
Energy
45% renewables by 2030
  Non-hydro renewables to 28-33% by 2030
 
Electricity 
generation
Non-hydro renewables at least 23% by 
2030
  10% efficiency gains by 2030
 
Transporta-
tion
Promote efficiency measures
  Improve public transport infrastructure
  Biofuels
18% biofuels in primary energy mix by 
2030
  Industry Promote new standards of clean technology
   
Enhance efficiency measures and low-
carbon infrastructure
Agriculture  
Strengthen Low-Carbon Agriculture plan 
(Plano ABC)
 
Restore 15 million hectares of degraded 
pastures by 2030
   
Five million hectares of integrated crop-
land-livestock-forestry systems by 2030
Source: http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Bra-
zil/1/BRAZIL%20iNDC%20english%20FINAL.pdf
Given these discrepancies among past invento-
ries, we choose to disregard the declared percent-
age reductions in the Brazilian INDC and, instead, 
focus on the absolute targets of 1.3 GtCO2eq for 
2025 and of 1.2 GtCO2eq for 2030. In order to as-
sess the impacts of the INDC, we built scenarios for 
the AFOLU sector based on existing inventories, 
studies, and reports from public, private and aca-
demic sources, to estimate the emissions budget 
available to the energy system within the time ho-
rizon of the INDC. 
The MESSAGE-Brazil-8000 model, MSB8000 
henceforth (Rochedo, Szklo, Lucena & Schaeffer, 
2015) was then used to optimize the energy system 
under different levels of carbon values ranging 
from US$0 to US$200 per ton of CO2eq. MSB8000 
generates demands for energy services from 
drivers such as GDP and population. Population 
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projections for 2050 were taken from the official 
estimates of IBGE (IBGE, 2015). Because of the 
recent slowdown of the Brazilian economy, we 
revised existing macroeconomic projections to 
match recent historical values and short-term of-
ficial projections, as explained in Section 2. 
Today, Brazil has one of the cleanest energy sys-
tems and a low-carbon energy mix based on hydro-
power for electricity (around 70-80% of electricity 
generation over recent years) and a strong pene-
tration of biofuels, especially sugarcane products, 
producing both hydrated and neat ethanol and 
electricity, and biodiesel currently blended at a 7% 
(B7) level with diesel (volume basis). Neat etha-
nol is currently blended with gasoline at 27% level 
(E27, volume basis). There has been a significant 
rise in wind generation recently and new auctions 
for solar power generation. 
The INDC targets are summarized in Table 12. 
The targets announced are moderately ambitious 
although there is potential for a higher contribu-
tion, especially from the AFOLU sectors (see case 
study). The main challenge comes from the energy 
systems, since energy demand is projected to con-
tinue a growth trend in the coming decades.
Recent studies indicate that, in the absence of 
mitigation efforts, the current Brazilian energy 
mix will continue on a trend of increasing carbon 
intensity, with natural gas and coal gaining impor-
tance in the power sector, and the sugar-alcohol 
sector undergoing a severe crisis that has caused 
the closure of several ethanol distilleries. The de-
pletion of the hydropower potential outside the 
Amazon region, and the vulnerability of existing 
hydro capacity to climate change (Lucena, Schaef-
fer, & Szklo, 2010; Lucena et al., 2009), means 
that other sources would take on increasing roles 
in meeting baseload demand, with results show-
ing coal to be the least cost solution (Lucena et 
al., 2015; Nogueira et al., 2014; Portugal-Pereira, 
Koberle, Lucena, Szklo & Schaeffer, 2015). In the 
ethanol sector in recent years, large internation-
al groups acquired Brazilian plants, which were 
mainly family owned businesses. However, these 
acquisitions did not result in the installation of 
new plants but rather in the expansion of exist-
ing ones, given the opportunity cost of capital and 
the control of gasoline prices in Brazil. Climate 
has been a large critical factor affecting sugarcane 
production in Brazil. For instance, in the main pro-
duction areas, the 2009/2010 harvest occurred 
under rainy conditions, which affected the quality 
of the raw material and disturbed the crop activi-
ties. As a result, some of the sugarcane had to be 
harvested in the following harvest. The opposite 
occurred in 2010/2011. Very dry weather during 
the crop affected the re-sprouting of the sugarcane 
and caused a decrease in the yield, which hap-
pened again in the following year. In addition, the 
dry weather impeded the treatment of the culture 
and renewal of the canebrakes (de Barros & Szklo, 
2015; IEA, 2013). 
The growing demand is fueled primarily by a 
growing population and rising income levels, with 
the highest uncertainty coming from the levels of 
economic activity in the coming decades. Thus, in 
the Cenergia/COPPE’s Brazilian scenario to match 
the official INDC, we focused first on adjusting 
GDP projections to match the recent deviations 
from a high-growth trajectory, and the forecasts 
for a reduced growth rate in the short-term. We 
then created plausible scenarios for AFOLU to 
generate emissions budgets for the energy sector 
to feed the MSB8000 model of the energy system.
Brazilian GDP and Macroeconomic 
Projections
The INDC does not specify the macroeconomic 
assumptions behind its projections, so we use a 
scenario reflecting current views of the trajectory 
of the Brazilian economy. There is broad consensus 
that the Brazilian economy will continue to 
expand in the coming decades, as is expected from 
an emerging economy. However, there is much 
uncertainty as to how fast it will grow; that is, how 
high the GDP growth rate will be. Official projec-
tions by government institutions place it above 3% 
on annual average between 2010 and 2050, with 
decadal annual growth rates as high as 4.5% (e.g 
EPE, 2014). International institutions have also 
projected high growth rates for Brazilian GDP 
(IEA, 2013). 
Although such high growth rates might have 
been reasonable to expect a few years ago, recent 
developments caused a marked reduction in eco-
nomic activity in Brazil that has made such esti-
mates obsolete. The average growth rate for the 
period 2011-2014 was just 1.5% per year (IBGE, 
2015). The most recent estimates published by the 
Brazilian Central Bank indicates Brazilian GDP 
shrinking by 2.66% in 2015, shrinking again by 
0.78% in 2016, and returning to modest growth in 
subsequent years (BCB, 2015). Most available GDP 
projections for Brazil were constructed before the 
current recession hit the country and the growth 
rates that resulted are far too optimistic. Because 
economic activity is a fundamental driver of the 
socio-economic scenario underpinning energy ser-
vice and resource demand, it is essential to have 
robust assumptions, at least in the historic and 
short-term periods.
We use SSPs GDP projections as a starting point, 
and then adjust them to match historical rates and 
short-term growth projections by the Brazilian 
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Central Bank (BCB, 2015). The Representative 
Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) have estimates 
for Brazilian GDP annual growth rates ranging 
between 1.2% and 4.0% for the 2010-2050 period, 
with the middle SSP2 scenario averaging 2.2% an-
nual average GDP growth rate21. These adjusted 
GDP projections are shown in Table  13. Of these, 
SSP2 is used as a reference scenario here. The re-
sulting 1.9% annual average growth rate for the 
period 2010-2050 may seem conservative, but we 
argue it is a realistic estimate of sustained growth 
over a long period. This 1.9% annual growth rate 
compounds over 40 years, resulting in a Brazilian 
GDP in 2050 that more than doubles compared 
to 2010. It should be noted that, for the purpose 
of evaluating the Brazilian INDC, the short term 
GDP growth projections are more relevant, since 
the INDC targets are 2025 and indicative to 2030. 
Hence, using the most up-to-date short-term pro-
jections is important.
We used the SSP2-adjusted GPD projection to 
adjust sectoral demands used previously in our 
assessments (Herreras-Martínez et al., 2015; Luce-
na et al., 2015; Nogueira et al., 2014). We call this 
adjusted scenario the COPPE-sCENario, and it is 
built by using the same 2010 base year value of our 
earlier scenarios, and applying the growth rates 
from the adjusted SSP2 scenarios of Table  13. The 
correction factor is then calculated as the ratio be-
tween the COPPE-sCENario and the old scenario 
for each 5-year period. The resulting GDP projec-
tion is shown in Table  14 .
Sectoral emissions consistent with the INDC
We ran the MSB8000 model using the GDP projec-
tions of the COPPE-sCENario under various 
carbon prices ranging from US$0 to US$200/
tCO2eq. Resulting energy emissions in 2030 for 
each carbon price applied are shown in Table  15. 
In order to assess the effects of the INDC on the 
energy system, scenarios consistent with the 
INDC targets have to be created for the AFOLU 
sectors, so that an emissions budget for the energy 
system can be compared to the MSB8000 results. 
Previous studies involving emissions cap scenarios 
have found that it is technically unfeasible for 
2030 energy emissions to be less than 70% of 2010 
energy emissions (Lucena et al., 2015), implying in 
energy-related emissions of around 410 MtCO2eq 
in 2030. Therefore, to arrive at this budget for 
energy, AFOLU emissions must be less than 790 
MtCO2eq in 2030 in order to meet the INDC total 
emissions target of 1.2 GCO2eq by 2030. 
21. https://secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/SspDb/
dsd?Action=htmlpage&page=about
Case study 3. INDC implementation and 
improving productivity in agriculture 
The significant reduction in deforestation rates in Brazil brought 
the country´s total emissions from a peak of 2.5 GtCO2eq in 2004 
to about 1.2 GtCO2eq in 2010, and caused the agricultural sector 
to overtake land-use change (LUC) as the main cause of emis-
sions (MCTI, 2013). Although increases in, and better enforcement 
of, protected areas by the federal government played an important 
role (de Souza et al., 2013; Soares-Filho et al., 2010), emissions 
from the agriculture and land use sectors are closely interrelated, 
and measures implemented in the agricultural sector were instru-
mental for the drop in deforestation. A persistent decoupling of 
agricultural production from deforestation has been observed 
recently, driven in large part by the intensification of agriculture 
and cattle ranching (Lapola et al., 2013; Macedo et al., 2012), and 
by private actor initiatives such as the Soy Moratorium (Nepstad 
et al., 2009) that reduced pressure for expansion of the agricul-
tural area. Some authors found that the level of agrarian technol-
ogy in a given region of Brazil is inversely proportional to the rates 
of deforestation in that region (de Souza et al., 2013). With Bra-
zil expected to supply a large share of future global demand for 
agricultural products, the intensification of the sector will need to 
continue if deforestation is to be further reduced or, even better, 
eliminated.
The cornerstone of the government´s climate policies for the 
agricultural sector is the Low-Carbon Agriculture Plan, or Plano 
ABC (MAPA, 2011), with mitigation targets between 134 and 
163 MtCO2eq by 2020, even though the potential may be much 
larger. In a recent study, Assad et al (2015) found that the actual 
emissions mitigation potential of Brazilian agriculture is more 
than ten times larger than the targets of the Plano ABC, about 
1.8 GtCO2eq between 2013-2023. In order to reduce agricultural 
emissions, both documents agree that most of the mitigation 
efforts must be directed at the bovine herd, which is responsible 
for the bulk of the sector´s emissions, mostly in the form of CH4 
from enteric fermentation (Brasil, 2015). About 63% of the miti-
gation targeted in the Plano ABC comes from the recuperation of 
degraded pastures (MAPA, 2011). Pasture degradation is defined 
as the progressive loss of natural vigor, productivity and recover-
ing capacity demanded by the animals (Assad et al., 2013). More 
than half of Brazil´s pastures is in a state of degradation, and 
recuperation could lead to a marked increase in herd productivity, 
reduced average age at slaughter and lifetime enteric emissions 
along with it, and increase soil carbon stocks (Assad et al., 2015; 
Dias-Filho, 2011). Moreover, Strassburg et al (2014) estimate that 
improving the productivity of Brazilian pasturelands would free 
up enough land to meet projected demands of crops and biofuels 
through 2040. 
Restoring degraded pastures involves mechanization for soil 
preparation, sowing and fertilization, requires capital invest-
ments and improved pasture management capacity, and some-
times supplementary irrigation (Dias-Filho, 2014; Smith et al., 
2007; Strassburg et al., 2014). Mechanization drives up demand 
for energy, notably diesel, demanding about 10 machine-hours 
per hectare (ANUALPEC, 2013), while irrigation drives up demand 
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for electricity (EPE, 2014), and fertilization increases N2O emis-
sions (Smith et al., 2007). Agriculture accounts for only 4% of 
primary energy consumption in Brazil but the ongoing expansion 
and modernization of the sector has raised energy consumption, 
particularly diesel, which accounts for roughly 58% of the sec-
tor’s primary energy consumption (EPE, 2013). Therefore, energy 
related emissions from the agricultural sector have increased 
alongside its intensification, and partly because of it. On the other 
hand, healthy pastures retain greater quantities of soil carbon 
(Assad et al., 2015; Dias-Filho, 2011), and provide better quality 
forage that can reduce CH4 emissions from enteric fermentation 
(Smith et al., 2007). Determining net emissions from pasture res-
toration is therefore a complex process, and, in order to remove 
carbon from the atmosphere, emissions from the energy required 
in the restoration process would need to be less than the 1 tC/ha/
year assumed by Assad et al. (2015) as the removal potential of 
pasture restoration.
However, if avoided deforestation from reduced agricultural 
expansion is included in the calculations, the result will certainly 
be a net carbon removal. Assad et al. (2015) estimate that about 
40 million heads of cattle graze on some 53 million hectares of 
degraded pastures in Brazil, amounting to less than 0.75 animal 
units per hectare. The current Brazilian bovine herd is approxi-
mately 220 million heads foraging on about 225 million hectares 
(IBGE, 2015), translating to a herd density of just below one head 
per hectare, well below the carrying capacity estimated by Stras-
sburg et al (2014). Increasing the current density by only 10%, 
to about 1.1 heads per hectare, would free up some 20 million 
hectares of land that could be used for agriculture. This amounts 
to about 28% of the country’s total cropland harvested area in 
2013 (IBGE, 2015).
Agro-forestry and no-till agriculture also present great mitiga-
tion potential in Brazil. The Plano ABC has mitigation targets of 
34-42 MtCO2eq by 2020 through adoption of these techniques on 
12 million hectares of cropland, representing about 25% of the 
emissions reductions targeted by the plan (MAPA, 2011). Although 
such systems reduce emissions from degraded pastures through 
improvements in soil carbon sequestration capacity (Dias-Filho, 
2011; Macedo et al, 2014; Smith et al., 2007; Zimmer et al, 2012), 
they demand more in terms of energy inputs than simply recu-
perating pastures through direct methods. For example, Sá et al 
(2013) reported 28% higher diesel consumption in pasture-soy-
bean co-cultivation than in pasture only recuperation. They also 
reported that introduction of no-till methods can partially offset 
this higher demand for diesel. For crop production, no-till methods 
can lead to both higher carbon sequestration capacity in soils and 
to lower CO2 emissions from lower energy use on the on hand, but 
to higher N2O emissions on the other (Smith et al., 2007). Reduc-
tions in energy use from adoption of no-till methods can vary from 
5% (Riquetti, Benez, & Silva, 2012; Sá et al., 2013)to as much as 
48% (Rondón, León, & Alfonso, 2005), depending on the crop and 
on local conditions.
Brazilian agriculture is mostly rainfed, with only 4.5 million hec-
tares, about 6% of planted area, irrigated in 2006 (IBGE, 2007). 
However, this number is increasing, and doing so at a faster pace 
than total harvested area. By 2012, the irrigated area had grown 
to 5.8 million hectares, representing 8.3% of total planted area 
(ANA, 2013). The irrigation potential in Brazil has been estimated 
at around 29.5 million hectares (Christofidis, 2008), and total irri-
gated area is projected to grow to some 7.8 to 9.8 million hectares 
by 2030 (MIN, 2011). This increase is pointed to as the main driver 
of growing electricity demand in the agricultural sector (EPE, 
2014). Since electricity generation in Brazil is expected to become 
more carbon intensive in the coming decades (Lucena et al., 
2015), this indirectly leads to higher emissions. However, there is 
considerable room for irrigation efficiency improvements, pointing 
to an important mitigation option with the potential co-benefit of 
better water use efficiency (Campana et al, 2000; Guimarães Jr 
et al, 2006; Lima et al, 2009; Reis et al, n.d.; Zocoler et al, 2012)
There is good potential for Brazil to sustainably supply a sig-
nificant portion of the global demand for agricultural products. 
However, policy support and regulation is necessary since the 
intensification of agriculture leads to higher yields, which in turn 
can drive up the price of land and lead to renewed deforestation 
pressures (Galford et al, 2013; Sparovek et al, 2010). In order for 
Brazil to realize its sustainable agricultural potential, a sustained 
integrated approach is needed that combines inter alia the elimi-
nation of incentives to deforestation, the introduction of policies 
and financial support for productivity improvements, as well as 
higher use of renewable energy and improved equipment effi-
ciency of the machinery and irrigation systems.
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Land-Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry
For the LULUCF sector, we analyzed three possible 
scenarios for deforestation in Brazil in 2030 using 
the same methodology as Cenergia (2015), but 
adjusting the targets to those of the INDC: 
 m Scenario 1: Deforestation remains at the same 
level as 2010, 
 m Scenario 2: Deforestation drops to 50% of 2010 
by 2025, and 
 m Scenario 3: Net-zero deforestation by 2030.
Base year 2010 emissions were calculated via 
a proxy of emissions per km2 calculated for 2005 
based on deforestation of 19,014 km2 reported 
by PRODES for Amazonia (INPE, 2014) and LU-
LUCF emissions of 1.24 MtCO2eq reported in 
the SCN (Brasil, 2010), resulting in an emission 
factor of a little over 70 tCO2eq per km2 of de-
forestation. If this value is assumed to remain 
constant between 2005-2010, multiplying it by 
7,000 km2 deforestation in 2010 reported by 
PRODES (INPE, 2014) we arrive at an estimate 
for LULUCF emissions of 490 MtCO2eq for the 
base year 2010. This is very similar to estimates 
from the REDD-PAC Project (OC, 2015), and to 
the unpublished TCN. 
Although the INDC pledges to compensate for 
“legal suppression of vegetation”, this seems to 
relate only to Amazonia, and it remains unclear 
to what extent this can be interpreted as net-zero 
emissions from deforestation (see below and case 
study 3). However, as we show in below, achieving 
net-zero emissions from deforestation is crucial to 
arrive at an economy-wide emissions level consist-
ent with the INDC.
Agriculture
Agriculture represents about a third of Brazilian 
emissions today and is expected to continue on a 
growing trend in absolute terms. We project the 
1990-2005 agricultural emissions time series of the 
SCN (Brasil, 2010) to 2030, and subtract the miti-
gation targets of the Plano ABC (MAPA, 2011)22, 
assuming the minimum target is reached in 2020 
(134 MtCO2eq) and the maximum in 2030 (163 
MtCO2eq)23. This results in agricultural emissions 
22. The Plano ABC is the Brazilian government’s low-car-
bon agriculture plan
23. The plan’s targets are supposed to be reached by 2020, 
but there are little indications that it will be accom-
plished by that time.
Table 15. Resulting GHG emissions in 2025 and 2030 associated with each level of carbon pricing from MSB8000 model (MtCO2eq) 
US$/tCO2eq Base $0 $5 $10 $20 $30 $40 $50 $75 $100 $150 $200
MtCO2eq
2025 803 713 707 689 689 685 680 672 669 667 646 639
2030 890 778 770 750 747 740 733 722 717 686 658 641
Note: Emissions include fossil fuel combustion from all sectors, industrial processes, waste treatment, and fugitive emissions Emissions 
from LULUCF are not included.
Source: COPPE
Table 13. Brazil GDP projections. SSPs adjusted for historic and revised short-term projections
2010-2015 2015-2020 2020-2025 2025-2030 2030-2035 2035-2040 2040-2045 2045-2050 Avg
SSP1 1.5% 0.3% 4.4% 4.1% 3.8% 3.5% 3.0% 2.6% 2.9%
SSP2 1.5% 0.3% 2.8% 2.4% 2.3% 2.1% 1.9% 1.8% 1.9%
SSP3 1.5% 0.3% 2.1% 1.5% 1.2% 1.0% 0.7% 0.5% 1.1%
SSP4 1.5% 0.3% 2.5% 2.2% 2.0% 1.8% 1.6% 1.4% 1.7%
SSP5 1.5% 0.3% 4.9% 4.6% 4.3% 3.9% 3.4% 3.0% 3.2%
Hist Proj
Source: COPPE
Table 14. COPPE-sCENario projections of Brazilian GDP
COPPE-sCENario              
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
2013US$ million 2163738 2332740 2366914 2721249 3069272 3431802 3810216 4194482 4576259
% annual growth
over each five year period
1.52% 0.29% 2.83% 2.44% 2.26% 2.11% 1.94% 1.76%
Source: COPPE
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of 437 MtCO2eq in 2025 and of 475 MtCO2eq in 
2030. This is also very similar to estimates from 
REDD-PAC (OC, 2015), and to the unpublished 
TCN. Therefore, mitigation from Plano ABC offsets 
emissions growth trend and agriculture emissions 
would be broadly stable  over the INDC period. 
Transformation in the Energy Sector of 
Brazil
The resulting emissions in 2030 of each LULUCF 
scenario were added to the agricultural emissions, 
and the total subtracted from the 2030 INDC target 
of 1.2 GtCO2eq, to estimate how much room is left 
for the remaining emissions (basically energy-
related emissions). Of the possible AFOLU combi-
nations, only Scenarios 2 and 3 led to a technically 
feasible energy emissions budget (>410 MtCO2eq). 
In other words, only the full implementation of the 
Plano ABC combined with deforestation less than 
50% of 2010 levels will lead to an energy emissions 
budget greater than the technically feasible 410 
MtCO2eq in 2030 estimated by Lucena et al. (2015). 
Scenario 2 leads to energy emissions budget of 480 
MtCO2eq in 2030, making it technically feasible 
but economically challenging, since not even 
a shadow price of carbon exceeding US$200/
tCO2eq would be enough to implement such a 
target (Table  15). Scenario 3 leaves room for 725 
MtCO2eq for emissions from the energy sector in 
2030. Therefore, Scenario 3 is the only scenario 
that is technically and economically feasible, 
although it would imply a shadow mitigation cost 
of around US$50/tCO2eq (so-called BC5024). In 
this case, a B50 scenario would imply in the invest-
ment in carbon capture facilities, particularly in 
ethanol distilleries (bio-CCS)—see Figure 31. 
However, the language in the INDC suggests 
mitigation that goes beyond the measures im-
plemented above for the AFOLU sectors. For the 
LULUCF sector, the INDC pledges to restore and 
reforest 12 million hectares of forests, leading to 
carbon removal from the atmosphere. The miti-
gation potential of this measure is uncertain and 
no value was given in the INDC. There are also 
pledges to net-zero deforestation in the Amazon 
by 2030, and compensation for deforestation that 
is legal, although, again, no specific measures are 
put forward. The REDD-PAC project25 estimates 
that net emissions from LULUCF will reach 240 
million MtCO2eq in 2030, in spite of net-zero de-
forestation in the Amazon and reforestation of 5 
million hectares.
24. From the Portuguese “Baixo Carbono”, which means 
low-carbon.
25. http://www.observatoriodoclima.eco.br/lei-de- 
floresta-zeraria-desmate-na-amazonia/
For the agricultural sector, the INDC pledges to 
strengthen the Plano ABC, “including by restoring 
an additional 15 million hectares of degraded pas-
turelands by 2030, and enhancing 5 million hec-
tares of integrated cropland-livestock-forestry sys-
tems (ICLFS) by 2030” (Brasil, 2015, our emphasis). 
The word additional suggests that this is in addition 
to the targets in the Plano ABC of restoring 15 mil-
lion hectares of degraded pastures (MAPA, 2011) 
This could potentially lead to mitigation of around 
55 MtCO2eq per year if we apply the 1 tC/ha/year 
estimated by Assad et al. (2015) as the removal po-
tential of pasture restoration. This would allow for 
energy emissions of 780 MtCO2eq, exactly what 
would be possible in a ‘no-regret mitigation sce-
nario’ with a US$0/tCO2eq shadow price of carbon 
(Table  15). This no-regret scenario includes meas-
ures in the energy system that have negative costs, 
such as energy efficiency, but are not implemented 
because of market failures, such as, inter alia, trans-
action costs, lack of information, lack of financing, 
split incentives and/or monopoly markets. 
We, therefore, adopt this no-regret scenario as 
the COPPE INDC scenario26 to assess the effect of 
the INDC on the energy sector. As will be shown 
below, the COPPE INDC scenario meets INDC both 
targets for non-hydro renewables, of 23% in elec-
tricity generation, and of 45% in primary energy 
26. The COPPE INDC scenario was developed independently 
by a group of experts affiliated with COPPE and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the Brazilian government. 
It should also be noted that the COPPE INDC scenario 
has no normative purposes, while it is aimed at exploring 
one of the different possible pathways compatible with 
the achievement of the Brazilian INDC target.


Fossil
CCS
Biomass
CCS
Figure 31. Carbon capture in low-carbon scenarios 
as a function of different CO2 prices
Note: Fossil CCS means capture in thermal power plants, oil refineries 
(including hydrogen generation units) and ammonia, cement and iron and 
steel facilities. Bio CCS includes capture in ethanol distilleries and, 
for higher prices, capture in biomass fueled thermal power plants.
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Source: COPPE, MSB8000 model
US$/tCO2eq
STUDY 05/20154 0 IDDRI
Beyond the Numbers: Understanding the Transformation Induced by INDCs
consumption, as well as the target of minimum 
18% biofuels in the primary energy mix. These 
goals can be met with the non-regret COPPE INDC 
scenario, but our analysis shows that, with higher 
marginal abatement costs, even further mitigation 
would be feasible.
Figure 32 shows the evolution of emissions in 
the baseline and in the COPPE INDC scenario, in-
dicating a reduction from 890 to 778 MtCO2eq, a 
13% drop from baseline in 2030. Figure 33 shows 
the evolution of sectoral emissions, and, as can 
be seen in Table  16, reductions vary greatly with 
some sectors increasing their emissions (Agricul-
ture, Services, and Process emissions), which are 
offset by the reductions in the others (particularly 
Industry, Buildings, Waste Treatment and Fugitive 
emissions). The increase in energy emissions from 
agricultural emissions comes from the increasing 
mechanization and intensification of Brazilian 
agriculture (see case study). Reductions in waste 
treatment emissions come from higher penetra-
tion of waste collection and treatment, while re-
ductions in fugitive emissions come from a general 
improvement in industrial processes and the re-
duction of flaring especially in petroleum produc-
tion in offshore platforms. 
Table  16. Percent change in low-carbon COPPE INDC 
emissions from baseline in 2030
Industry -16.7%
Agriculture1 5.9%
Transport -4.1%
Buildings -19.7%
Energy Sector2 4.0%
Electricity Production -2.1%
Industrial Processes -13.2%
Waste Treatment 1.4%
Non-CO23 -32.2%
Source: COPPE, MSB8000 model
Note: Emissions include fossil fuel combustion from all sectors, industrial processes, 
waste treatment, and fugitive emissions. 1 Emissions from energy consumption in 
the agriculture sector; 2 Fuel combustion for self-consumption in energy conversion 
facilities; 3 Fugitive emissions
The sectoral emissions from Table  16 are pictured 
in Figure 33, highlighting the baseline increases in 
emissions from processes, waste treatment, indus-
try and transportation, and their contribution to 
the reduction in the INDC scenario. 
As can be seen, the transport sector remains a 
major source of GHG emissions in the INDC sce-
nario, with only a slight 4% reduction from base-
line in 2030. However, there is potential for further 
reductions, albeit at a higher mitigation cost. At 
US$50/tCO2eq, for example, the sector’s emissions 
drop by close to 7%, and surpasses 8% at US$100/
tCO2eq. These may seem modest compared to po-
tential reductions in OECD countries, but country-
specific barriers limit further reductions. First, 
there is the challenge of timely deployment of mass 
transportation, with metro lines, for example, only 
present in a few of the major cities in the country 
today and even so with limited capillarity. Second, 
the renovation of the light-duty fleet is slower than 
in OECD countries due to the high cost of vehicles 
relative to income levels, which leads to older cars 
remaining active for a longer time. Third, there 
is a strong preference for individual modes of 
transport, especially as income levels rise. Finally, 
freight transport is heavily reliant on trucks riding 
on inadequately paved roads, with a modal shift to 
rail or water facing serious challenges from lack of 
investment and inefficient bureaucracy. 
These factors imply in growing final energy and 
energy service indicators for the transportation 
sector, from 1343 MJ/US$-2013 in 2010 to 2242 MJ/
US$-2013 (in terms of the ratio between final en-
ergy and GDP), and from 0.84 pkm/US$-2013 to 
1.08 pkm/US$-2013 (in terms of the ratio between 
energy service and GDP).
The greatest mitigation potential is in the in-
dustrial thermal energy consumption, through 
low-cost measures such as substitution of burners, 
adjustment of air-fuel ratio in the burners, thermal 
isolation, heat exchange networks and improve-
ment of processes control. Industrial emissions 
drop by almost 17% in the COPPE INDC scenario, 
being the cheapest option to curb emissions under 


Figure 32. Annual energy system emissions in baseline 
and low-carbon COPPE INDC scenarios
Note: Emissions include fossil fuel combustion from all sectors, 
industrial processes, waste treatment, and fugitive emissions.
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the integrated energy assessment of MSB8000. On 
the other hand, process emissions rise by 1.4% in 
the COPPE INDC scenario. This is mostly due to 
increased hydro-treatment (HDT) in petroleum 
refineries for production of highly specified fuels, 
implying in higher hydrogen production. However, 
for shadow prices of carbon higher than US$30/
tCO2eq, these process emissions can be mitigated 
via CCS in hydrogen production units (as was 
shown in Figure 31).
The annual reduction in primary energy con-
sumption in the COPPE INDC scenario compared 
to baseline (Figure 34) indicates a drop of about 
13% from baseline in 2030. Total primary energy 
consumption rises in the time horizon in pace with 
growing population and income levels. 
Figure 35 shows primary energy consumption by 
source with an overall increase from 2010, but a re-
duction from baseline in the INDC scenario driven 
in large part by a drop in most energy carriers (oil 
12%, coal 11%, biomass 18%, sugarcane products 
11% and solar 10%) and a concomitant large in-
crease in gas consumption of 19% accompanied by 
a slight increase in hydropower consumption of a 
little less than 1%. 
Figure 36 shows electricity generation high-
lighting the continuing dominance of hydropower 
along with an increasing presence of sugarcane 
bagasse, onshore wind and distributed solar PV. 
There is a drop in electricity consumption of about 
3.3% from 675 TWh to 653 TWh in 2030, caused 
by efficiency gains in the electricity sector. This 
is exactly a third of the INDC target of 10%. En-
ergy efficiency potential is a challenge to quantify 
given is diffuse nature, and no concrete measures 
are offered in the INDC. The round value of 10% 
is perhaps the lowest round number that could be 
included in a document of the nature of an INDC, 
and most likely does not reflect a hard target but, 
rather, signals a preoccupation to include energy 
efficiency as part of the mitigation efforts. There 
is certainly room to improve efficiency in electric-
ity uses, be it from reducing the currently high 
16% losses in transmission and distribution (EPE, 
2013), or from a myriad of possibilities in all sec-
tors of the economy, from irrigation in the agricul-
tural sector to other end uses in residential, servic-
es and industrial sectors. Still, given the lifetime of 
appliances and the gradual substitution for more 
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efficient equipment, energy efficiency policies may 
take time to show large reductions in demand.
Sugarcane bagasse responds the most to the re-
duction in demand from the baseline to COPPE 
INDC scenario, with an almost 28% drop, followed 
by a reduction in coal generation using domestic 
coal (of low quality), which falls by about 17%, and 
CHP by 4.5%. In contrast, there is no change to elec-
tricity generation from other sources, except for a 
small increase in hydropower generation of 0.8%, 
which still translates to about 3.5 TWh given the 
large share of hydropower in the Brazilian electric-
ity mix. Other renewable sources remain unaltered.
The no-regret COPPE INDC scenario has net 
negative costs for the energy system, indicating 
a net benefit to the sector27 as can be seen in Fig-
ure 38. This benefit, however, can only be realized 
by the elimination of widespread barriers and 
market failures that plague the Brazilian economy 
and reduce its overall efficiency28. These include 
high-interest rates (currently at 14.25% per year), 
high inflation (9.6% forecast for 2015) and low in-
vestor confidence that is fueled by high political 
and economic uncertainty in the short-term, and 
27. It should be noted that this result depends on the dis-
count rate assumed, in this case, 10% per year.
28. It should be considered that policies to reduce these 
barriers would have a cost, which is not considered in 
the modeling effort. 
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structural inefficiencies in the long-term such as 
an overly complex tax system, a heavy tax load 
(currently ~35% of GDP), low labor productivity 
and inadequate infrastructure. These problems are 
often referred to collectively as the “Brazil-cost”, 
which puts a premium on prices, effectively func-
tioning as a barrier to investment. A reduction in 
the Brazil-cost could potentially lead to a more 
efficient economy, and consequently to improve-
ments in the energy and carbon efficiencies of the 
country.
Although we only report results through 2030, 
the MSB8000 model time horizon is 2050, and im-
portant dynamics occur past 2030 that make the 
case for a more ambitious mitigation effort in the 
medium term. In particular, more coal generation 
capacity is deployed pre-2030 in the COPPE INDC 
scenario than in higher-CO2 price scenarios, indi-
cating the danger of a carbon lock-in that would 
make mitigation in later years more challeng-
ing. Actually, in the Baseline the coal share in the 
electricity generation evolves from 2% in 2030 to 
18% in 2050, while in the COPPE INDC scenario it 
evolves from 2% in 2030 to 8% in 2050 and in BC50 
it remains sTable  in 2% from 2030 to 2050. There-
fore, a strategy involving further effort after 2030 
would be hampered by coal power plants installed 
pre-2030 that would not have reached the end of 
their lifetime. 
Table  17 shows the share of renewables under 
various shadow costs of mitigation, indicating that 
most renewable energy targets in the INDC can 
be met by the COPPE INDC scenario. The major 
exception is the 45% share of total renewables in 
primary energy consumption (PEC) indicated by 
the INDC, a share that only realized with shadow 
costs higher than US$50/tCO2eq. All other targets 
are met with the COPPE INDC scenario, including 
INDC targets of 23% of non-hydro renewables in 
electricity generation and 18% share of biofuels 
in PEC. Clearly, it is worth stressing that Brazil’s 
INDC did not provide the macroeconomic scenario 
behind the targets. Nor did it highlight if these tar-
gets were based on an integrated analysis. There-
fore, given our results, it is possible to say that 
most of INDC targets related to the energy system 
are feasible at relatively low-carbon prices.
Table  17. Share of renewables under various shadow 
costs of mitigation (PEC = primary energy consumption; 
EG = electricity generation)
2030
COPPE 
INDC
BC10 BC20 BC50 BC100 BC200
Total renewa-
bles in PEC
39% 40% 40% 43% 47% 49%
Biofuels in PEC 26% 27% 28% 30% 33% 36%
Sugarcane in 
PEC
20% 20% 21% 23% 26% 28%
(Wind + Solar + 
Biofuels) share 
in PEC
28% 28% 29% 32% 35% 38%
Hydro share 
in EG
68% 68% 68% 66% 66% 65%
(Wind+Solar) 
share in EG
21% 21% 21% 23% 23% 23%
Source: COPPE, MSB8000 model
Table  18 shows Brazil’s energy and carbon in-
tensity in the baseline and COPPE INDC scenarios, 
as well as the electricity grid emission factor un-
der both scenarios. There is a drop in all indica-
tors, reflecting an improvement to both the energy 
and carbon intensity of the economy. By 2030, the 
energy intensity drops from 126.4 toe/kUS$ in the 
baseline to 110.2 toe/kUS$, a 12.6% drop, while the 
carbon intensity falls from 253.4 tCO2eq/kUS$ in 
the baseline to 253.4 tCO2eq/kUS$, a 12.8% drop. 
In contrast to the economy-wide improvement in 
carbon intensity, there is an increase in the grid 
factor from 42.2 kg/kWh to 42.7 kg/kWh, a 1.2% 
increase in carbon intensity in electricity genera-
tion, underlining the exclusion of mostly sugar-
cane bagasse and coal, with bagasse generation 
dropping by a larger amount than coal, thus in-
creasing the electricity grid emission factor.
Conclusions 
The land use emissions pledges in the INDC 
have elicited criticism from observers saying 
that although relatively ambitious, they do not 
go far enough, especially in light of the potential 
for mitigation in Brazil (see case study). Much 
BC0
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
Figure 37. Carbon intensity of the Brazilian economy, 
from energy related GHG emissions in  the Baseline 
and COPPE INDC scenarios
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of the challenge will be in the implementation 
of adequate measures to reach the targets, espe-
cially given the recent changes to the Forest Code 
in 2012. Particular controversy exists around the 
so-called “amnesty” to land owners who illegally 
deforested their land prior to 2008, as there is a 
powerful “ruralist” lobby claiming that without 
such amnesty, most Brazilian rural properties 
would be “unfeasible”29. The issue is under review 
by the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal 
Federal). 
In addition, there is the controversy around the 
environmental reserve quota (or CRA for Cota de 
Reserva Ambiental), a flexible mechanism that al-
lows farmers that have overshot the clearing limit 
on their land can buy quotas from other farmers 
who keep more forest coverage on their proper-
ties than required by law. Using the land use mod-
el GLOBIOM, the Redd-Pac study estimated that 
without the amnesty and without the CRA, there 
is considerable potential for recovering almost 30 
million hectares of forest, twice as much as the 
15 million hectares pledged in the INDC. In a sce-
nario where the CRA is only available for crop-
lands but not to pasturelands, the potential falls 
to 21 million hectares. Although this is still more 
than the INDC pledge, the study shows that the 
CRA can be a perverse incentive, especially for 
29. http://www.observatoriodoclima.eco.br/lei-de- 
floresta-zeraria-desmate-na-amazonia/
the caatinga and cerrado biomes, and if adopted 
without further policies, the CRA could become 
a disincentive for forest recuperation in 2 million 
hectares in the Cerrado alone. In fact, the cerrado 
is the biome that bears much of the brunt of agri-
cultural expansion, and is expected to lose much 
of its area as a consequence of more visible sup-
port to halt deforestation in the Amazon. 
We have focused here in the COPPE INDC 
scenario because the targets for AFOLU permit 
a less ambitious effort from the energy system, 
and because it is the least cost scenario that still 
meets most of the INDC targets. However, and 
we have pointed to this throughout the text, 
mitigation in the Brazilian energy system can 
certainly go further with higher shadow costs of 
carbon. As shown in Figure 38, the results of the 
optimization model, which optimizes the energy 
system from 2010 to 2050, indicates that up to 15 
US$/tCO2 the low-carbon scenarios can be seen 
(from the microeconomic perspective of the en-
ergy system) as non-regret. Even for higher CO2 
prices the differences between the costs seems 
not to be huge.
Certainly, should more be done to abate energy 
emissions, less will be required from AFOLU for 
the country to meet its INDC targets. Although 
AFOLU mitigation measures tend to bring the 
most co-benefits, including a higher net present 
value, there are important barriers that may 
stand in the way such as transaction costs.
Table 18. Energy sector indicators under the COPPE INDC scenario and Baseline, 2010-2030, Brazil
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Baseline
Total
Emissions MtCO2 584.9 701.2 704.1 802.6 889.8
Energy Mtep 249.2 290.4 308.9 350.4 388.0
Carbon Int. tCO2eq/kUS$ 270.3 300.6 297.5 294.9 289.9
Energy Int. toe/kUS$ 115.2 124.5 130.5 128.8 126.4
Power Sector
Emissions MtCO2 30.86 40.65 28.23 28.13 28.47
Generation GWh 510.6 527.0 577.2 618.2 675.3
Grid Factor kgCO2eq/kWh 60.4 77.1 48.9 45.5 42.2
                 
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
COPPE INDC
Total
Emissions MtCO2 584.9 701.2 653.8 712.7 777.8
Energy Mtep 249.2 290.2 265.0 303.1 338.3
Carbon Int. tCO2eq /kUS$ 270.3 300.6 276.2 261.9 253.4
Energy Int. toe/kUS$ 115.2 124.4 111.9 111.4 110.2
Power Sector
Emissions MtCO2 30.86 42.96 28.38 28.27 27.87
Generation GWh 510.6 521.6 540.1 602.1 653.0
Grid Factor kgCO2eq /kWh 60.4 82.4 52.5 47.0 42.7
Note: Emissions include fossil fuel combustion from all sectors, industrial processes, waste treatment, and fugitive emissions.
Source: COPPE, MSB8000 model
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2.7. India 
Background
India submitted its INDC to the UNFCCC on 
the 2nd of October 201530. It outlines eight inter-
related action points focusing on mitigation, 
adaptation, technology, finance and capacity 
building. From the perspective of the energy 
sector it sets aspirational quantitative goals on 
2 specific aspects, namely (a) reducing emission 
intensity of GDP by 33-35% by 2030 compared to 
2005 levels, and (b) achieving 40% cumulative 
electric power installed capacity from non-fossil 
fuel based energy resources by 2030, with the 
help of technology transfer and low cost interna-
tional finance. To facilitate achieving these goals, 
throughout the INDC text, particular emphasis 
has been placed on institution building at the 
national and international level for mobilization 
of finance and technological capabilities, espe-
cially from developed countries. This institution 
building is aimed at strengthening collective 
action and creating an inclusive and equitable 
framework globally to work towards “climate 
justice”31. The Indian INDC is “contingent upon 
an ambitious global agreement including addi-
tional means of implementation to be provided 
30. India’s intended nationally determined contribution: 
Working towards climate justice Available at: http://
www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20
Documents/India/1/INDIA%20INDC%20TO%20UNF-
CCC.pdf, last accessed 07/10/2015
31. Indian INDC.
by developed country parties, technology transfer 
and capacity building”32 
Although the main section on its INDCs in the In-
dian submission does not talk about sectoral targets 
except for creating an additional carbon sink of 2.5 
to 3 billion tonnes of CO2eq through additional for-
est and tree cover by 2030, the INDC document re-
fers to various directional/indicative measures and 
policies that could facilitate the achievement of the 
INDC targets. The document mentions 100 GW of 
Solar, 60 GW of Wind and 10 GW of biomass by 
2022 and alludes to 63 GW installed capacity of nu-
clear energy by 2032. It mentions that annual fuel 
savings due to continuation of the National Mis-
sion on Enhanced Energy Efficiency are estimated 
to reach 23 million toe per year by 2020. 100 bil-
lion kWh of annual energy saving is expected from 
higher penetration of LED bulbs. More energy sav-
ings are likely to come through the Super-Efficient 
Fan Program and successive Corporate Vehicular 
Fuel Consumption Standards in 2017 and 2022. 
Some new policy initiatives integrating the impera-
tives of sustainable development such as the Smart 
Cities Mission, Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and 
Urban Transformation (AMRUT), Green Transpor-
tation Network, JalMargVikas, Metro Rail Systems 
(MRTs), Green Highways (Plantation & Mainte-
nance) etc. have also been highlighted. 
While India’s INDC continues to stress that the 
extent of low-carbon transformation is contingent 
upon the provision of technology transfer and fi-
nance by developed countries,33 ongoing and new 
initiatives to mobilize domestic resources to sup-
port clean energy transition such as the National 
Clean Energy Fund (NCEF) have also been empha-
sized. In particular the effective increase in carbon 
tax on fossil fuels has been highlighted, of which 
the tax per metric ton of coal produced and im-
ported in India to fund the NCEF, which was es-
tablished in 2013 is one component. Importantly, 
the tax on coal has been continuously increased 
from R50($0.8) in 2013 to R100($1.6) in 2014 and 
to R200($3.2) in 2015.34 The Economic-Survey 2015 
further suggests that it could be increased over 
time up to R498 ($8.0) per metric ton.35
32. Indian INDC, page 30.
33. NitinSethi (2015) Javadekar says Subramanian’s views 
on climate change policy not India’s, Business Stan-
dard, 25 August 2015. http://www.business-standard.
com/article/economy-policy/javadekar-says-sub-
ramanian-s-views-on-climate-change-policy-not-in-
dia-s-115082400708_1.html
34. Minister of Finance (2015). Budget 2015-2016 Speech of 
ArunJaitley Minister of Finance.
35. Ministry of Finance (2015).Economic Survey 2014-15, 
Vol. I. pp 128.http://indiabudget.nic.in/es2014-15/
echapter-vol1.pdf
Figure 38. Cost differential between Baseline
and COPPE INDC scenarios, from 2010 and 2050
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Note: Emissions include fossil fuel combustion from all sectors, 
industrial processes, waste treatment, and fugitive emissions.
Source: COPPE, MSB8000 model
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From the listing of ongoing and new policy ini-
tiatives and the eight point action plan to achieve 
INDCs it is evident that India would need to fur-
ther strengthen its action across various sectors by 
not only continuing along the strategies outlined 
in India’s National Action Plan on Climate Change, 
but moving even more ambitiously towards clean 
and efficient energy use. In the energy sector, the 
two mainstays of policy intervention will be pro-
moting energy efficiency in end use sectors such as 
buildings, appliances and industry and increasing 
the share of renewable energy in the energy mix. 
Indications to this effect have already been given 
by the government by raising the aspirational tar-
gets for non-fossil fuel electric power capcity to 175 
GW (100 GW of Solar, 65 GW of Wind and 10 GW 
of Nuclear) by 202236 and exploration of “deep-
ening” (including new Designated Consumers in 
the currently covered 8 sectors) and “widening” 
(including new sectors: Railways, Refineries and 
Power Distribution Companies) options under the 
Perform Achieve and Trade (PAT) scheme for en-
ergy efficiency under the National Mission on En-
hanced Energy Efficiency (NMEEE).37
Transformation Implied by the INDC
The above discussion outlines the direction of 
transformation. How this transformation may be 
distributed across activities and what challenges it 
may face in implementation is not elaborated upon 
in the INDC. This preliminary analysis here there-
fore examines these aspects for the energy sector by 
complementing an earlier modelling study under-
taken by TERI (2015) and adjusting the clean and 
efficient energy targets in 2030 along the direction 
mentioned in the INDC. This exercise considers 
only energy sector CO2 emissions as opposed to 
GHG emissions covered under the INDC. 
CO2 emissions from the energy sector have been 
steadily increasing. In 1994, energy sector account-
ed for 62% of total GHG emissions, in 2000 about 
67% and in 2007, around 71%. However, given the 
need for improving access to energy and infra-
structure for basic services, and the aspiration of 
high and inclusive growth, the energy sector and 
in particular energy intensive sectors like cement 
and steel are expected to grow more rapidly than 
other sectors. 
Our analysis indicates that in achieving the 
INDC target, the power sector will have to play a 
36. Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) 
(2014). Renewable Energy Programmes Gets A New Im-
petus; Focus on Development of Energy Infrastructure.
37. Bureau of Energy Efficiency (Bee)(2015), Perform 
Achieve &Trade (PAT) Scheme: Looking Back and Way 
Forward, http://www.iipnetwork.org/KEP01-01.pdf2
critical role. Total centralized installed capacity for 
electricity generation will have to increase around 
five times from 138 GW in 2006 to 702 GW in 2031 
to meet the needs of the economy. Of this, 100 GW 
comes from solar, 70 GW from large hydro and 60 
GW from wind. The share of non-fossil fuel based 
energy will be 37% (see Figure 39). It is important 
to note that this modelling exercise assumes a low-
er rate of growth (8.3%) and rate of urbanization 
(37%) for the period 2006-2031 compared to those 
indicated in the INDC i.e. 8.6% and 40% respec-
tively for the period 2014-2030. Hence, the total 
centralized installed capacity as well as of non-fos-
sil fuel based sources commensurate with INDCs 
is likely to be higher than what this preliminary 
analysis suggests. The corresponding increase in 
end use energy demand from different sectors are 
given in Table  19.   
Table  19. Increase in end-user energy demand 2006-
2031, India 
Increase in 2031 over 2006
Industry Factor 3
Transport Factor 4
Commercial 
(services)
Factor 5
Source: TERI scenario based on the India MARKAL model
Given the level of GDP growth, based on our 
exercise, the total primary energy supply would 
increase 4 times, due to increase in final demand 
(Table  19). The share of traditional biomass de-
creases from 33% to 11%, while contribution of fos-
sil fuels increases in primary demand from 63% to 
84% with higher access to modern fuels for cook-
ing, lighting etc. and also increase in the number 
of household with electricity (“energy for all” pro-
gramme). The existence of biomass, especially in 
the traditional form is a cause of concern since it 
implies that this is being used for cooking even in 
2031. Coal still remains an important part of the 
mix for various reasons: 1) It remains an econom-
ically competitive method to produce electricity; 
and 2) limited options in fuel switching available 
in the industry sector. The challenge of meeting 
the INDC levels of energy demand is likely to be 
more since it aspires towards providing a more 
rapid and inclusive growth than that envisaged in 
our scenario. 
The industry sector is a strong contributor to 
GDP growth. In a developing economy like India’s, 
it has the critical role to provide jobs and mate-
rial for a rapidly growing, industrializing and ur-
banizing economy. It is the second largest energy 
consuming sector after transport. Overall demand 
from the industry sector as estimated in our exer-
cise would be 3 time that of 2006 levels by 2031. 
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This increase is due to the magnitude of industrial 
growth and associated infrastructure requirement 
after taking into account the improvements in in-
dustrial energy efficiency. Given that Indian ce-
ment plants are second best only to Japan in terms 
of efficiency, and that the steel industry also has 
achieved significant efficiency gains in the past 
few years of ~5% and the PAT (Perform Achieve 
and Trade) Scheme of the Bureau of Energy Ef-
ficiency (BEE), Ministry of Power has delivered 
4-5% energy intensity gains between 2012-15 for 
more than 450 large plants in 8 sectors, further en-
ergy efficiency improvements are not likely to be 
easy. Further reductions in energy intensity would 
generally not be low hanging fruits but more capi-
tal intensive emission reduction options. 
By 2031, passenger mobility requirements are 
expected to be three times compared to 2006. Re-
quirements for freight transport mobility would be 
five times. Transport sector will need 4 times more 
energy in 2031 compared to 2006. To decarbon-
ize the transport sector, there is an urgent need 
to move towards public transport. Further, fuel 
switching must be achieved towards advanced 
biofuels, which may be carbon neutral and would 
be able to substitute away from petrol and diesel. 
Indeed, India’s oil consumption growth is led by a 
growth in the transport sector. Among oil consum-
ing sectors, demand from the transport sector has 
grown the fastest in the last couple of decades and 
is expected to grow the fastest among all sectors 
at around 8% per year until 2031. India’s mobil-
ity needs are far from being met for both people 
and goods, with a low base and high growth rate. 
So while India would like to significantly increase 
the use of public networks – metro and railways, 
which are more efficient options - the sector’s 
growth may well exceed the rate at which these 
solutions can be deployed. 
Our analysis suggests that share of public trans-
port is an important contributor to overall decar-
bonisation of the economy, since the pressure from 
road vehicles increase leads to a direct increase in 
oil consumption. Moving higher levels of passen-
ger and freight traffic to rail based mobility is an-
other important aspiration, albeit the rapid growth 
in road based movement has provided tough com-
petition to rail in the last decades. Our scenario as-
sumes that we are able to reverse the decrease in 
the share of rail based transport. 
Given the trend of urbanization, it is important 
that India focuses on proper and integrated ur-
ban planning and reducing the pressure on urban 
centres. 
Further, the commercial sector is expected to 
lead to an increase in demand of about five times 
the current levels. It is anticipated that 70% of the 
building stock in 2031 would be new buildings; 
this implies that even though capacity is being cre-
ated at the best standard for energy efficiency, it 
is expected that the increase in total capacity and 
therefore energy requirement could increase by 5 
times. 
Conclusion
India has a population of 1.2 billion of which 
304 million do not have access to electricity; 380 
million do not have access to modern forms of 
cooking fuel, and 92 million are without access 
to safe drinking water. The per capita energy 
consumed is 0.6 toe, which is a third of the world 
average. India is faced with a formidable challenge 
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of maintaining rapid and inclusive growth but 
through clean and sustainable forms of energy. 
When one juxtaposes this primary objective with 
India’s INDC it becomes clear that not only is this 
very challenging, it is also a challenge that no other 
large country has undertaken previously. Although 
other countries are also ramping up their transi-
tion to a low-carbon economy, there is no obvious 
historical benchmark available which India can 
follow that will enable it to overcome this challenge 
of sustainable development and climate mitigation. 
Our analysis suggests the following conclusion: 
The level of transformation that is faced by 
India is tremendous, it must be appreciated in 
terms of the energy and other services that need 
to be provided to a large under-served and poor 
population
Given this scale of transformation, a 33-35% re-
duction in intensity is very ambitious and would 
entail a path that has never before been followed 
by other countries
To achieve this scale of transformation it is 
critical that globally an inclusive and equitable 
framework is developed that not only provides for 
framework on commitments but also on technol-
ogy innovation, demonstration and global avail-
ability, and international finance support and 
innovation. 
STUDY 05/2015 4 9IDDRI
Beyond the Numbers: Understanding the Transformation Induced by INDCs
Case Study 4. The Challenges of Long-term 
Transformations in the Light of INDCs 
The analysis in this chapter has focused largely on 2025 and 
2030, being the relevant time horizon for INDCs. However, short-
term transformation needs to be coherent with long-term goals 
of very low emissions at the global level, and hence in all major 
emitters (around 1.7 tons of energy related emissions in 2050 at 
the global level). This case study examines some of the challenges 
associated with these long-term objectives, and builds the case 
for the need to analyse INDCs in the light of the coherence with 
long-term deep transformation. It explores the challenges facing 
some of the countries in this chapter of moving from INDCs in 
2030 to deep decarbonisation by 2050.   
Section 2.2 noted that the European Union sees relatively little 
decarbonisation of transport energy by 2030, under the INDC (Fig-
ure 7). This is also confirmed by the global results in section 4, 
which show relatively little decarbonisation of transport energy 
by 2030 (see Figure 48). However, by 2050 a very significant 
decarbonisation of transport energy needs to take place, nota-
bly through the electrification of transport and the deployment of 
advanced biofuels. In Europe, the share of electricity is projected 
to be required to reach about 16% by 2050, up from 3% in 2030 
under the INDC. Given that it is very difficult to electrify freight 
transport, the share of electricity in passenger transport would 
have to be even higher. In 2030, in the order of 30% of annual 
vehicle sales would need to be electric in order to ensure that 
the share of electricity in final energy consumption in transport 
grow sufficiently in order to meet challenge of the decarbonisation 
of transport energy. This is a major industrial, innovation, and 
infrastructure challenge, which needs to be prepared for in the 
coming 15 years. 
A similar example can be drawn from the INDC analysis of China. 
In the Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project (DDPP), the Chinese 
Deep Decarboniation Scenario followed broadly the same pathway 
to 2030 as the INDC scenario in this report. Thereafter, continued 
reductions are pursued through notably the deployment of carbon 
capture, usage and storage (CCUS) in the power and industry sec-
tors (as well as electric mobility – see above). In this scenario, by 
2050 CCUS facilities are expected to be installed in about 75% of 
coal power plants by 2050.
This discussion highlights three important points. Firstly, there 
are multiple pathways towards 2025/2030 objectives, but not 
all of them are consistent with 2050 deep reductions. China and 
the EU could meet their 2030 targets, but in so doing still fail to 
unlock the necessary technological, infrastructural and industrial 
capacity to deploy these crucial solutions after 2030. Secondly, 
this underscores the need to prepare now the technologies and 
solutions that will be required in the long-term given the inertia of 
the economic and physical systems that need to change. Interna-
tional and domestic policy-making needs to give greater attention 
to unlocking these solutions post Paris. Thirdly, it highlights the 
need for dynamic policy making to allow a timely change of course 
if these solutions do not come online.   
Note: ligth red represent what is modelled as required after the INDC 
timeframe in order to reach -80% reductions by 2050. 
Source: PRIMES
Share of electricity in transport final energy consumption
Figure c. The challenge of post 2030 electric 
mobility in the EU
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3. CO-BENEFITS AND TRADE 
OFFS OF INDCS
Cross-Cutting Analysis
Climate mitigation can trigger synergies and 
trade-offs with other policy objectives at the 
national level, such as poverty reduction, clean air, 
public health, or energy independence. Synergies 
(often referred to as co-benefits) are thus impor-
tant because they influence the national support 
for climate mitigation policies and more directly 
impact the life of local populations. The IPCC AR5 
Working Group III Assessment provides a large, 
qualitative overview of potential co-benefits and 
adverse side-effects (see Table  6.7 in IPCC AR5 
WGIII), and highlights that local circumstances 
will to a large degree influence whether or not 
(and to which extent) certain co-benefits and 
trade-offs will materialize. In the “multi-objective” 
framing, it’s clear that a sustainable energy transi-
tion goes beyond climate concerns and can include 
everything from ensuring energy security and air 
quality to decreasing water use and biodiversity 
loss (Stechow et al. In press). Here we carry out 
a quantitative analysis at the national level, and 
examine the synergies and trade-offs that are 
projected to materialize under the implementation 
of the INDC. We explore two dimensions: (1) local 
air quality and (2) energy trade and independence. 
In the context of the project, INDC assessments 
with sufficient detail were available for five coun-
tries: Brazil, Japan, the European Union (EU27), 
China, and USA. Detailed country-level analy-
ses estimate how much INDCs would reduce CO2 
emissions at the national level (Table  20). These 
CO2 emission reductions are then used, together 
with stylized relationships that were derived 
from the results of large-scale studies with glob-
al integrated assessment models (IAM) of the 
energy-economy-land system38, to estimate the ex-
tent of synergies and trade-offs under the INDCs 
(see Annex for details).
Table  20. Overview of emission reductions in 2030 under 
the INDCs
Reductions in 2030 of CO2 from energy 
and industrial sources
Country relative to 2010
relative to 
reference*
Japan -23% -20%
EU28 -29% -9%
USA -22% -24%
Brazil 35% -11%
China +34% -12%
*Because different national modelling teams included different assumptions on 
which policies to include in their ‘reference’, the reductions relative to reference are 
not directly comparable. For example, the reference pathway of the EU28, already 
includes climate policies.
The changes in local air quality that are pro-
jected under the implementation of the respective 
INDCs of countries are quantified by looking at the 
reductions of two key air pollutants: black carbon 
(soot) and sulphur dioxide. These changes are ex-
pressed relative to a reference case in absence of 
the INDC and earlier climate commitments, like 
the Cancún pledges. 
Air pollution is significantly reduced in most of 
the assessed INDC cases (Figure 41). Black carbon 
emissions can be reduced up to about 15% relative 
to the situation without new climate action, and in 
most cases similar reductions are found for SO2. 
However, these values vary strongly among coun-
tries, with countries that currently already have 
stringent air pollution controls (like the EU28 or 
Japan) seeing less of an air pollution co-benefit. 
38. In particular, data from the LIMITS project was used, 
which received funding under the European Commu-
nity’s Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2007-2013 
under grant agreement n° 282846.
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Figure 41. Estimates of the reduction in national emissions of black carbon (soot)
and SO2 in 2030 as a result of implementing the respective INDCs.
Source: IIASA calculations
Change in 2030 of SO2 emissions relative to referenceChange in 2030 of BC emissions relative to reference
EU28 Japan USA BrazilChinaEU28 Japan USA BrazilChina
Japanese projection of energy-import 
decrease from INDC compared 
to 2013 import dependence level
EU projection of energy-import
decrease from INDCs















-7%
-20%
-25%
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
Note: each dot represents a single model estimate. The Japanese projection of 
energy import decrease from the INDCs (from Case Study 5) is presented in terms 
of decrease compared to 2013 net-import levels.
Figure 42. Estimates of the reduction in net-energy imports 
in 2030 as a result of implementing the respective INDCs
Source: IIASA calculations
Difference in net−energy imports compared to the Reference
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As SO2 is mainly co-emitted with CO2 by coal fired 
power plants, sources of SO2 are more closely linked 
to key emissions of CO2 from the power and indus-
trial sectors. Therefore, the estimated synergies 
are generally larger, leading to a reduction in SO2 
pollution in all models. Finally, in Japan and Chi-
na, the possible increase in black carbon emissions 
under the implementation of their INDC is a result 
of a more extensive use of biomass, for which black 
carbon emissions can be high. This is illustrated by 
the positive values in the left panel of Figure 41. 
For these two countries the black carbon co-bene-
fits are thus more uncertain. 
For the most part, climate mitigation measures 
lead to a decrease in energy import dependence 
by increasing the use of domestic renewables and 
energy efficiency measures. At the same time, cli-
mate policies can increase energy import depend-
ence by curbing the use of domestic coal. These 
conflicting forces lead to uncertainty in estimat-
ing net-trade impacts of GHG emission reductions. 
In the case of net-energy imports, the INDCs for 
the EU28, Japan and China depict up to a 25% de-
crease in net-energy imports compared to the ref-
erence case (Figure 42). 
For the U.S. and Brazil, the story is a bit different. 
The biggest uncertainty for the US’ net-energy trade 
is not domestic climate policies but rather how the 
demand and price of oil, gas and coal develop both 
within the country and in international markets. 
That’s because, under most assumptions, in the 
absence of any climate policies, the US becomes 
energy independent over the next several decades 
(as early as 2025 and in all except one by 2060). 
Thus while the US’ net-energy imports will be in-
fluenced by climate policy, the bigger uncertainty 
is the development of fossil fuel markets globally. 
Brazil, with its biofuels program has very low en-
ergy imports today. While there is a modest growth 
in some models (up to about half of primary energy 
supply) other models depict the country as export-
ing small amounts of oil over the next twenty years. 
Thus, similar to the U.S., the biggest uncertainty 
with Brazil isn’t what will happen to the country’s 
climate policy but rather how the demand and 
price of oil, gas and coal develop internationally.
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Case study 5. Structural change, 
macroeconomic strategy and 
climate mitigation in China 
China’s economic structure is a major determinant of its GHG 
emissions. In comparison with other countries at a similar level 
of development, China’s economy is heavily dependent on fixed 
investment and industrial production. In 2014, investment made 
up 47% of China’s GDP, up from 38.3% in 2000. A notable  jump 
occurred in 2009, when investment’s share in GDP increased by 4.9 
percentage points. This was due to a significant stimulus package 
and monetary easing unleashed in the wake of the global financial 
crisis. On the production side, China’s GDP is dominated by the 
industry sector, which made up 43.9% of Chinese GDP in 2013.39 
China’s GHG emissions are therefore largely driven by the indus-
trial sector, which was responsible for 65% of growth in energy-
related CO2 emissions between 2000 and 2013.40 Rapid invest-
ment in physical infrastructure has driven in turn investment in 
industrial production facilities (steel, cement), which in turn has 
driven investment in (coal-fired) generation capacity to feed the 
industrial sector. China’s economic structure has thus been a key 
driver of CO2 emissions. 
Table . Assumptions in the structural change scenarios 
Fixed 
structure 
scenario
 Medium 
structural 
change
 High 
structural 
change
GDP growth rate 
2010-2030 (%)
5.5 5.5 5.5
Share of industry 
sector 2014 (%)
47
47 47
Share of industry 
sector 2030 (%)
48 42 38
Share of tertiary 
sector in 2010 (%)
44
44 44
Share of tertiary 
sector in 2030 (%)
48 53 57
Source: Authors, based on assumptions in China INDC scenario, chapter 2.5
There is substantial evidence and understanding among Chinese 
policy makers that this investment- and industry-driven economic 
model is starting to falter. Headline growth has slowed signifi-
cantly; debt has grown rapidly; there is overcapacity in the power 
generation, real estate and manufacturing sectors; exports are no 
longer contributing positively to growth, and there are signs of 
financial instability. The government has recognized the need to 
restructure the Chinese economy with the concept of the “New 
Normal”, i.e. slower headline growth and a progressive restructur-
ing of the economy towards domestic consumption and services. 
This would have significant benefits for climate mitigation, as 
the Chinese macro-economy would transition towards less energy 
and emissions-intensive sectors. This structural adjustment is 
39. Data from Oxford Economics. 
40. Authors’ calculations based on Enerdata. 
expected to bring a significant improvement in energy intensity, 
alongside technological improvements in efficiency. The impor-
tance of this is illustrated in the figure below, which shows the 
effects of structural change in mitigating Chinese emissions, by 
comparing two structural change scenarios with a counter-fac-
tual fixed structure scenario. The major assumptions are shown 
in the Table.
In order to isolate the effect of structural change, the scenarios 
assumes that the carbon intensity of the industrial and tertiary 
sectors remains fixed at their 2014 levels, i.e. 2.18 tCO2/1000 
USD and 1.16 tCO2/1000 USD respectively.41 This also means that 
the case-study focuses only on the effects of macro-economic 
restructuring, and ignores the effects of restructuring within the 
industrial sector, i.e. away from value added generated by emis-
sions intensive industries such as cement and steel, and toward 
more emissions-efficient industrial activities. 
The figure below shows the difference in the level of CO2 emissions 
between the two structural change scenarios and the fixed struc-
ture scenario, holding all other assumptions constant. It can be 
seen that structural change can make a very significant contribu-
tion to GHG mitigation in the coming couple of decades (about 10% 
in 2030, assuming an emissions peak 2030 at about 11 Gt). This 
illustrates well the synergy between the Chinese government’s mac-
roeconomic policy (engineering a gradual and smooth transition to 
the ‘New Normal’) and the objectives of climate mitigation. It also 
illustrates a major source of uncertainty in Chinese climate policy 
and emissions scenarios, namely the future direction of the Chinese 
macro-economy. A dynamic approach to policy making is required to 
progressively resolve this uncertainty, as well as full integration of 
macroeconomic policy and climate policy considerations. 
41. Authors’ calculations based on data from Enerdata. 
N.B. this includes only CO2 from fossil fuel combustion, 
not industrial process emissions. 
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Figure e. illustration of the energy related CO2 
impacts of structural change in China    
Source: Authors, based on structural assumptions 
in China INDC scenario, chapter 2.5
Medium structural 
change versus 
fixed structure
High structural 
change versus 
fixed structure
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Case study 6. Energy security and 
import dependency in Japan 
In Japan energy supply is highly dependent on imported fos-
sil fuels because of a lack of domestic resources. In the 2000s, 
import dependency of primary energy supply (hereafter import 
dependency) in Japan was more than 80%, even if nuclear power 
is accounted as a domestic resource. Moreover, since 2011, import 
dependency has substantially increased due to the suspension of 
nuclear power, rising to approximately 94% in 2013. In addition, 
import bills for fossil fuels have been also increased since 2011 
and grown to approximately 280 billion USD in 2013, together with 
rise in crude oil prices in this period. Combining decarbonisation 
in the mid- to long-term with energy security is a particular chal-
lenge for resource poor countries; however, decarbonisation can 
also provide substantial synergies with energy security. 
The scenarios developed by NIES for the MILES Project include fos-
sil fuel import bills and import dependency in 2030 and in 2050 
as shown in the figure below. In 2030, because of energy effi-
ciency improvement, promotion of renewable energies and restart 
of nuclear power, import dependency accounts for around 75% 
and import bills falls to around 220 billion USD despite of rise in 
crude oil prices, which are taken from IEA’s Energy Technology Per-
spectives 2015. Even in Low-Nuclear Scenario, in which nuclear 
plant operates no more than 40 years, import dependency in 2030 
falls to around 79% which is lower compared to the 2000s level.
Moreover, continuing decarbonisation efforts after 2050 drive 
down import dependency to less than a half of primary energy 
supply in 2050. Thus decarbonisation in the mid- to long-term 
generally contributes to enhance energy security and to decrease 
import dependency. However, a switch from coal to LNG might 
cause a rise in total fossil fuel import bills, since LNG is likely 
to be more expensive than coal and pipeline gas. Import bills in 
the Enhanced Action Scenario, in which GHG emissions in 2030 
falls by approximately 25.3% with respect to the 2005 level, 
stays almost the same level as NIES INDC Scenario due mainly to 
increased use of imported natural gas, despite additional deploy-
ment of renewable energies. Hence, promotion of natural gas 
entails challenges associated with energy security issue in the 
nations which import natural gas resources as LNG.
The main point, however, remains that implementing the Japa-
nese INDC could lead to a significant improvement in energy secu-
rity, measured in terms of import dependency and import bills. 
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Figure f. Import dependency and bills of fossil fuels in Japan for the scenarios developed by NIES
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Case study 7. International technology 
learning, renewables deployment 
and energy access in India 
Renewable energy policy in India dates back to early 1980s 
responding to episodes of energy crisis in the 1970s. Since then, 
international cooperation has been central to India’s renewable 
energy strategy. In addition to North-South technology transfer, 
emphasis on South-South cooperation has gained specific atten-
tion in recent years. As many as 35 bilateral/multilateral coopera-
tion frameworks between India and other countries for new and 
renewable energy have been signed between 2007 and 2015.42 
According to the Census of 2011, close to 32% of population relies 
on kerosene for basic lighting and a little over 67% use grid elec-
tricity. More than 300 million have no electricity at all. Close to 
60% households use inefficient biomass based technologies for 
cooking with serious implications for health, air quality and GHG 
emissions. The imperatives of energy access and climate change 
in India therefore require the provision of affordable and reliable 
modern clean energy solutions for cooking and lighting to all its 
citizens. Accordingly, renewable energy is the mainstay of India’s 
climate policy for its multiple development co-benefits, includ-
ing creation of green jobs. In particular, decentralized renewable 
energy systems which offer a relatively cheaper option to provid-
ing electricity to those living in remote areas where gird connected 
electricity is not an economically viable option.43 
Most successful experience in international cooperation on the 
supply side has been in the wind sector. As a result the installed 
capacity has increased over 20 times during 1998 and 2014 with 
a sustained annual investment in the range of USD 3 billion per 
year since 2006 and increasing competition in the domestic man-
ufacturing market (Chaudhary, 2014). 
India began exploring wind energy options in early 1980s. The 
first commercial project was set up in 1989 with support from 
the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA). However, 
it needed another decade of sustained government policies and 
international support to facilitate technology transfer, demonstra-
tion and market creation before the wind sector could take off in 
India. It created a market dynamism that drew improved technol-
ogy systems (still not the most sophisticated systems) through 
foreign firms setting local manufacturing units and an aggressive 
collaboration and global network strategy of the Indian company 
Suzlon Energy Limited. Suzlon used multiple strategies for acquir-
ing different technologies such as licensing agreements, joint 
ventures, equipment supply agreements and acquisition of com-
panies and developed a global network of supply across countries 
including India, Germany, Austria, Netherlands, USA and so on 
(Lewis, 2007).
The key lesson from India’s wind sector is: sustained mutually 
assuring efforts in terms of cooperation between governments 
and between companies are critical, mere national policies are 
42. http://mnre.gov.in/schemes/support-programmes/
international-cooperation-3/
43. http://mnre.gov.in/schemes/decentralized-systems/
not enough. Before developing countries can go for commercial 
acquisition of technologies, international cooperation for techni-
cal and commercial capacity building is critical.
On the delivery side, however, Indian experience with distributed 
renewable energy systems (biomass and solar) has been more 
diverse and insightful. For a variety of social, economic and 
geographical factors, modern cooking fuels and grid connected 
electricity are unlikely to be accessible to all in immediate future 
(TERI, 2014). Hence continuous upgradation and adoption of 
technologies to ensure affordability, suitability to local context 
and reliability is necessary. It is evident from the experience with 
multiple government and NGO led initiatives to provide renewable 
energy solutions at the household level focusing on solar energy 
for lighting and improved cook-stoves or biogas for cooking e.g. 
National Biogas and Manure Management Programme (NBMMP), 
the Unnat Chulha Abhiyan Programme, Akshya Urja, Remote Vil-
lage Electrification (RVE) Programme by the Ministry of New and 
Renewable Energy44 and programs such as Lighting a Billion Lives 
(LaBL) and development and diffusion of improved cook-stoves 
and biomass gasifiers by The Energy and Resources Institute 
(TERI). 
Interestingly, the experience shows that distributed renewable 
energy solutions require little North-South technology transfer, yet 
the role of international cooperation is critical. Collectively, the 
success stories (or the instances of failures) indicate that deploy-
ment of distributed renewable energy solutions requires building 
an ecosystem of mutual learning and cooperation among different 
actors for transfer of knowledge and capacities. The most impor-
tant role of international cooperation has been to provide timely 
financial and technical support to build this ecosystem which 
enables critical learnings over the years related to soft-technolo-
gies necessary for successful deployment and technological R&D. 
The support from the Swedish Development Agency, for example, 
enabled TERI to develop multiple business models and technolog-
ical capabilities for biomass gasifiers that are now enabling TERI 
to transfer these technologies and capacities to Africa. The key 
insight from this experience is that international cooperation can 
facilitate extending North-South cooperation into South-South 
collaboration and in that process enable innovations (hard as 
well as soft) to adopt technologies to suit diverse local contexts.
44. http://mnre.gov.in/f i le-manager/annual-re-
port/2014-2015/EN/Chapter%205/chapter_5.htm
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at the same AF. Precise estimates of geothermal, tidal and off 
shore-wind are not available yet (Mathur, 2014). However, these 
huge potentials are difficult to exploit due to their poor economic 
viability and technological barriers, with exception of wind. With 
the current techno-economic circumstances, therefore, India’s 
options for increasing energy supply keeping in mind the concerns 
of climate change give equal importance to coal (of which India 
has large reserves) with emphasis on clean coal technologies in 
the short run and promote renewable energy, particularly wind and 
solar with a long term perspective. 
In addition, and more importantly, efforts to reduce the overall 
effective energy demand by promoting energy efficiency across 
sectors are critical for partially offsetting the potential GHG 
impacts of economic development. This has been the main thrust 
of the Electricity Conservation Act of 2001. Substantial possibili-
ties of energy efficiency improvement lie in the industry, buildings 
and transport sector. While large industrial units are being regu-
lated for reducing their energy intensity under the PAT (Perform, 
Achieve and Trade) scheme, the MSMEs (Medium, Small and Micro 
Enterprises) are being incentivised as they are highly unorganized 
and hence difficult to regulate. Similarly, while large energy con-
suming buildings are subjected to energy efficiency codes, house-
holds are being incentivised to use energy efficient appliances 
and lighting systems. In the transport sector efforts are being 
made to increase share of railways in freight, shift towards mass 
urban transit systems, and improved vehicular fuel efficiency for 
private vehicles. 
An aggressive embark towards transforming India’s energy sup-
ply in favour of renewable energy is possible only at high upfront 
costs supported by timely commercially viable technological 
breakthroughs across sectors, particularly in storage technolo-
gies, second and third-generation biofuels, and electrical vehicles 
along with high penetration of energy efficiency solutions. Such a 
scenario may allow India to reduce her total CO2 emissions from 
the energy sector (Mathur, 2014). However, technological break-
throughs alone are not sufficient as the constraints of land avail-
ability, further exacerbated by the high pressure of urbanization, 
will require difficult political and institutional solutions. In addi-
tion adequately accelerated build-up of supporting infrastructure, 
appropriate skill sets, regulatory and institutional frameworks, 
and adequate renewable manufacturing capacities will also have 
to be a real possibility. 
Clearly efficient use of fossil fuels and promotion of renewable 
energy over a long time horizon are India’s options for responding 
to climate change and energy security concerns simultaneously. 
India’s National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) reflects 
this understanding, which is further deepened in India’s INDC.
Case study 8. The Indian perspective on 
energy security and climate change
Energy security and climate change are intricately linked policy 
challenges for India. The development imperatives of India 
demand rapid increase in energy consumption (hence supply) 
which is likely to increase GHG emissions. At the same time India 
is severely vulnerable to climate change induced risks due to pov-
erty, direct dependence of large population (~70%) on the agri-
culture sector and a long coast line (approximately 7500 km). The 
number of deaths by disaster and the number of people affected 
have increased 8 times between 2009 and 2013. The economic 
loss from disasters between 1990 and 2013 is approximately 50 
billion dollars. The need to build both adaptation capacities to 
climate change and infrastructure for development is linked to the 
challenges of ensuring reliable energy supply as well as control-
ling GHG emissions from it.
India’s development and energy security concerns are defined in 
the context of providing reliable quality energy services to a popu-
lation of 1.2 billion, which is expected to reach 1.8 billion in 2050. 
Over 300 million people (about 4.5 times the population of France) 
are without access to electricity today. There are also fractions of 
the population on the margins, who get access to electricity but 
for limited number of hours. Similar or even more numbers do not 
have access to modern fuel for cooking and, therefore, are exposed 
to excess amount of indoor air pollution, in particular the female 
population. Exacerbating the problem of energy inaccessibility is 
the energy delivery system that is rather primitive and inefficient. 
There is a pressing need to modernize and strengthen this system 
with regard to delivering energy for cooking as well as lighting 
services.
Currently, India’s energy supply is heavily dependent on fossil 
fuels large part of which is imported: about 80% of the crude 
oil accounting for 30% of import bill in 2010 and a third of the 
natural gas consumption. With projected energy demand grow-
ing by more than 3 times during 2011-2031 (TERI, 2015), the 
reliance on imported fuel and vulnerability to international price 
fluctuations is bound to increase. Hence, from energy security 
perspective non-fossil fuel based energy options are critical for 
India. These options are also in alignment with the imperatives 
of climate change. 
Renewable energy options are potentially very attractive. The esti-
mated wind potential at 80 m hub height is around 500 GW. Over 
58% of the land receives solar insolation to the tune of 5 kWh/m2/
day. This makes solar energy a preferred option for India. Large 
hydro is estimated to have a potential of 148 GW at 40% avail-
ability factor (AF) while small hydro has around 15 GW potential 
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use the highly efficient supercritical technology. Renovation and 
modernization, and life extension of existing old power stations 
is being undertaken in a phased manner. About 144 old thermal 
stations have been assigned mandatory targets for improving 
their energy efficiency. Coal beneficiation has been made manda-
tory. Introduction of ultra-supercritical technology, as and when 
commercially available is part of future policy. Besides, stringent 
emission standards being contemplated for thermal plants would 
significantly reduce emissions. Indian INDC has also identified 
Super Critical Pulverized Combustion, Ultra Super Critical, Pres-
surized Circulating Fluidized Bed Combustion, Combined Cycle, 
Integrated Gasifier Combined Cycle, and Fuel Cell as priority clean 
coal technologies for India. About 100 GW installations using new 
clean coal technologies at around a 20% improvement in current 
efficiency of coal plants could mitigate about 1400 Mt CO2e vis-a-
vis traditional coal technologies during 2015-2030. 
The Restructured-Accelerated Power Development and Reforms 
Programme (R-APDRP) of the Indian government envisages state 
utilities having aggregated technical and commercial (AT&C) 
losses above 30% to reduce these by 3% per year, while those 
having AT&C losses below 30% to reduce these by 1.5% per year. 
National average T&D losses have significantly improved from 
about 32% in 2005 to 22% last year, and are projected to reduce 
to around 15% by 2022 (Lok Sabha, 2015). Projected reduction 
to 15% by 2022 implies a saving of around 500 Mt CO2e during 
2015-2030. 
These indicate large plans for cleaner coal in India. Carbon diox-
ide Capture and storage (CCS) technology could also provide a 
way forward to continue using coal in India without associated 
GHG emissions to the environment. Our preliminary estimates 
indicate that India has a potential to mitigate around 800 Mt-CO2 
each year from coal use at below $60 per t-CO2. Research however 
has to be done to estimate storage locations and their potential, 
especially near large point sources of GHG emissions, along with 
a large CCS demonstration pilot project in India.
Coal production, transport, usage and ash disposal deploy almost 
one million persons. Income from coal royalty constitutes almost 
50% of total earning of states like Jharkhand and Odisha (ToI, 
2015b; GoO, 2007), which are some of the least developed large 
Indian states. Path dependencies of coal use therefore have 
strong socio-economic and political linkages, apart from the huge 
investments in coal infrastructures that have to be managed in 
case coal use has to be strongly discontinued in India. On the 
other hand, the latest policy of targeted simultaneous strong push 
to renewable energy in India through 100 GW of new solar and 36 
GW of new wind capacities by 2022, would need fresh investments 
to the tune of US$ 140 billion by 2022 (MNRE, 2015). More renew-
able capacities may be installed beyond 2022 until 2030. 100 GW 
solar could save up to 1680 Mt CO2e emissions during 2015-2030 
vis-à-vis baseline coal power. Similarly wind and other renewa-
bles could save up to 1100 Mt CO2e during 2015-2030. It is also 
noted that the additional power capacities planned may provide 
up to additional 220 GW by 2022, which should be able to wipe off 
energy deficit in India in near future. India had an energy deficit 
of 5.1% and peak power deficit of 2% during 2014-15, which is 
projected to go down to around 2% this year. 
Case study 9. Perspectives for coal, 
implications for the transition pathway, 
lock-in and alternative options. 
India’s total primary energy demand (TPED) for 2013-14 was 837 
million ton of oil equivalent (mtoe) (WEO, 2014), which has been 
growing 5.5% annually since 2010. Coal constituted 44% of TPED 
at 778 million tons (Mt) in 2013-14. Domestic production of all 
types of coal was 610 Mt and imports were 168 Mt. Coal imports 
have been growing at 25% per year since 2010. 
The Indian domestic coal’s average heat value was 3500 Kcal/Kg 
in 2013-14 with average ash content of 41%, and 0.51% sulfur by 
weight (MoC, 2015a). These parameters for imported coal45 were 
5995 Kcal/kg, ash 13% and 1% S by weight.
Industrial coal consumption is mainly for power generation (525 
Mt) in 2013-14, steel (75 Mt) and cement plants (24 Mt) (MoC, 
2015b). The average boiler efficiency in power sectors has been 
30% with a PLF of 66% last year (CEA, 2014). There has been a 
decline in PLF since 2010 from a high of 75%, mainly due to coal 
shortages.
India’s coal based power capacity stands at 165 Giga Watt (GW) 
(CEA, 2015) with another 88 GW under various stages of construc-
tion (World Bank, 2014). Total projected additional demand for 
coal in power sector is therefore around 400 Mt/year. Indian coal 
consumption is thus projected to cross at least one billion ton (Bt) 
within next 5 years. It may be much higher. For instance, the Power 
and Coal Minister had indicated his plans to set up coal washeries 
for 500 Mt of coal every year for next five years, indicating a total 
coal handling of above 2.5 billion ton per year (TOI, 2015a). The 
government owned Coal India Ltd., one of the largest coal min-
ing company in the world, produced 462 Mt in 2014 (CIL, 2015) 
and has been increasing production by 20-25 Mt/year since the 
last 4 years. The CIL is planning to expand mining capacity by 
around 115 Mt by 2017. Realistically, it may add another 200 Mt 
by 2020. Enhanced energy efficiency by existing large coal con-
sumers, under Perform Achieve Trade policy of the Indian govern-
ment, could save 50 Mt/year. The newly auctioned coal-blocks and 
other captive mines could produce around 200 Mt by 2020. This 
would still require over 200 Mt demand-supply gap, which has to 
be met through imports. 
This highlights two issues – coal is projected to remain mainstay 
of the Indian energy system in near to medium-terms and coal 
imports are most likely to continue around 150-200 Mt/year. 
India emitted 2479 Mt-CO2 in 2013-14 with coal contributing 
1146 Mt. Clean coal technologies, including super critical pul-
verized coal power plants, coal washing, and enhancing combus-
tion efficiency through renovation and modernization of existing 
plants could provide GHG mitigation. India has already estab-
lished 27.5 GW of supercritical units and around 50 GW capacities 
are under construction. Government of India has already taken 
several initiatives to improve the efficiency of coal based power 
plants and to reduce their GHG emissions. For instance, all new, 
large coal-based generating stations have been mandated to 
45. Average of coal from Indonesia, South Africa, USA and 
Australia
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4. BUILDING THE BRIDGE FROM 
INDCS TO 2 DEGREES: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR THE PARIS AGREEMENT
4.1. Introduction
The UNFCCC process has recognized the goal of 
limiting warming to 2°C above preindustrial levels 
as the long-term objective of the global commu-
nity. This requires deep cuts in global GHGs as 
documented in the IPCC reports. It is therefore 
an important question to what extent the INDCs 
put the world on track towards reaching the below 
2°C goal. This section gives an overview of the 
aggregate global effect of the INDCs on green-
house gas emissions, but more importantly on the 
underlying energy system transformation and the 
challenges associated with reaching the below 2°C 
goal after 2030. Furthermore, it discusses options 
to build on and strengthen the mitigation action 
implied by INDCs.
The 118 INDCs (covering 145 countries) submit-
ted to the UNFCCC and published on its website46 
before October 2, 2015, represent ca. 85% of global 
GHG emissions in 2012. Most of those mainly re-
port emission targets for 2025 or 2030, with sev-
eral offering explicit information on policies and 
technologies to be employed for reaching these 
targets. We use an integrated global energy-econ-
omy-climate modeling system to derive a compre-
hensive picture of the global implications of these 
INDCs and of the post-2030 mitigation require-
ments to adhere to the stated objective of limiting 
global warming below 2°C. This global modelling 
framework also allows consideration of countries 
46. http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submis-
sion%20Pages/submissions.aspx
without an explicit emissions target, and of indi-
rect effects such as technology spillovers and leak-
age. Obviously, due to the aforementioned gaps in 
the INDC information, many assumptions on pol-
icies in the various model regions are crucial for 
such an analysis. A short description of the meth-
odology is provided in Section 4.2, and the Annex 
to this section (at the end of this report) provides 
more detail on the modeling assumptions for the 
INDCs. Section 4.3 aims to provide a best-guess 
interpretation of INDCs in terms of their global 
emissions and energy implications, but does not 
explicitly explore the uncertainty range of INDC 
outcomes. Its main focus is the analysis of the 
post-2030 transition requirements towards the 2oC 
goal that would follow from the INDCs. As these 
requirements include a substantial and very rap-
id strengthening of the global mitigation effort in 
the period 2030-2050, we also explore a bridging 
scenario that allows a smoother transition towards 
the 2oC goal by overachieving the INDCs in 2030 
(Section 4.4). Such a scenario could emerge from 
ratcheting up INDC ambition levels and underly-
ing policies in the coming years to keep the 2oC 
target within reach. Such strengthening of policies 
would signal a credible commitment to the long-
term goal causing actors in the energy and other 
sectors to account for this commitment in their in-
vestment decisions early on.      
4.2. Methodology
The aggregate impact of the INDCs on global emis-
sions and energy use in 2030, and the transitioning 
from the INDCs towards the long-term goal of 
limiting global warming to 2oC were investigated 
with the integrated assessment modeling frame-
work REMIND-MAgPIE (Bauer et al. 2012, Luderer 
et al. 2013, Bertram et al. 2015, Klein et al. 2013, 
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Popp et al. 2014)capturing the dynamics of the 
global energy-economy-land-climate system. Since 
the focus of this report is on the energy transition, 
the analysis was mainly conducted in REMIND, 
with the land use model MAgPIE providing infor-
mation on land use emissions and their reduction 
potentials as well as bioenergy availability and 
associated co-emissions. 
REMIND is a macro-economic growth model 
with eleven world regions47 and a detailed rep-
resentation of the energy sector48. It has been 
frequently used in international integrated as-
sessment modeling studies and contributed a sig-
nificant portion of mitigation scenarios assessed in 
the 5th Assessment Report of the IPCC (Kriegler et 
al., 2013b; Kriegler et al., 2014; Riahi et al. 2015; 
Clarke et al. 2014). The general framework of the 
analysis is to compare a baseline scenario of the fu-
ture development of the energy-economy system 
until 2100 with a set of climate policy scenarios 
in which emissions reductions are implemented 
through carbon pricing and technology policies. 
The analysis in this report was based on four cli-
mate policy scenarios in addition to the counter-
factual baseline scenario without climate policy 
(BASE):    
 m INDC-extended: In this scenario, the INDCs 
were implemented on the level of the 11 RE-
MIND regions, and extended beyond 2030 by an 
extrapolation of the regional carbon prices that 
emerged under the INDCs as well as technology 
targets for selected regions. The modelled carbon 
price trajectories can be interpreted as a proxy 
for mitigation measures undertaken in a region 
without taking a view on the actual instruments 
that are used to achieve the emissions reductions 
(implicit carbon pricing). The long-term climate 
outcome of the INDC-extended scenario is high-
ly sensitive to assumptions about the extrapo-
lation of regional carbon prices beyond 2030, 
and therefore is not the focus of this chapter. 
A more detailed description of the INDC imple-
mentation can be found in the Annex. The ag-
gregation of INDCs to REMIND regions relied 
in large part on a detailed country-by-country 
47. The REMIND model resolves six major economies 
(China, EU28, India, Japan, Russia, USA), and groups 
remaining countries into five larger regions (Latin 
America; Subsahara Africa excl. South Africa; Middle 
East & North Africa; Other Asia; and a hybrid region of 
remaining countries)
48. The REMIND models traces the production and use 
of energy from primary energy sources (coal, oil, gas, 
uranium, biomass, other renewable energy sources) to 
secondary energy (electricity, liquids, gases, solids, hy-
drogen, heat) to final energy use in the transport and 
stationary sectors. It includes around 50 energy conver-
sion technologies. 
analysis of the emissions implications of INDCs 
conducted by the Netherlands Environmental 
Assessment Agency (PBL) (PBL 2015). There-
fore, the global emissions outcome of INDCs in 
the year 2030 as calculated in the INDC scenario 
reflects the global estimate of the PBL analysis.   
 m INDC-2°C: This scenario has been developed to 
analyze the transition from the INDCs in 2030 to 
the 2oC goal after 2030. To this end, the model 
was fixed to the INDC scenario until 2030, and 
then allowed to respond to the emissions con-
straint imposed by the 2oC goal after 2030 (by 
implementing a globally uniform carbon price 
post-2030 that increases with the marginal cost 
of abatement). Due to the fixing to the INDC tra-
jectory until 2030, there is no anticipation in the 
model of the carbon constraint and carbon price 
post-2030 implied by the 2oC target.  
 m Bridge-2°C: Since the INDC-2oC scenario im-
plies abrupt and very rapid changes to the en-
ergy system in the period 2030-2050, we also 
analyze a scenario where investors anticipate 
the significant strengthening of policies post-
2030, and therefore can prepare with additional 
measures in the period 2020-2030 to allow for 
a more continuous transition. This anticipation 
effect leads to adjusted investments so that most 
INDCs are overachieved (see Section 4.4). The 
driver of this scenario is strengthened policies 
and targets by 2020 for the period 2030 and 
post-2030.  
 m Immediate-2oC: In this scenario, the 2oC goal is 
imposed immediately in 2015 (in terms of a ra-
diative forcing target of 2.6 W/m²) and imple-
mented in the model with a globally uniform 
carbon price that increases over time with the 
marginal cost of abatement. This scenario is 
used as a benchmark to assess differences be-
tween the INDC scenarios and a ‘cost-effective’ 
2oC scenario in 2030 and the period 2030-50. It 
is a pure counterfactual as actual policies will 
take into account equity considerations and dif-
ferentiated regional responsibilities and capa-
bilities in addition to cost-effectiveness. 
The results from these scenarios are put into 
the context of the mitigation scenario literature 
assessed by the 5th Assessment Report (AR5) of 
Working Group 3 of the IPCC. Besides baseline 
and cost-effective immediate implementation 2oC 
scenarios, the AR5 also assessed 2oC scenarios with 
delayed additional mitigation until 2030. Those 
scenarios were derived in the AMPERE and LIM-
ITS projects (Kriegler et al., 2015; Riahi et al., 2015; 
Kriegler et al., 2013b), which conducted a series 
of international integrated assessment modeling 
studies on the implication of short-term action on 
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the attainability of long-term climate goals. Al-
though these scenarios were mostly based on an 
extrapolation of the Cancun pledges, and thus pro-
jected higher emissions in 2030 than in the INDC 
scenario, they are qualitatively similar to the IN-
DC-2oC scenario analyzed here and therefore pro-
vide an important point of reference and connec-
tion of our study to the findings of the AR5 of IPCC. 
4.3. Aggregate Impact 
of the INDCs
On a global level, the estimated aggregate 2030 
emissions outcome in the INDC scenario (red line, 
Figure 43) results in a clear deviation from base-
line and a strong reduction of emission growth 
until 2030. The 2030 emission level is also below 
the extrapolation of existing Cancun pledges anal-
ysed in the AMPERE and LIMITS studies (Refer-
ence funnel in Figure 43) that provided the basis 
for the discussion of delayed mitigation efforts 
(High 2030 funnel in Figure 43) in the IPCC’s AR5 
(Clarke et al., 2014). 
A number of observations that can already be 
found in the relevant literature (Kriegler et al., 
2013b, 2015; Riahi et al., 2015; Luderer et al., 2013) 
apply to the INDC scenario as well. A significant 
gap towards an immediate implementation of poli-
cies consistent with a 2°C target can be observed in 
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Figure 43. Greenhouse gas emissions in the scenarios of this study, compared with literature
Immediate−2°C
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INDC−extended
Greenhouse gas emissions in the scenarios of this study (solid lines), compared with the 2030 range and best estimate from the country-level analysis of conditional 
INDCs of PBL (www.pbl.nl/indc, vertical black line and dot), and the inter-quartile ranges of the FullTech-450-OPT (Immediate 2°C*), FullTech-450-LST (Low 2030)
and FullTech-450-HST (High 2030) scenarios of the AMPERE study, as well as the reference policy scenarios of the AMPERE and LIMITS studies.
While section 4.3 discusses the INDC-2°C scenario, section 4.4 explores the possible effect of an early announcement of 2°C compatible policies (Bridge-2°C). 
Total greenhouse gas emissions were calculated based on global warming potentials from IPCC's second assessment report (SAR).
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PBL INDC Tool calculations (www.pbl.nl/indc INDC range and best estimate) and IPCC AR5 scenario database
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2030. In order to still reach 2°C after following the 
INDC trajectory until 2030, an abrupt downturn in 
emissions and very rapid emissions reductions (Ri-
ahi et al. 2015) in the two following decades would 
be needed (Figure 44). Furthermore, long-term 
emissions in the second half of the century would 
need to be even lower, including increased levels 
of carbon dioxide removal from the atmosphere 
to compensate residual emissions and obtain net 
negative emissions in the long run (van Vuuren 
2011; Kriegler et al., 2013a; Fuss et al., 2015). As 
shown in Figure 44, the rate of emissions reduc-
tions over the period 2030-2050 increases signifi-
cantly in the INDC-2°C scenario to more than -4% 
per year, compared to a slight emissions increase in 
the 2015-2030 period. In the Immediate-2°C sce-
nario, the annual rate of reduction is less than 
-3%49. This points to the challenge of maintaining 
the 2°C target as long term objective after 2030 in 
the INDC scenario. Emissions reduction rates of 
more than 4% per year have little historical prece-
dent, particularly on the global level. The greater 
the degree of low-carbon transformation in 2030, 
49  In Figure 44 the higher reduction rate from 2030-2050 
in the Immediate-2°C scenario, with respect to AM-
PERE’s FullTech-Base scenario, is due to the later start 
date of stringent policies (after 2015 compared to after 
2010 in the AMPERE study). 
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the smaller the required increase in ambition lev-
els after 2030 to keep climate change below 2°C 
degrees warming.   
In accordance with previous studies, we find 
a large part of early mitigation occurring in the 
electricity sector. The INDC scenario achieves 
roughly a third of the expansion in low-carbon 
electricity production until 2030 that one would 
observe in an immediate action 2°C pathway. The 
2030 share of low-carbon electricity is higher in 
the new INDC scenario compared to the ‘moder-
ate policy scenarios’ from the AMPERE and LIM-
ITS projects.  This shows the impact of dedicated 
low-carbon technology targets (see Table A.1 in 
the Annex) in the INDCs of the major economies 
(Figure 45). However, the increase in the INDC 
scenario lags behind the development in the 
cost-effective Immediate-2°C scenario, which 
has to be compensated by a much stronger ramp 
up of low-carbon electricity in the 2030-2050 
timeframe, increasing its share by nearly 50% in 
just 20 years.
In the transport sector on the other hand, prog-
ress in terms of carbon intensity improvements of 
transport energy supply by 2030 is very limited, 
as the transport system stays dominated by pe-
troleum-based fuels, even in the immediate 2°C 
scenario (Figure 46). This result is confirmed 

Figure 45. Low-emissions electricity share 
at the global level 
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The boxplots represent the results from the FullTech-450-OPT (right) and 
FullTech-450-HST (left) scenarios of the AMPERE study, respectively and 
the horizontal line in the background marks the 2012 historic value (IEA 2014).
Figure 46. Carbon intensity of transport fuels, including 
indirect emissions from electricity and hydrogen generation
gCO2/MJ
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
-2.5
-4.7 -6.3
-45.4 -43.9 -38.6
2015
205020302050203020502030
Immediate−2°CBridge−2°CINDC−2°C
Source: REMIND model analysis
The horizontal line at the top marks the 2015 model value, as an equivalent 
accounting by the IEA is not available.
by the analysis of INDC-based transformation 
pathways for six major economies in Section 2. 
By mid-century, however, a profound change of 
the transport sector is foreseen in all 2°C com-
patible scenarios, with electro-mobility and 
Coal with CCS
Coal
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Figure 44. Annual rate of change in GHG emissions
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The colored bars denote the scenarios of this study, while the boxplots show 
results from the FullTech-450-OPT (right) and FullTech-450-HST (left) scenarios 
of the AMPERE study, respectively. The boxes denote the interquartile range, 
while the whiskers show the full range. Two outliers in the AMPERE study 
(scenarios with >800EJ potential for biomass) are represented by dots.
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but is not effective in stopping the further build-up 
of very carbon-intensive infrastructure. Therefore 
one of the most striking differences between the 
INDC and the 2°C scenario in 2030 is the much 
higher use of coal, while gas consumption differ-
ences are much smaller and there is hardly any 
change in oil consumption (Figure 48). 
Annex 8.2. shows the development of carbon 
prices over time in the different world regions. 
Importantly, the carbon prices until 2030 are not 
necessarily reflecting the marginal costs of abat-
ing an additional ton of emissions, but are in-
dicative of the marginal effort required to reach 
2030 emissions cuts beyond those reductions 
achieved through sectoral or technology policies 
that were included in the model analysis for sev-
eral major economies. Such policies drive down 
the explicit carbon price that would emerge in 
an emissions trading system imposed in conjunc-
tion with them (Bertram et al., 2015). In order 
to derive more robust conclusions on the carbon 
price implications of INDCs, more explicit state-
ments in future communication by parties on the 
intended policies to reach INDC emission targets 
would be important.  
Nevertheless, it appears to be a robust finding 
that the focus of policy INDCs is placed on renew-
able energy support schemes. Such support is not 
a bad thing, indeed it is necessary. However, it 
needs to be complemented by measures to limit 
Figure 47. Primary energy deployment of different low-carbon technologies in 2030
Note: Modern biomass excludes traditional biomass use and biomass deployment with CCS, and therefore is higher in the INDC scenario than in the Immediate scenario. 
The horizontal line in the background marks the 2012 historic value (IEA 2014) with the exception of modern biomass, for which an equivalent accounting is not available. 
Direct equivalent accounting method is used for non-combustible fuels.
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biofuels providing each significant shares of total 
mobility50. 
When separating low-carbon energy supply by 
technology (Figure 47) it can be seen that espe-
cially for wind power, the INDC scenario already 
comes close to the deployment level in the Imme-
diate 2oC scenario. On the other hand, particularly 
high deployment gaps between the “INDC” and 
the “2°C” scenario can be observed for the CCS 
technologies. Gas-CCS only receives explicit sup-
port under the Chinese low-carbon target of 20% 
of primary energy consumption. Bio-CCS is only 
supported by carbon price revenues for the carbon 
dioxide removed from the atmosphere, which is in 
most regions not enough to incentivize its deploy-
ment, so that there is more biomass deployment 
without CCS in the INDC scenario.
From Table A.1 in the Annex it can be seen that 
the majority of technology policies are targeted to 
the support of renewable energy. This is an effec-
tive means of increasing the share of low-carbon 
technologies in electricity generation (Figure 45), 
50. The carbon intensity of transport fuels in 2050 is slight-
ly lower in the INDC-2°C scenario than in the immedi-
ate 2°C scenario, as the higher effective carbon prices in 
the long-term lead to less remaining petroleum-based 
vehicles. Given the shorter lifetime of vehicles com-
pared to power generating infrastructure, this effect of 
higher effective carbon prices in the post-2030 period is 
already visible in 2050.
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further carbon lock-in such as emissions regula-
tion of coal-fired power plants or a carbon price. 
Those measures are equally important as low-car-
bon technology support measures to achieve the 
desired emissions reductions in the short and long 
terms (Bertram et al., 2015).
The significant increase in emissions reductions 
rates between 2020-30 and 2030-50 is reflected 
in a substantial increase of the carbon price after 
2030 in the INDC-2°C scenario. Due to more mod-
erate mitigation action until 2030, post-2030 car-
bon prices in the INDC-2°C scenario reach higher 
values than in the 2°C scenario, again signifying 
the scope of the mitigation challenge to stay below 
the 2oC limit after 2030.  
4.4. Impacts of an Early 
Strengthening and 
Extension of INDCs 
The analysis of the INDC-2°C scenario shows that 
an abrupt shift of policy would be needed to still 
achieve the 2°C target after following the INDC 
trajectory until 2030. Therefore, one important 
element of the Paris Agreement to be negotiated 
later this year will be the provision of mecha-
nisms for strengthening ambition levels over time 
towards the goal of limiting warming to 2°C. Incre-
mental strengthening of INDCs for the post-2030 
period alone is unlikely to cause the trend-break 
needed to reach 2°C. The rate of transformation 
of the global energy system needs to be increased 
already in the decade 2020-30 beyond what is 
implied by the INDCs. There are three complemen-
tary ways of doing so:
 m Increasing the ambition of existing INDC targets 
for the years 2025 or 2030. This has the advan-
tage of bringing short-term commitments fur-
ther in line with the 2°C goal, thus re-affirming 
the commitment to the long-term goal. Howe-
ver, it may have the disadvantage of not provi-
ding a sufficient timeframe for implementing 
the short-term commitments.    
 m Adopting much more ambitious, transformatio-
nal INDC targets for the post-2030 period. This 
has the advantage of providing a longer-time 
horizon for the necessary deep transformation. 
If relevant actors, e.g. in the energy sector, per-
ceive such a policy commitment to be credible, 
they will in anticipation adjust their investment 
decisions early on (Bosetti et al 2009, Blanford 
et al 2009). However, if the required degree of 
strengthening post-2030 commitments becomes 
too large, actors may doubt that they will be fol-
lowed through with.  
 m Committing to and adopting new policies for de-
cade 2020-2030 and the period beyond. This has 
the advantage of targeting particular aspects of 
the transformation (such as the deployment of 
CCS, or electrification of transport), and can 
also make targets more credible.  Given the 
need to adopt policies targeted to the reduc-
tion of fossil fuel use in addition to low-carbon 
support policies, announcements of measures 
establishing an implicit or explicit carbon price 
could be particularly effective in stabilizing 
Figure 48. Deployment of unabated fossil energy in 2030
Note: Total gas consumption varies less than shown here, as the deployment of gas with CCS (see Figure 47) partly compensates the lower consumption in the Bridge-2°C
and especially the Immediate-2°C scenario. The horizontal line in the background marks the 2012 historic value (IEA 2014)
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over the period 2020-2030 are 47% higher in the 
“Bridge-2°C” than in the “INDC-2°C” scenario. This 
helps to close the “investment gap” to the “Imme-
diate-2oC” scenario significantly. While the INDCs 
mobilize only around 60% of the investments de-
ployed in the “Immediate-2oC” scenario over the 
period 2020-30, already 85% of these investments 
are mobilized in the “Bridge-2oC” scenario. Also, 
the “Bridge-2oC” scenario allows for a smoother 
increase in investment volumes after 2030. While 
average annual investment volume for the period 
2030-50 would only increase by 50% in the “Imme-
diate-2oC” scenario relative to 2020-30, they would 
double in the bridge scenario, and would even 
have to triple in the “INDC-2oC” scenario. Cumu-
lative investment in low-carbon power generation 
over the period 2020-2050 is around $30-32 tril-
lion (undiscounted) in all three scenarios achiev-
ing shares of low-carbon electricity generation be-
tween 87-91% in 2050 (see Figure 45).     
The “Bridge-2oC” scenario also has significant 
implications for the gradual phase-out of invest-
ments into new freely-emitting fossil fuel power 
generation, thus helping to prevent a carbon bub-
ble of investments that would be stranded by a 
sharp strengthening of climate policies.  As can be 
seen in Figure 49 (left panel), the INDCs as cur-
rently proposed are not enough to initiate a sig-
nificant reduction of investments into fossil fuel 
power generation until 2030 compared to present 
investor expectations and enhancing the credi-
bility of the climate policy commitment.
These three strategies are therefore complemen-
tary. We therefore propose that: by 2020 at the 
latest, countries strengthen existing INDCs for 
2025 or 2030 and adopt ambitious post-2030 IN-
DCs, along with the commitment to adopt and 
implement specific policies to strengthen the 
energy system transition in the decade 2020-
2030 and beyond.
To illustrate the significant effect such a cred-
ible commitment would have, we analyse in this 
section the “Bridge-2°C” scenario that provides a 
bridge between the INDCs as starting point and 
the 2oC goal. This scenario assumes the same poli-
cies of “INDC-2°C”, i.e. moderate ambition levels 
until 2030 and a significant increase thereafter, 
but allows for anticipation of the rapid increase in 
effective carbon pricing after 2030 that maintain-
ing the 2°C limit would entail. As can be seen in 
Figure 43, the anticipation of such a rapid increase 
after 2030 leads to strong overachievement of the 
2030 emission targets implied by the INDCs, as fur-
ther investments into carbon-intensive infrastruc-
ture would not be economical in such a scenario. 
Instead, investments are redirected into low-car-
bon energy technologies early on. As shown in Fig-
ure 49 (right panel), average annual investments 
into low-carbon electricity generation capacities 
Figure 49. Average annual investment into power generation capacity
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levels, while the “Bridge-2oC” scenario would re-
duce such investments over the period 2020-30 
by one third (compared to cutting 2020-30 high 
carbon investments in half in the “Immediate-2oC” 
scenario). Both the “Bridge-2oC” and “INDC-2oC” 
scenarios cut investments into fossil fuel power 
generation over the period 2030-50 by a further 
70-80% compared to the period 2020-30. This en-
ables the “Bridge-2oC” to reach substantially lower 
levels of residual investments into freely emitting 
fossil-fuel power plants over the period 2030-50 
than in the “INDC-2oC” scenario (15% vs 28% of 
investment levels in 2012), again constraining the 
risk of a carbon bubble and stranded assets.    
As a result of this early restructuring of energy 
investments, the energy transformation and emis-
sions trajectory is much smoother and thus in no 
point of time exhibits the abrupt changes appar-
ent in the “INDC-2°C” scenario in 2030 or in the 
“Immediate-2°C” scenario in 2015. As can be seen 
from Figure 43, the “Bridge-2oC” scenario leads 
to an additional reduction of about 5 GtCO2eq/yr 
from projected INDC levels in 2030, constituting 
a substantial overachievement of currently pro-
posed INDCs. From the respective columns in Fig-
ures 44-46, we see that the challenges of reaching 
the 2°C target are considerably reduced compared 
to the “INDC-2°C” scenario, as the additional early 
action in terms of restricting coal use (Figure 48) 
and expanding low-carbon options (Figure 45 and 
Figure 47) reduces the pressure on the necessary 
decarbonisation rates post-2030 (Figure 44). In 
that context it is noteworthy to mention that this 
advantage might even be bigger than what the 
model results imply, as the model cannot capture 
all the path-dependencies (e.g. on the demand 
side, in the development of technologies etc.) 
that might make an abrupt trend-break as in the 
INDC-2°C scenario difficult to realize. 
The “Bridge-2oC” scenario highlights the key 
advantages of a credible commitment to strength-
en ambition levels. It helps to avoid the abrupt 
changes implied in the “INDC-2oC” scenario by 
means of stabilizing expectations of relevant ac-
tors early on.  The obvious challenge for this effect 
to happen is to establish sufficient credibility, as 
uncertainty over the implementation of the poli-
cies and their strengthening in the future would 
weaken the effect of anticipation. Such credibility 
will likely have to build on mechanisms to raise 
ambition levels of both existing (2025 or 2030) 
and future (post-2030) commitments, accom-
panied with specific policy commitments to ad-
dress crucial aspects of the transition (carbon 
pricing, technology innovation + deployment 
etc). If the Paris Agreement includes transparent 
mechanisms to strengthen this policy ambition, 
the “Bridge-2°C” scenario shows that it could pro-
vide the needed signal for the timely adjustment 
of investment decisions, avoiding carbon lock-in 
and stranded assets and enabling early deploy-
ment of key mitigation options.  
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5. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
This report has investigated the impact of INDCs 
on the energy sector in five countries and one 
region, as well as at the global level in aggregate. 
Other reports from the UNFCCC and UNEP will 
provide cutting-edge analysis of the impact of 
INDCs on aggregate emissions by 2030, and of the 
implications thereof in the light of the 2°C trajec-
tory. This analysis complements those studies.  In 
addition to aggregate emissions trajectories, the 
INDCs should be judged in terms of their capacity 
to catalyse a transformation of energy systems that 
would allow their deep decarbonisation by 2050. 
By 2030, multiple pathways can lead to a given 
emissions level, but not all of them are compat-
ible with this deep decarbonisation, if for example 
the necessary long-term technologies are not 
adequately prepared or if infrastructure decisions 
lock-in high carbon economic and social structures 
(such as sprawling, inefficient cities). It is there-
fore crucial to understand the concrete technolog-
ical, infrastructural and policy changes that INDCs 
would imply. Doing so can also help to formulate 
post-Paris policy recommendations. 
This report concludes with 
three main findings: 
In the analysis of this report, INDCs accelerate and 
consolidate action on climate change in key major 
economies and at the global level. A significant 
transition appears in the electricity sector, with the 
dynamic of technology deployment approaching 
what is required for 2°C. In aggregate from 2010 
to 2030 the carbon intensity of electricity produc-
tion declines by 40% in the five countries and 
one region assessed. At the global level, the 
deployment of low-carbon electricity production 
under the global INDC scenario is 41% in 2030, 
an increase of roughly 10 percentage points from 
2012 levels, but still below what is seen in 2030 
in 2°C scenarios. Similar positive trends are seen 
regarding energy efficiency in the end-use sectors: 
transport, buildings and industry. Transport in 
particular would see significant improvements 
in energy intensity, falling in aggregate by 30% 
between 2010 and 2030 in the in the five countries 
and one region assessed individually. In Japan and 
the European Union, the energy intensity of GDP 
drops a further 33% and 34% between 2010 and 
2030, while it drops 48% in China over the same 
time period. In the USA, energy intensity of GDP 
drops 26% between 2010 and 2025. The whole 
process towards the Paris negotiations has estab-
lished a positive dynamic on which future policy 
and business strategies can build. 
There appears to be uneven progress on address-
ing the drivers of GHG emissions, when we consid-
er what actions are projected to underpin the im-
plementation of INDCs. Some crucial low-carbon 
solutions, like CCS, electric vehicles, advanced 
biofuels, sustainable urban planning, appear un-
likely to be developed under the INDCs at the scale 
and speed required for a 2°C scenario, given the 
implied lock-in of carbon-intensive infrastructure 
in 2030 under the INDC scenario. By 2030, unabat-
ed coal deployment is more than twice as high in 
the global INDC scenario developed for this paper 
than in the immediate 2°C scenario. However, the 
national and global INDC scenarios demonstrate 
little deployment of CCS, with a share of CCS in 
electricity generation of about 3% in 2030 for the 
USA, China, Japan and the EU. Yet, given the scale 
of fossil fuel infrastructure in 2030 under the INDC 
scenario, it seems that CCS will need to be a cru-
cial technology for mitigation post-2030. The risks 
of lock-in into high carbon infrastructures and 
technologies thus appear significant, if the INDC 
trajectory is followed to 2030. Future international 
cooperation and national policy should also focus 
on accelerating specific crucial solutions, such as 
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innovation and deployment of post-2030 mitiga-
tion options and limiting carbon lock-in. 
The INDCs are an entry point to put the world 
on a trajectory towards 2°C, but as currently sub-
mitted may not be enough to keep the below 2°C 
goal in reach. The global INDC scenario in this 
report showing emissions of 54 GtCO2eq51  in 2030 
is above the emissions range of cost-effective sce-
narios consistent with the below 2°C goal as esti-
mated by the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (30-
50 Gt CO2e in 2030).  With this level of emissions 
in 2030, emissions reductions would need to be 
extremely rapid after 2030, in the order of 4-5% 
51. Source: REMIND model and PBL INDC Tool.
per year, if the below 2°C objective is to be met. 
This rate of reduction would imply significant risks 
to feasibility and high costs. For this reason, this 
report develops a bridge scenario representing a 
situation in which by 2020 targets and policies for 
2030 are strengthened, and ideally new ambitious 
targets proposed for the period after 2030. The re-
port shows that this can lower global emissions in 
2030 substantially to around 49 GtCO2eq/yr, close 
to the upper bound of the range of cost-effective 
2°C scenarios in AR5, amounting to an overachieve-
ment of current INDCs by more than 5 GtCO2eq/yr 
in 2030. The Paris agreement should establish a 
clear mechanism to allow the regular, predictable 
and timely revision of national contributions and 
the global framework. 
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ANNEX 
REMIND-MAgPIE assumptions 
for modelling the energy and 
emissions impact of the INDCs
This study wants to contribute an understanding 
of the global energy system transformation impli-
cations of the INDCs, as well as of challenges for 
reaching 2°C in both a scenario following the 
INDC trajectory until 2030 and a scenario that 
foresees strengthening trough anticipation of 
post-2030 policies in 2020. The implementation 
of the scenarios in the model REMIND (Bauer et 
al. 2012, Luderer et al. 2013, Bertram et al. 2015) 
therefore tries to both capture the emission and 
energy system impacts adequately, employing 
a best-guess strategy in light of the considerable 
uncertainties related to actual policy implementa-
tion. Furthermore, due to the limited sectoral and 
regional model resolution, a stylized representa-
tion of policies is used. 
At the core of most INDCs is a statement about 
emission targets, either specified in absolute terms 
or relative to a base year or a reference scenario 
trajectory without INDC policies. We represent this 
emissions component of the INDCs by prescribing 
emission targets for the year 2030 (2025 in the case 
of the USA) and implementing a region-specific 
exponentially increasing carbon price from 2020-
2030 to make the model reach these bounds. As 
a minimum, we impose a 1$/t CO2 carbon price 
even if the quantity target is non-binding, to rep-
resent the effect of the diverse policies mentioned 
in different INDCs. The carbon prices reflect the 
marginal effort required to reach 2030 emissions 
cuts beyond those cuts achieved through technolo-
gy policies that are included in the model analysis 
for several major economies (see below). Table  A 
below details the calculation of emission targets 
for the REMIND model regions based on the infor-
mation contained in the INDCs. As the exact deter-
mination of the 2030 emission level to be expected 
from the INDC is not the core goal of this exercise, 
we build on the work of PBL (PBL 2015) that has 
performed detailed country-level analysis of the 
emissions implications of INDCs for a large num-
ber of countries. We adjust our assumptions for 
countries for which we lack exact 2030 emission 
quantity information to arrive at a global 2030 
emission level comparable to the best estimate of 
PBL.
Most so far enacted climate policies don’t take 
the form of comprehensive carbon pricing but are 
rather targeted sectoral or technology policies to 
foster low-carbon technologies and to limit emis-
sion intensive technologies. Therefore, we addi-
tionally represent in a stylized way a number of 
these policies in the regions which have announced 
such policies or associated targets in their INDC or 
national climate and energy plans (see second col-
umn of Table  A). 
The REMIND model captures the full basket of 
greenhouse gases from fossil fuel use, industry 
and land use. For the implementation of the IN-
DCs, land-use change emissions are constrained to 
exogenous trajectories. These have been derived 
with the land use model MAgPIE (Lotze-Campen 
et al. 2008, Popp et al. 2014), taking into account 
targets to limit deforestation and enhancing natu-
ral sinks, e.g. through afforestation, as announced 
in INDCs of various countries. We consider land-re-
lated INDCs from Brazil, Argentina and China. For 
Latin America (largely based on the land-use re-
lated INDCs of Brazil and Argentina), we assume a 
reduction of annual deforestation by 80% until the 
year 2030 compared to the baseline year 2005. Af-
ter 2030, we assume that the deforestation rate of 
Latin America remains constant. Based on China’s 
INDC announcement, we assume that historical 
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Table A. Overview of regional policies represented in the INDC scenarios of Chapter 4
Region
Emission target for 2030 (2025 for USA), implemented in the model via 
increasing carbon prices over the period 2020-2030
Additional energy sector policies for regions 
AFR 
(Subsahara Africa without 
South Africa)
Target calculated based on INDC statistics: 
1. Countries without INDC (representing 28% of 2012 emissions of the AFR region) 
are assumed to follow their baseline.
2. For bigger countries with quantified 2030 targets (28% of 2012 emissions), the 
sum of their absolute 2030 targets (calculated from the specified reductions of 
national BAU projections) is used. 
3. Countries with INDC referring to emission reduction relative to BAU, but without 
specifying their BAU assumption (44% of 2012 emissions) are assumed to have 
half the relative reduction than those with quantified INDC (measured against the 
REMIND BAU). 
For the allocation of 2030 BAU emissions onto these three country groups, it is 
assumed that their emission share in 2012 remains roughly unchanged until 2030.
CHN
(China)
Emission intensity of GDP -65% in 2030 vs. 2005
100(200) GW solar in 2020 (2030), 200(400) 
GW wind in 2020 (2030); Low-carbon PE share 
increasing linearly from 16% in 2020 to 20% in 
2030 and beyond (accounting for renewable and 
nuclear electricity with assumed 45% efficiency); 
10% gas share in 2020 
EUR
(EU-28)
-40% GHG below 1990
Renewable secondary energy share (in gross final 
energy as defined by EU) of 20% in 2020, 27% in 
2030 and increasing with 0.5pp per year beyond
IND
(India)
Emission intensity of GDP -34% in 2030 vs. 2005 
100(180) GW solar in 2022(2030), 65(110) GW 
wind in 2022(2030). 40% non-fossil based 
electricity capacity share in 2030.
JPN
(Japan)
-25.4% GHG below 2005
Bound on fossil fuels in transport, increasing in 
ambition over time from -13% below BAU in 2020 
to -70% in 2100.
MEA
(North Africa, Middle East, 
and Asian Countries of the 
Former Soviet Union) 
Countries without INDC (representing 80% of 2012 emission of the MEA region) 
are assumed to follow their baseline, for countries assessed by PBL* (10% of 2012 
emissions), the abatement relative to BAU is taken from the PBL analysis, and half 
of that is assumed for further countries with INDC (10% of 2012 emissions). 
For the allocation of 2030 BAU emissions onto these three country groups, it is 
assumed that their emission share in 2012 remains roughly unchanged until 2030.
LAM 
(Latin America)
Countries without INDC (representing 29% of 2012 emission of the LAM region) 
are assumed to follow their baseline, for countries assessed by PBL* (57% of 2012 
emissions) the abatement relative to BAU is taken from the PBL analysis, and half 
of that is assumed for further countries with INDC (14% of 2012 emissions). 
For the allocation of 2030 BAU emissions onto these three country groups, it is 
assumed that their emission share in 2012 remains roughly unchanged until 2030.
OAS 
(Other Asia, excluding 
China, India, Japan, Middle 
Eastern and Former Soviet 
Union Countries)
Countries without INDC (representing 15% of 2012 emission of the OAS region) 
are assumed to follow their baseline, for countries assessed by PBL* (57% of 2012 
emissions) the abatement relative to BAU is taken from the PBL analysis, and half 
of that is assumed for further countries with INDC (29% of 2012 emissions). 
For the allocation of 2030 BAU emissions onto these three country groups, it is 
assumed that their emission share in 2012 remains roughly unchanged until 2030.
ROW
(Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada, South Africa, 
Other Europe excluding 
EU-28 and Russia)
PBL database* contains INDC emission levels for 12 countries that have submitted 
INDCs, mostly with absolute 2030 emission targets, representing close to 100% 
of emissions of the ROW region in 2012; we use the sum of the 2030 value for 
those 12 countries scaled with EmissionsREMIND,ROW (2005)/EmissionsPBL,12countries 
(2005), in order to reflect the trend of the PBL analysis for this region.
RUS
(Russia)
-35% GHG below 1990
USA -27% GHG below 2005 (in 2025)
No new freely emitting coal power plants from 
2020 onwards, bound on fossil fuels in transport, 
increasing in ambition over time from -13% 
below BAU in 2020 to -70% in 2100.
*We use the “INDC emissions 2030 - Conditional PBL best estimate” values for all countries for which PBL analysis is used.
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Figure A.1. CO2 prices in the scenarios of this study
INDC–extended INDC−2°C Bridge−2°C Immediate−2°C
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Note: The implicit carbon prices shown here do not reflect the stringency level of the overall INDC of a region, as for some regions, additional policies are represented in 
the modelling that depress the prices shown here (see table 1 in the annex). As all countries are likely to implement dedicated technology policies, actual carbon prices 
in a trading scheme or a carbon tax scheme will be lower for regions for which the complementary policies are not yet represented.  Monetary values are given in 
$US-2012. REMIND 2005 monetary values are scaled by 1.18 for conversion to 2012. 
Source: REMIND model analysis
(2005) afforestation trends in China continue un-
til 2020, resulting in 40 Mha additional forest area. 
For the time after 2020, we assume that afforesta-
tion rates in China decline by 2%/yr. 
The REMIND model features perfect foresight, 
so that the level of policies assumed post-2030 has 
an impact on the way mitigation targets until 2030 
are met. Therefore, we assume a continuation of 
a steady but moderate increase of ambition level 
in both the pricing and technology policies. For 
the carbon pricing, an exponential increase with 
1.25% p.a., overlaid with a convergence of regional 
prices towards a medium trajectory is assumed, so 
that all regions experience a price increase and the 
spread between them narrows over time. For the 
technology targets as well, a moderate increase of 
stringency over time is assumed.
An overview of the REMIND model can be found 
in the supplementary material of Bertram et al. 
(2015), and a detailed documentation of REMIND 
can be found here: 
http://www.pik-potsdam.de/research/
sustainable-solutions/models/remind/
description-of-remind-v1.5
Carbon Price Representation in 
the REMIND Model under INDC 
Scenario and 2°C scenarios
The figure above shows the CO2 prices in the four 
policy scenarios. Note that they do not reflect the 
stringency level of the overall INDC of a region, 
as for some regions, additional policies are repre-
sented in the modelling that depress the prices 
shown here (see Table  A in the annex). As all 
countries are likely to implement dedicated tech-
nology policies, actual carbon prices in an emis-
sions trading scheme or a carbon tax scheme will 
be lower for regions for which the complementary 
policies are not yet represented.
Co-benefit calculations
For the air pollution analysis, we used scenarios 
from the LIMITS modelling framework to estab-
lish the relationship between the greenhouse gas 
emission reductions and air pollutant changes 
using a delayed climate stabilization scenario and 
a business-as-usual projection in five different 
models (AIM, GCAM, IMAGE, MESSAGE, and 
WITCH) in 2030. To establish this relationship 
for each model, we assumed that for a given time 
slice, air-pollution co-benefits scale linearly with 
CO2 emission reductions relative to a baseline 
without climate policy. For each model, the linear 
relationships were then used to project what the 
air pollutant changes would be under that model’s 
assumptions and the INDC and reference levels 
resulting from the country-level analysis by the 
national modelling teams. This results in a range 
of air pollutant emission reductions from the 
INDC greenhouse gas emission reduction rela-
tive to the reference pathways. Because of known 
limitations, the co-benefits in 2030 can be overes-
timated relative to what global models would have 
simulated. All scenarios model a continuation and 
successful implementation of current air quality 
policies. 
To estimate the net-energy import depend-
ence implications of INDCs, we used scenarios 
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from LIMITS, AMPERE, and EMF27 under differ-
ent climate and technology policy assumptions. 
For each region-model combination, a linear 
regression was run on the full scenario set for 
2030 to estimate the relationship between emis-
sions and net-energy trade. This relationship was 
then used in conjunction with the country-level 
results from national teams to project the range 
of change in net-energy imports under that re-
gion’s INDCs. The linear regression relationships 
were established for energy importing regions 
using six models for the EU (DNE, IMAGE, MES-
SAGE, POLES, REMIND, and WITCH), five mod-
els for China (DNE, IMAGE, POLES, REMIND, 
and WITCH) and four models for Japan (DNE, 
IMAGE, POLES, and REMIND). MESSAGE was 
excluded from the analysis because it depicts 
China as becoming an energy exporter in the 21st 
century whereas all the other models depict the 
country as an energy importer. ❚
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